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Malware1 associated actor

HCrypt

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs15Tracked
Type
Crypter
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionPost exploitationCredential theftKeyloggingCrypto theft
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLanding pageLure
Platforms
Windows

HCrypt is a Windows malware crypter and multistage loader used to protect, stage, and inject other malware, especially remote access trojans. It has been described as a crypter-as-a-service offering and has been observed in campaigns since at least 2021 delivering payloads such as AsyncRAT, BitRAT, NjRat, NanoCore RAT, QuasarRAT, LimeRAT, Warzone RAT, RevengeRAT, and Remcos-like final-stage implants. HCrypt commonly operates through heavily obfuscated script chains involving HTA, VBScript, JavaScript, PowerShell, and sometimes AutoHotKey components, with later stages decoding embedded binaries in memory and reflectively loading .NET modules or injectors.

A recurring HCrypt tradecraft pattern is multistage in-memory execution followed by process injection into legitimate Windows or .NET binaries, including use of aspnet_compiler.exe and other trusted processes as hosts for the final payload. Observed chains establish persistence through Startup-folder manipulation, scheduled tasks, or dropped script launchers, then retrieve or reconstruct additional stages, decode embedded PE payloads, and invoke .NET injector routines. Associated campaigns have also performed antivirus discovery, Windows Defender tampering, UAC bypass, deletion of execution traces, and other defense-evasion actions.

HCrypt has been linked to phishing-driven and malspam-driven delivery, including HTML attachments that generate malicious ISO images locally, ISO files containing obfuscated script stagers, and phishing websites hosting lure content. Public file-hosting services and compromised websites have been used to stage intermediate payloads. Some reporting also associates HCrypt-generated payload chains with clipboard hijacking aimed at cryptocurrency theft, indicating that HCrypt has been used not only as a generic packer or protector but as an operational loader framework for multiple downstream malware families.

HCrypt is best characterized as an evasive Windows loader/crypter ecosystem rather than a single payload family. Its primary role is to conceal, deliver, and inject secondary malware while complicating static and behavioral detection through obfuscation, staged execution, reflective loading, and abuse of legitimate processes.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Basilisk

We encountered a fileless campaign that used a new HCrypt variant to distribute numerous remote access trojans (RATs) in victim systems. HCrypt is a crypter and multistage generator that is considered difficult to detect.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The malicious file is hidden as an ISO that is distributed through a phishing email or website.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

A phishing email or website tricks a user into downloading and executing the malicious ISO file that contains the initial VBScript stager.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

This campaign uses two different attack vectors: phishing websites and emails.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Water Basilisk’s attack chain is a combination of the VBScript and PowerShell commands.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

The final stage is an obfuscated PowerShell script that contains the payloads and is responsible for deobfuscating and injecting them into the assigned process.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

The HTA contains VBScript code within the HTA script tags... set HBBB = GetObject(...) Execute ( " HBBB.Run HB+HBB, 0, True " )

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The JavaScript inside contains document.write() and unescape() function calls. This means the actual contents of the HTA file are a bit obfuscated using URL encoding and will be deobfuscated and written into an HTML document in memory at the time of rendering.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The code contains references to kernel32, LoadLibraryA, and GetProcAddress. These references mean the code likely imports additional native, non-.NET DLL functions at runtime for its injection operations.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The RAT delivery campaign starts from an AutoHotKey compiled script... all of which start with an AHK executable that leads to the different VBScripts that eventually load the RAT.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The attack begins with the malicious ISO image file... opening an ISO file in new operating systems is as simple as double-clicking the file.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

It achieves persistence by creating the file C:\Users\Public\Run\Run.vbs, adding it to the Startup path, and downloading and executing the final stage in memory.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

One of my colleagues made a statement recently about how commonplace process injection has become among malware... many adversaries deploying malware have begun using crypters like HCrypt or Snip3 that inject their arbitrary payloads into other arbitrary processes... analyzing a malware payload protected using HCrypt and injected into aspnet_compiler.exe.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

It achieves persistence by creating the file C:\Users\Public\Run\Run.vbs, adding it to the Startup path, and downloading and executing the final stage in memory.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

This means the actual contents of the HTA file are a bit obfuscated using URL encoding... There’s quite a bit of string obfuscation going on here as well... two really large hex-encoded strings... some base64 code at the bottom of the script that has some string obfuscation inside that gets replaced/removed during runtime.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The malicious file is hidden as an ISO that is distributed through a phishing email or website.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

One of my colleagues made a statement recently about how commonplace process injection has become among malware... many adversaries deploying malware have begun using crypters like HCrypt or Snip3 that inject their arbitrary payloads into other arbitrary processes... analyzing a malware payload protected using HCrypt and injected into aspnet_compiler.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

This script deobfuscates a PowerShell command... The Powershell decodes the blob... it decrypts the blob

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

MalwareBazaar says the sample is a HTA file... The HTA contains VBScript code within the HTA script tags.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

Among the loaded binaries is a DLL injector called “VBNET,” which reflectively loads a .NET PE payload in a selected .NET legitimate process.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Tampering with Microsoft Defender and other antivirus products

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

These binaries search the victim’s clipboard content for Bitcoin and Ethereum addresses using regex, then replaces them with the attacker’s own address.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

The PowerShell command creates a Net.WebClient object and calls DownloadString() to retrieve additional content... The easy hypothesis here is that PowerShell will likely download content from this URL and execute it.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching15Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.