Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware

Oski

Tracked since Feb 19, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs779Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageCracked software
Platforms
Windows

Oski Stealer is a Windows information-stealing malware family associated with credential theft and collection of other sensitive host data. It has been observed extracting browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet-related data, screenshots, and system information, and it has shown behavioral overlap with closely related stealer families such as Arkei, Vidar, and possibly Mars, which can complicate precise family attribution in some cases. Reporting has noted code-sharing or lineage links between Oski and other commodity stealers in the Arkei/Vidar ecosystem.

Oski has appeared in multi-stage crimeware delivery chains alongside loaders, banking trojans, and post-exploitation tooling. Documented campaigns delivered it through phishing emails that impersonated copyright complaints and linked victims to malicious documents hosted on legitimate file-sharing services; those documents used macros to retrieve and execute follow-on payloads. Oski has also been distributed through fake coronavirus-themed landing pages reached via malicious router-based traffic redirection, as well as through cracked-software or keygen lures used to deliver stealer payloads.

On infected systems, Oski is associated with browser data theft and exfiltration of collected information in archive form. Observed artifacts linked to Oski-style activity include stolen browser history, screenshots, and host profiling data. Related stealer samples in this cluster have also downloaded browser-support libraries commonly used to access protected data from Firefox and Chromium-derived browsers. Anti-analysis behavior associated with Oski-era stealer variants includes checks for Windows Defender emulator artifacts, a technique also seen across several other commodity stealers.

Oski has circulated in underground markets, including cracked builds offered on cybercrime forums, which lowered the barrier to entry for financially motivated actors. Its use aligns with broad credential-harvesting and information-theft operations rather than narrowly targeted espionage, though campaigns delivering it have affected users across multiple countries and sectors.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584Compromise InfrastructureEvidence1

The majority of the emails contained links to a malicious file hosted on Google Drive... the use of a legitimate web platform for hosting the malicious content may provide another way for the attacker to evade various protections

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The malicious-sites users land on claim to offer an app that provides “the latest information and instructions about coronavirus (COVID-19).” Users who click on the download button are ultimately redirected to one of several Bitbucket pages that offers a file that installs malware.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Cisco Talos recently uncovered a series of email campaigns utilizing links to malicious documents hosted on legitimate file-sharing platforms to spread malware.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

When the URL is accessed, the victim is delivered a malicious file, often a Microsoft Office document... These documents contain malicious macros that initiate the infection process

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The majority of the emails contained links to a malicious file hosted on Google Drive.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

These documents contain malicious macros that initiate the infection process and are responsible for retrieving a malicious payload and executing it to infect the system.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

When the URL is accessed, the victim is delivered a malicious file, often a Microsoft Office document similar to the one in Figure 4.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The crypter used in these campaigns is undergoing active development and improvements to obfuscate the contents of malware payloads.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

the initial malware payloads used the same crypter, which obfuscates the malicious contents present in the binary executable and make analysis more difficult.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

"anti-emulation technique... string comparaison between: The computer name and 'HAL9TH' ... The username and 'JohnDoe'"; "Qbot looked for the existence of an emulator-specific file, C:\INTERNAL\__empty"

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

It fills these allocated buffers with helper functions which are used for further self modifications or unpacking procedures of the payload. The last allocated buffer is then finally filled with the unpacked malware payload.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Known as Oski, the relatively new piece of malware extracts browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallet addresses, and possibly other types of sensitive information.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Stealers commonly capture system configuration data within a text file... let’s start with system.txt.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

"anti-emulation technique... string comparaison between: The computer name and 'HAL9TH' ... The username and 'JohnDoe'"; "Qbot looked for the existence of an emulator-specific file, C:\INTERNAL\__empty"

Collection

2 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

After unpacking the ZIP we can find just a few files... screenshot.jpg

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Once we do that, we can see it looks like the malware uploaded a ZIP archive named USR1V37900ZM7Q.zip.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Threat hunters often focus on spotting command-and-control (C2) servers, open directories typically identified by the phrase “Index of” and phishing components.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

Users who click on the download button are ultimately redirected to one of several Bitbucket pages that offers a file that installs malware.

T1104Multi-Stage ChannelsEvidence1

We also discovered infection chains that deliver multiple payloads to a single victim as part of a multi-stage infection process.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The network activity from the report indicates the sample downloaded mozglue.dll, sqlite3.dll, nss3.dll, freebl3.dll, and a couple others.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Since this file is uploaded over HTTP, it stands to reason that we can carve it out of the network traffic and inspect the contents.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

779 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching779Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.