JDY botnet is a botnet observed by Dragos being used in a Volt Typhoon–correlated activity cluster tracked as Voltzite. In the reported campaign, the JDY botnet was used to scan public-facing IP address ranges and VPN appliances, targeting organizations in the energy, oil, gas, and defense sectors. Dragos reported no confirmed exploitation during this scanning phase and assessed with moderate confidence that the activity was intended for pre-staging future intrusions and potential operational-data exfiltration.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Another campaign involved Voltzite using the JDY botnet to scan for public-facing IP addresses and VPN appliances across energy, oil, gas, and defense sectors.
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
“JDY malware doesn’t directly attack systems. Instead, it collects detailed information about infrastructure to map potential targets. This data is then likely used by other tools to plan exploits, discover vulnerabilities, and carry out actual attacks.”
the botnet now scans the internet for fresh vulnerabilities almost as soon as they are disclosed
Most strikingly, the operators ramped up scans of Fortinet devices right after a new flaw, CVE-2026-35616, went public.
“Black Lotus Labs found a sharp spike in scans of Fortinet devices hours after CVE-2026-35616 was publicly disclosed on April 5, 2026. The botnet didn’t wait for a patch window. It started looking for unpatched devices the same day the flaw became public.”
Some devices are also managed with Platypus, an open-source reverse-shell tool
A lightweight dropper script checks the device architecture, fetches the matching payload, and launches it before wiping itself from disk.
the bots perform multiprotocol scans that grab service banners, TLS certificates, and other fingerprints
Once running, the malware beacons to a central “dispatch service” and pulls scanning tasks on demand.
“The malware itself identifies its host, checks in to the dispatch service via HTTPS with a structured JSON packet describing the system’s OS, architecture, uptime, memory, and malware version, then waits for scanning tasks.”
Operators run it through hidden Tor services that mask both the control and payload servers.
Because so many bots are legitimate U.S. devices, the JDY botnet blends into normal traffic. Consequently, geofencing, IP reputation filters, and static blocklists struggle to catch it.
A lightweight dropper script checks the device architecture, fetches the matching payload, and launches it before wiping itself from disk.
it receives encrypted instructions and updated fingerprinting rules
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.