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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

BlackBeard

Tracked since Feb 23, 2026 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionDLL sideloadingProcess injectionReconnaissance
Delivery
MalvertisingDrive by
Platforms
Windows

Blackbeard, also known in its click-fraud toolchain as Blackbeard/Pigeon, is a multistage Windows malware family used primarily to generate fraudulent advertising revenue. Samples date to at least 2012, with campaigns targeting computers in the United States documented from mid-2013. Distribution involved malvertising, hidden iframes, and malicious Java applets delivering drive-by infections.

The initial downloader supports both 32-bit and 64-bit execution and retrieves additional modules, including the Pigeon downloader and clickbot components. Later variants integrated previously separate stages and could deliver alternative payloads, including a SOCKS5 proxy. Blackbeard obtains elevated privileges through UAC bypass techniques involving DLL sideloading or exploitation of CVE-2013-3660. It establishes persistence by modifying a protected Windows RPC system library to decrypt and execute a locally stored payload, changing ownership and access permissions and temporarily disabling Windows File Protection. Other techniques include custom packing, encrypted payload storage, process injection, and RSA- and RC4-protected command-and-control communications.

Pigeon performs click fraud through an invisible Internet Explorer automation object. It retrieves browsing tasks, follows advertising redirection chains, modifies browser settings, hooks APIs to suppress visible activity, and simulates mouse movements and clicks to imitate human browsing.

This Windows click-fraud family is distinct from the Rust-based BlackBeard backdoor also called Archer RAT or RUSTRIC, which has been associated with MuddyWater operations targeting Middle Eastern entities.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2013-3660via virusbulletinExploited in the wildWin32k Read AV VulnerabilityThe third function (0x4086c0) exploits CVE-2013-3660 [ 8 ]. If this function succeeds, a standard user can run programs under administrator privileges. | The Blackbeard/Pigeon clickbot follows the path that was previously set by ZeroAccess... The variant described in early 2014 distributed its own trojan features via drive-by download.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater (Boggy Serpens)

«По некоторым публикациям, группа также применяет бэкдор BlackBeard, хотя его точная атрибуция требует дополнительной верификации по первоисточникам Unit 42.»

via codebycodeby.net
MuddyWater

CHAR shares a similar structure and development environment as the Rust-based malware BlackBeard (aka Archer RAT and RUSTRIC)...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.008MalvertisingEvidence1

The infection chain starts with malvertising, where malicious redirection is incorporated into the script code of an infected advertisement.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

An infection chain runs through a malvertising campaign with Java exploitation and ends up dropping a payload with the filename ‘notepad.exe’.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The suspected malvertising code is JavaScript... An iframe with very small dimensions is injected via the document.writeln method.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

If we put a fake cryptbase.dll library into the sysprep directory, it will load the fake library instead of the real one. Sysprep is an elevated process, so everything it loads is also elevated.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The reply to the second POST request is encrypted with RC4. It contains the main module, which is then decrypted, injected into the svchost.exe process, and executed.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The third function (0x4086c0) exploits CVE-2013-3660 [ 8 ]. If this function succeeds, a standard user can run programs under administrator privileges.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The system API ShellExecuteW is resolved with the parameter ‘runas’ to run a file with elevated privileges... The code uses the System Preparation tool (sysprep.exe)... If we put a fake cryptbase.dll library into the sysprep directory, it will load the fake library instead of the real one.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

A malicious Java applet is loaded, which creates and drops the notepad.exe file into the %TEMP% directory.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The reply to the second POST request is encrypted with RC4. It contains the main module, which is then decrypted, injected into the svchost.exe process, and executed.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Instead of modifying the above-mentioned registry keys, an important system DLL is patched so that the payload is executed every time the operating system starts.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The processor architecture is decided by the GetNativeSystemInfo function. The expected result is either 0x00 or 0x09, which stands for PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_INTEL (x86) or PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_AMD64 (x64), respectively.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

If we put a fake cryptbase.dll library into the sysprep directory, it will load the fake library instead of the real one. Sysprep is an elevated process, so everything it loads is also elevated.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

The malware then creates a new access control list (ACL) with two access control entries (ACE): current user and SYSTEM. This access list is then assigned (using SetNamedSecurityInfoW) to the rpcss.dll file.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The bot first collects system identification data... ‘p’ is the platform (1=x86, 2=x64); ‘os’ is the operating system name; ‘v’, ‘vc’ and ‘b’ are probably version, subversion and build version respectively

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The processor architecture is decided by the GetNativeSystemInfo function. The expected result is either 0x00 or 0x09, which stands for PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_INTEL (x86) or PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE_AMD64 (x64), respectively.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Communication with the C&C server is encrypted... The initial post always starts with ‘0|’... The second POST request to the C&C server is unencrypted and uses only the previously received hash to request an additional payload.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

When the architecture is finally decided, the downloader performs its main purpose – it downloads a payload from a hard coded site.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Communication with the C&C server is encrypted... Calling advapi32.dll!CryptEncrypt finishes the task... From now on, encryption is achieved with RC4.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.