MalwareUsed by 1 actor

GSRAT

GSRAT is an AutoIt-based remote access trojan (RAT) observed since at least February 2025 and attributed in the provided reporting to activity associated with the North Korea-linked threat actor Konni. The malware was described in connection with spear-phishing campaigns, including a May 2025 campaign targeting organizations associated with Japanese financial institutions and domestic financial-sector-related organizations. Reported infection chains used spear-phishing with LNK and ZIP files, and persistence was established via the Startup folder and scheduled tasks. The content directly associates GSRAT with Konni operations and financial-sector targeting in Japan. No specific indicators of compromise are provided in the source content beyond the malware name, delivery chain elements, and persistence mechanisms.

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

KONNI

...attacks leveraging “GSRAT,” an AutoIt-based RAT observed since February 2025 and attributed to activity associated with the North Korea-linked threat actor “Konni.”

via jpcert blogblogs.jpcert.or.jp

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

"Initial access was achieved... via spear-phishing emails"; "attackers conducted a spear-phishing campaign... distributed malicious links"

Execution

5 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"Persistence was achieved... creating scheduled tasks"

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

"ultimately launched AutoIt. The compiled AutoIt script containing GSRAT then communicated with its C2 server"

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

"infection then proceeded through VBS and BAT scripts"

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

"infection then proceeded through VBS and BAT scripts"

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

"download ZIP archives containing shortcut (LNK) files disguised as documents. When the LNK file was executed..."

Persistence

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"Persistence was achieved... creating scheduled tasks"

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"Persistence was achieved by registering the malware in the Startup folder"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

"Persistence was achieved... creating scheduled tasks"

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"Persistence was achieved by registering the malware in the Startup folder"

Stealth

1 technique

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"decrypts data embedded in its resources using XOR and AES"; "strengthened string obfuscation"; "obfuscated script ran"

Command and Control

1 technique

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"downloaded malicious configuration data, leading to malware delivery"; "downloading and extracting additional payloads"

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

jpcert blogNews

Feb 20, 2026

JSAC2026 -Day 1- - JPCERT/CC Eyes | JPCERT Coordination Center official Blog

AutoIt-based RAT delivered via spear-phishing (LNK/ZIP chain) with persistence via Startup folder and scheduled tasks; provides remote shell, file operations, enumeration, and execution; observed variants include JSON comms and custom delimiters.

ctoatncsc substackNews

Feb 1, 2026

CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending February 1st

AutoIt-based RAT delivered via spearphishing using an LNK plus AutoIt script; associated with Konni activity targeting Japan-linked financial organizations.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping9

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

GSRAT