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Malware

Banshee Stealer

Tracked since Feb 8, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingCrypto theftExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
macOS

Banshee Stealer is a macOS information-stealing malware family that emerged in August 2024 and supports both Intel x86_64 and Apple Silicon ARM64 systems. It was marketed on underground forums as a malware-as-a-service offering with a subscription price of $3,000 per month. Its source code leaked in November 2024, after which the original operation shut down; the leaked code subsequently enabled the development of additional variants.

Banshee collects browser login credentials, cookies, browsing history, macOS Keychain material, cryptocurrency-wallet data, and information from approximately 100 browser extensions. Supported browsers include Chrome, Firefox, Brave, Edge, Vivaldi, Yandex, Opera, OperaGX, and Safari, although the analyzed Safari collection functionality was limited to cookies. Targeted wallets include Exodus, Electrum, Coinomi, Guarda, Wasabi Wallet, Atomic, and Ledger. It also collects Apple Notes data, selected documents and key-related files from user folders, hardware and software information, and the host's public IP address.

The malware uses deceptive AppleScript dialogs claiming that system settings must be updated to capture the user's macOS password, then validates the supplied credentials locally. It performs debugger and virtual-machine checks, and early samples avoid execution when Russian is the preferred system language. It also mutes system audio during collection. Collected data is staged temporarily, compressed with the macOS ditto utility, XOR-encrypted, Base64-encoded, and exfiltrated to a remote server through an HTTP POST request using cURL. Early analyzed samples retained C++ symbols and debugging information and lacked sophisticated obfuscation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

BANSHEE stealer executes AppleScripts; interestingly, it writes the AppleScripts to the same file /tmp/tempAppleScript.

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence1

BANSHEE stealer executes AppleScripts... it writes the AppleScripts to the same file /tmp/tempAppleScript.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The zip file is then XOR encrypted and base64 encoded.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

BANSHEE Stealer supports basic evasion techniques, relies on the sysctl API to detect debugging and checks for virtualization by running a command to see if “Virtual” appears in the hardware model identifier.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

It runs the command system_profiler SPHardwareDataType | grep 'Model Identifier' to determine whether the string Virtual appears in the hardware model identifier.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence4

It detects debugging by utilizing the sysctl API.

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1003.006DCSyncEvidence1

It copies the keychain of the system /Library/Keychains/login.keychain-db to <temporary_path>/Passwords.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

The malware creates an Osascript password prompt... When the user enters the password, it will be validated using the dscl command.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

Regarding Safari, only the cookies are collected by the AppleScript script for the current version.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

Wallets.cpp [is] responsible for collecting data from cryptocurrency wallets... Exodus, Electrum, Coinomi, Guarda, Wasabi Wallet, Atomic, Ledger.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

These credentials can be leveraged to decrypt the keychain data stored on the system, granting access to all saved passwords.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

BANSHEE collects data from 9 different browsers currently, including browser history, cookies, logins, etc.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

Researchers at Elastic Security Labs analyzed the malware and confirmed it can steal keychain passwords and data from multiple browsers.

Discovery

8 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

It gets the machine's public IP by requesting it from freeipapi.com through the built-in macOS cURL command.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

When the user enters the password, it will be validated using the dscl command by running dscl Local/Default -authonly <username> <password>.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The function System::collectSystemInfo collects system information... It executes the command system_profiler SPSoftware DataType SPHardwareDataType.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

It then collects various files from the system... Files with the following extensions .txt, .docx, .rtf, .doc, .wallet, .keys, or .key from the Desktop and Documents folders.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

BANSHEE Stealer supports basic evasion techniques, relies on the sysctl API to detect debugging and checks for virtualization by running a command to see if “Virtual” appears in the hardware model identifier.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

It runs the command system_profiler SPHardwareDataType | grep 'Model Identifier' to determine whether the string Virtual appears in the hardware model identifier.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence5

It parses the user-preferred canonicalized language returned from the CFLocaleCopyPreferredLanguages API and looks for the string ru.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence4

It detects debugging by utilizing the sysctl API.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

It then collects various files... .txt, .docx, .rtf, .doc, .wallet, .keys, or .key from the Desktop and Documents folders.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

The malware creates an Osascript password prompt... When the user enters the password, it will be validated using the dscl command.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

After the malware finishes collecting data, it first ZIP compresses the temporary folder using the ditto command.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

After the malware finishes collecting data, it first ZIP compresses the temporary folder using the ditto command.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence3

The zip file is then XOR encrypted and base64 encoded and sent through a post request to the URL.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

[The data is] sent through a post request to the URL: http://45.142.122[.]92/send/.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

[The archive is] sent through a post request to the URL: http://45.142.122[.]92/send/ with the built-in cURL command.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.