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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
"UNC5176 campaign distributing URSA... URSA is a backdoor that is capable of stealing login credentials for various banks, cryptocurrency websites, and email clients."
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
For this particular case, Mispadu’s entry vector is spam, similar to past campaigns involving the malware. By sending messages that refer to overdue invoices, attackers create a seemingly urgent situation that then persuades receivers to download a .zip file from malicious URLs.
This zip file contains an MSI (Microsoft Installer file) that has a VBScript... reveal the final VBScript file that executes an AutoIT Loader/Injector.
This zip file contains an MSI (Microsoft Installer file) that has a VBScript. This is followed by three layers of obfuscation that, when deobfuscated, reveal the final VBScript file that executes an AutoIT Loader/Injector.
reveal the final VBScript file that executes an AutoIT Loader/Injector... loads into the memory the final payload: a Delphi file containing the trojan code and processes.
The final VBScript also retrieves data on the operating system version.
“guardrails including anti-VM/Sandbox… if the checks are passed it initiates connections to the C2…”
If the script detects a virtual environment such as the following, the script terminates its execution: Hyper-V VirtualBox VMWare
It also inspects whether the system is using any of the following languages... As aforementioned, the attackers are targeting users whose machines are set to use these identified languages. If the system is using a different language ID from those listed, the attack process stops.
117 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.