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Malware3 associated actors

ReconShark

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK21Techniques
IOCs29Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationReconnaissancePersistenceDefense evasionPost exploitation
Delivery
SpearphishingPhishing
Platforms
Windows

ReconShark is a Windows reconnaissance malware component associated with the North Korean espionage actor Kimsuky, also tracked as TA427, APT43, Emerald Sleet, and THALLIUM. It is assessed as an evolved variant or reconnaissance-focused successor of the BabyShark malware family and has been used in targeted intelligence-collection operations against think tanks, research universities, government entities, media organizations, NGOs, North Korea-focused analysts, and other individuals of strategic interest in the United States, Europe, and Asia.

ReconShark is primarily delivered through highly tailored spearphishing campaigns. Observed delivery chains include phishing emails, links to cloud-hosted lure documents, password-protected malicious Office documents, and macro-enabled Microsoft Office files. In some campaigns, operators built rapport with targets over time before sending weaponized documents. The malware has also been observed in an intrusion chain following exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerabilities CVE-2024-1708 and CVE-2024-1709, where a VBScript-based payload with strong code and behavioral overlap to BabyShark was deployed.

Its core function is host reconnaissance in support of follow-on intrusion decisions. ReconShark gathers information such as running processes, hardware and battery details, user and host characteristics, network configuration, routing and ARP data, installed software, services, recent files, and deployed security products. Variants have used Windows Management Instrumentation and command execution to enumerate the environment, including checks for endpoint protection and other defensive tooling. Some observed samples altered Microsoft Office macro warning settings to reduce user prompts and facilitate macro execution.

ReconShark exfiltrates collected data over HTTP POST and, in some cases, encodes harvested information before transmission. Certain variants avoid writing reconnaissance output to disk prior to exfiltration, while others stage collected data locally and remove artifacts after transmission. The malware has also demonstrated persistence mechanisms, including scheduled-task execution of VBScript stored in an Alternate Data Stream, with periodic polling for additional code.

A notable characteristic of ReconShark is conditional second-stage deployment. Based on the victim environment and detected security controls, it can retrieve and execute additional payloads including VBS, HTA, batch, DLL, malicious Office template, and modified shortcut-based components. Observed tradecraft also includes obfuscation, randomized script elements, changing payload URLs, and simple string encryption to hinder static analysis and signature-based detection. Overall, ReconShark functions as a selective reconnaissance and staging platform that enables Kimsuky to profile victims and tailor subsequent espionage activity.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

In May of this year, we wrote about Kimsuky evolving reconnaissance capabilities in a new global campaign, which was an interesting campaign making use of a new malware component we call ReconShark.

via sentinelone blogsentinelone.com
KTA082

KTA082 (Kimsuky) is known to target individuals using documents containing malicious macros as part of spear phishing campaigns for its RECONSHARK malware.

via kroll blogkroll.com
Nickel Kimball

Tools BabyShark, KONNI, FastFire, FireViewer, FastSpy, ReconShark, KimJongRAT, Kimsuky

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

"...using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."

T1585Establish AccountsEvidence1

Since the start of 2023, brand impersonation has become the center of many questions we receive from everyday network defenders... we continually observe brands being impersonated for illicit use, including credential phishing and malware delivery.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

"The threat actors conduct extensive spearphishing operations, using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

KTA082 (Kimsuky) is known to target individuals using documents containing malicious macros as part of spear phishing campaigns for its RECONSHARK malware.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Ongoing campaigns use a new malware component we call ReconShark, which is actively delivered to specifically targeted individuals through spear-phishing emails, OneDrive links leading to document downloads... In the malicious emails, Kimsuky entices the target to open a link to download a password-protected document. Most recently, they made use of Microsoft OneDrive to host the malicious document for download.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Kimsuky engages in extensive email correspondence and uses spoofed URLs, websites imitating legitimate web platforms, and Office documents weaponized with the ReconShark malware.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

Similar to previous BabyShark variants, ReconShark relies on Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query process and battery information.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

In addition to exfiltrating information, ReconShark deploys further payloads in a multi-stage manner that are implemented as scripts (VBS, HTA, and Windows Batch)...

