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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The obfuscation is consistent with the result of MacroPack (an offensive security tool which is available on GitHub) when executed with the --obfuscate-names parameter.
The obfuscation is consistent with the result of MacroPack (an offensive security tool which is available on GitHub) when executed with the --obfuscate-names parameter.
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Since this attack is only used to lure the user, we just have to find a way that x appears to be a valid extension to the user eye, but not a valid extension to Windows Defender. The simplest way to do it is simply to add a space... Unicode propose a lot of space char from different size, including zero width spaces.
Unicode RTLO is an attack consisting into spoofing an extension by injecting a Unicode Right-To-Left-Override character (U+202E). This is possible because Unicode compatible applications will display all char after the RTLO char from right to left. For example, a file called: example[rtlo]fig.exe would be displayed as "exampleexe.gif" to the user.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.