BlackBeard
- Type
- Downloader
- Capabilities
- PersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- MalvertisingDrive by
- Platforms
- Windows
Blackbeard, also known in its click-fraud toolchain as Blackbeard/Pigeon, is a multistage Windows malware family used primarily to generate fraudulent advertising revenue. Samples date to at least 2012, with campaigns targeting computers in the United States documented from mid-2013. Distribution involved malvertising, hidden iframes, and malicious Java applets delivering drive-by infections.
The initial downloader supports both 32-bit and 64-bit execution and retrieves additional modules, including the Pigeon downloader and clickbot components. Later variants integrated previously separate stages and could deliver alternative payloads, including a SOCKS5 proxy. Blackbeard obtains elevated privileges through UAC bypass techniques involving DLL sideloading or exploitation of CVE-2013-3660. It establishes persistence by modifying a protected Windows RPC system library to decrypt and execute a locally stored payload, changing ownership and access permissions and temporarily disabling Windows File Protection. Other techniques include custom packing, encrypted payload storage, process injection, and RSA- and RC4-protected command-and-control communications.
Pigeon performs click fraud through an invisible Internet Explorer automation object. It retrieves browsing tasks, follows advertising redirection chains, modifies browser settings, hooks APIs to suppress visible activity, and simulates mouse movements and clicks to imitate human browsing.
This Windows click-fraud family is distinct from the Rust-based BlackBeard backdoor also called Archer RAT or RUSTRIC, which has been associated with MuddyWater operations targeting Middle Eastern entities.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
«По некоторым публикациям, группа также применяет бэкдор BlackBeard, хотя его точная атрибуция требует дополнительной верификации по первоисточникам Unit 42.»
CHAR shares a similar structure and development environment as the Rust-based malware BlackBeard (aka Archer RAT and RUSTRIC)...
Techniques & procedures
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
The infection chain starts with malvertising, where malicious redirection is incorporated into the script code of an infected advertisement.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
An infection chain runs through a malvertising campaign with Java exploitation and ends up dropping a payload with the filename ‘notepad.exe’.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
The suspected malvertising code is JavaScript... An iframe with very small dimensions is injected via the document.writeln method.
If we put a fake cryptbase.dll library into the sysprep directory, it will load the fake library instead of the real one. Sysprep is an elevated process, so everything it loads is also elevated.
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The reply to the second POST request is encrypted with RC4. It contains the main module, which is then decrypted, injected into the svchost.exe process, and executed.
The third function (0x4086c0) exploits CVE-2013-3660 [ 8 ]. If this function succeeds, a standard user can run programs under administrator privileges.
The system API ShellExecuteW is resolved with the parameter ‘runas’ to run a file with elevated privileges... The code uses the System Preparation tool (sysprep.exe)... If we put a fake cryptbase.dll library into the sysprep directory, it will load the fake library instead of the real one.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
A malicious Java applet is loaded, which creates and drops the notepad.exe file into the %TEMP% directory.
The reply to the second POST request is encrypted with RC4. It contains the main module, which is then decrypted, injected into the svchost.exe process, and executed.
Instead of modifying the above-mentioned registry keys, an important system DLL is patched so that the payload is executed every time the operating system starts.
The processor architecture is decided by the GetNativeSystemInfo function. The expected result is either 0x00 or 0x09, which stands for PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_INTEL (x86) or PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_AMD64 (x64), respectively.
If we put a fake cryptbase.dll library into the sysprep directory, it will load the fake library instead of the real one. Sysprep is an elevated process, so everything it loads is also elevated.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The malware then creates a new access control list (ACL) with two access control entries (ACE): current user and SYSTEM. This access list is then assigned (using SetNamedSecurityInfoW) to the rpcss.dll file.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
The bot first collects system identification data... ‘p’ is the platform (1=x86, 2=x64); ‘os’ is the operating system name; ‘v’, ‘vc’ and ‘b’ are probably version, subversion and build version respectively
The processor architecture is decided by the GetNativeSystemInfo function. The expected result is either 0x00 or 0x09, which stands for PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_INTEL (x86) or PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_AMD64 (x64), respectively.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
Communication with the C&C server is encrypted... The initial post always starts with ‘0|’... The second POST request to the C&C server is unencrypted and uses only the previously received hash to request an additional payload.
When the architecture is finally decided, the downloader performs its main purpose – it downloads a payload from a hard coded site.
Communication with the C&C server is encrypted... Calling advapi32.dll!CryptEncrypt finishes the task... From now on, encryption is achieved with RC4.
Observables
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.