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

ReconShark deploys further payloads in a multi-stage manner that are implemented as scripts (VBS, HTA, and Windows Batch)...

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The lure documents Kimsuky distributes contain Microsoft Office macros that activate on document close. | ReconShark deploys further payloads in a multi-stage manner that are implemented as scripts (VBS, HTA, and Windows Batch)...

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

ReconShark edits Windows Shortcuts (LNK files) to the msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, whale.exe, and firefox.exe applications. When executed, these LNK files start the linked legitimate applications and execute malicious code at the same time.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Kimsuky also seizes any available opportunity to distribute password-protected weaponized Office documents that deploy the ReconShark reconnaissance malware.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware runs the following commands to modify the windows registry... These keys set the VBAWarnings keys for Word and Excel to a value of “1”... turning off some macro protections in those versions.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

ReconShark edits Windows Shortcuts (LNK files) to the msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, whale.exe, and firefox.exe applications.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

ReconShark edits Windows Shortcuts (LNK files) to the msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, whale.exe, and firefox.exe applications.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Some ReconShark strings are encrypted using a relatively simple cipher to evade static detection mechanisms.

T1221Template InjectionEvidence1

ReconShark replaces the default %AppData%\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm Office template, which opens whenever a user starts Microsoft Word, with a malicious Office template hosted at the C2 server.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The malware runs the following commands to modify the windows registry... These keys set the VBAWarnings keys for Word and Excel to a value of “1”... turning off some macro protections in those versions.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

ReconShark functions as a reconnaissance tool... ReconShark checks for the presence of a broad set of processes associated with detection mechanisms, such as ntrtscan.exe, mbam.exe, NortonSecurity.exe, and avpui.exe.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

ReconShark exfiltrates information relevant for conducting subsequent precision attacks, such as deployed detection mechanisms and hardware information.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

ReconShark checks for the presence of a broad set of processes associated with detection mechanisms... Enumeration of deployed detection mechanisms.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

we continually observe brands being impersonated for illicit use, including credential phishing and malware delivery.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ReconShark exfiltrates information relevant for conducting subsequent precision attacks... with the main distinction being the use of a different C2 server: staradvertiser[.]store.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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sentinelone labsNews · Apr 11, 2025Kimsuky Evolves Reconnaissance Capabilities in New Global Campaign | SentinelOneReconShark is a Kimsuky reconnaissance malware component delivered via malicious Office macros. It profiles infected systems by collecting running process information, battery details, and endpoint detection products, exfiltrates that data via HTTP POST, and conditionally deploys additional payloads including VBS, HTA, batch scripts, Office templates, and DLLs. It also modifies LNK files and replaces Normal.dotm to achieve further payload execution and persistence-like compromise of Microsoft Word.Read more ↗sentinelone labsNews · Apr 11, 2025Kimsuky | Ongoing Campaign Using Tailored Reconnaissance Toolkit | SentinelOneCustom malware previously distributed by Kimsuky as part of reconnaissance campaigns to enable subsequent attacks.Read more ↗sentinelone labsNews · Apr 11, 2025Kimsuky Strikes Again | New Social Engineering Campaign Aims to Steal Credentials and Gather Strategic Intelligence | SentinelOneReconShark is reconnaissance malware used by Kimsuky and delivered via password-protected weaponized Office documents. It exfiltrates information useful for follow-on precision attacks, including deployed detection mechanisms and hardware information.Read more ↗proofpoint threat insight blogNews · Apr 11, 2024From Social Engineering to DMARC Abuse: TA427’s Art of Information Gathering | Proofpoint USReferenced as a malware payload that TA427 may deploy in rare cases after establishing trust via extended email conversations, potentially to compromise a corporate device when a victim checks personal email on it.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching29Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping21Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.