Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
We also observed another backdoor used by this threat actor. This backdoor is totally different from Mongall, as we found it is based on the Heyoka open source project.
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
From 2018 to present, this actor has also been observed using a fake removable device as an initial infection vector... The spreader component will try to find the removable device in the victim’s environment. This malware component will copy all the malicious modules to any removable device to spread the malware in the target’s network environment
After decrypting the encrypted payload, DLL-test.dll will execute rundll32.exe and run specific export functions. The loader injects the decrypted payload into memory and runs it persistently.
From 2018 to present, this actor has also been observed using a fake removable device as an initial infection vector... The spreader component will try to find the removable device in the victim’s environment. This malware component will copy all the malicious modules to any removable device to spread the malware in the target’s network environment
Aoqin Dragon “obtained the Heyoka open source exfiltration tool and subsequently modified it for their operations.”
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Originally an open-source proof-of-concept exfiltration tool using spoofed DNS requests for bidirectional tunneling. Aoqin Dragon modified it into a more capable custom backdoor with shell access, file/process management, persistence checks, DLL injection deployment, and hardcoded C2s.
An open-source exfiltration tool used to copy files from compromised devices via spoofed DNS requests that establish a two-way communication tunnel.
Open source exfiltration tool used to steal data and modified by Aoqin Dragon for operational use.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.