Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

BTMOB RAT

Tracked since Mar 10, 2026 · Updated 20 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs30Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistence
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureFake update
Platforms
Android

BTMOB RAT is a commodity Android remote access trojan sold through a Malware-as-a-Service model and used for device takeover, surveillance, credential theft, and financial fraud. It belongs to the SpySolr-related Android RAT ecosystem. Its capabilities include real-time remote control, keylogging, screen monitoring and recording, camera access, audio recording, GPS tracking, file management, command execution, and data exfiltration. It abuses Android Accessibility Services and supports WebView-based credential capture, enabling operators to monitor victims and interact with applications on compromised devices. It also provides persistent remote access.

BTMOB RAT has targeted banking customers in Brazil, Argentina, Spain, Portugal, and Mexico, with additional distribution campaigns spanning Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Banking and cryptocurrency users are prominent targets. Distribution includes phishing websites and fraudulent application-download pages that induce users to install malicious Android packages. MiningDropper, also known as BeatBanker, has delivered BTMOB RAT through a multistage installation chain using counterfeit Google Play update interfaces. In newer BeatBanker variants, BTMOB RAT replaces an earlier banking module while the delivery framework retains separate cryptocurrency-mining functionality. These delivery chains use encrypted payload staging, dynamic code loading, and anti-analysis checks to reduce detection. BTMOB RAT and related tooling are also distributed through criminal Telegram channels.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
EVLF

"Recent iterations of the campaign have been found to drop BTMOB RAT instead of the banking module."

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Découvert pour la première fois en février 2025, ce RAT est principalement distribué via des sites de phishing et des applications malveillantes disponibles sur le Google Play Store.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Guided and dropper app

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

Cyble said that final payload can steal credentials through WebView injections, log keystrokes, exfiltrate data, abuse Accessibility Services, and support real time remote control, screen monitoring, file handling, audio recording, and command execution.

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet" and "Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)"

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence1

Cyble said that final payload can steal credentials through WebView injections, log keystrokes, exfiltrate data, abuse Accessibility Services, and support real time remote control, screen monitoring, file handling, audio recording, and command execution.

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet" and "Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)"

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Une caractéristique clé de ce RAT est son exploitation des services d'accessibilité d'Android, qui lui permet d'obtenir des permissions légitimes et de contourner les mécanismes de sécurité du système.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"The initial APK file is packed... libludwwiuh.so... decrypt another ELF..." and "names are encrypted... using XOR (stack strings technique)"

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

A fast growing Android malware campaign is using a framework called MiningDropper to push far more dangerous threats onto phones disguised as normal apps.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-kill Fast stable and persistence

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

Hide and unhide app icon

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Disable google play protect

Credential Access

5 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

"...keylogging..."

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Live keylogger

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence1

Il récupère des données de l'interface utilisateur de l'appareil, ce qui inclut des informations sensibles sur l'écran, telles que des identifiants de connexion, des messages, ou des informations bancaires.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Browser password stealer

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Bypass banking apps and steal crypto

Discovery

2 techniques
T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

Automatically gain all permissions

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti-kill Fast stable and persistence

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.005VNCEvidence1

HVNC Silent screen control

Collection

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence3

"...keylogging..."

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Live keylogger

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence1

Il récupère des données de l'interface utilisateur de l'appareil, ce qui inclut des informations sensibles sur l'écran, telles que des identifiants de connexion, des messages, ou des informations bancaires.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

"...screen recording..."

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Ce RAT surveille également le presse-papiers, permettant de capturer des données qui y sont temporairement stockées, telles que des mots de passe ou des informations de paiement.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Block call & sms ... Call and sms

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Cyble said that final payload can steal credentials through WebView injections, log keystrokes, exfiltrate data, abuse Accessibility Services, and support real time remote control, screen monitoring, file handling, audio recording, and command execution.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

"...display of a counterfeit Play Store update screen that permits further payload delivery"

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

It is a premium android rat use to hack all latest mobile phones easily... Silent screen control... Apps tracking... Live location... Call and sms... Contacts manager... Apps manager

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

"...credential exfiltration..."

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Cyble said that final payload can steal credentials through WebView injections, log keystrokes, exfiltrate data, abuse Accessibility Services, and support real time remote control, screen monitoring, file handling, audio recording, and command execution.

Impact

2 techniques
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

Crypto mining from your victims

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

Broadcast DDos

Indicators of compromise

Observables

30 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

15 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+10 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching30Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.