ReconShark
- Type
- Spyware
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationReconnaissancePersistenceDefense evasionPost exploitation
- Delivery
- SpearphishingPhishing
- Platforms
- Windows
ReconShark is a Windows reconnaissance malware component associated with the North Korean espionage actor Kimsuky, also tracked as TA427, APT43, Emerald Sleet, and THALLIUM. It is assessed as an evolved variant or reconnaissance-focused successor of the BabyShark malware family and has been used in targeted intelligence-collection operations against think tanks, research universities, government entities, media organizations, NGOs, North Korea-focused analysts, and other individuals of strategic interest in the United States, Europe, and Asia.
ReconShark is primarily delivered through highly tailored spearphishing campaigns. Observed delivery chains include phishing emails, links to cloud-hosted lure documents, password-protected malicious Office documents, and macro-enabled Microsoft Office files. In some campaigns, operators built rapport with targets over time before sending weaponized documents. The malware has also been observed in an intrusion chain following exploitation of ConnectWise ScreenConnect vulnerabilities CVE-2024-1708 and CVE-2024-1709, where a VBScript-based payload with strong code and behavioral overlap to BabyShark was deployed.
Its core function is host reconnaissance in support of follow-on intrusion decisions. ReconShark gathers information such as running processes, hardware and battery details, user and host characteristics, network configuration, routing and ARP data, installed software, services, recent files, and deployed security products. Variants have used Windows Management Instrumentation and command execution to enumerate the environment, including checks for endpoint protection and other defensive tooling. Some observed samples altered Microsoft Office macro warning settings to reduce user prompts and facilitate macro execution.
ReconShark exfiltrates collected data over HTTP POST and, in some cases, encodes harvested information before transmission. Certain variants avoid writing reconnaissance output to disk prior to exfiltration, while others stage collected data locally and remove artifacts after transmission. The malware has also demonstrated persistence mechanisms, including scheduled-task execution of VBScript stored in an Alternate Data Stream, with periodic polling for additional code.
A notable characteristic of ReconShark is conditional second-stage deployment. Based on the victim environment and detected security controls, it can retrieve and execute additional payloads including VBS, HTA, batch, DLL, malicious Office template, and modified shortcut-based components. Observed tradecraft also includes obfuscation, randomized script elements, changing payload URLs, and simple string encryption to hinder static analysis and signature-based detection. Overall, ReconShark functions as a selective reconnaissance and staging platform that enables Kimsuky to profile victims and tailor subsequent espionage activity.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In May of this year, we wrote about Kimsuky evolving reconnaissance capabilities in a new global campaign, which was an interesting campaign making use of a new malware component we call ReconShark.
KTA082 (Kimsuky) is known to target individuals using documents containing malicious macros as part of spear phishing campaigns for its RECONSHARK malware.
Tools BabyShark, KONNI, FastFire, FireViewer, FastSpy, ReconShark, KimJongRAT, Kimsuky
Techniques & procedures
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
"...using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."
Since the start of 2023, brand impersonation has become the center of many questions we receive from everyday network defenders... we continually observe brands being impersonated for illicit use, including credential phishing and malware delivery.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
"The threat actors conduct extensive spearphishing operations, using typosquatting or domains thematically aligned with their target."
KTA082 (Kimsuky) is known to target individuals using documents containing malicious macros as part of spear phishing campaigns for its RECONSHARK malware.
Ongoing campaigns use a new malware component we call ReconShark, which is actively delivered to specifically targeted individuals through spear-phishing emails, OneDrive links leading to document downloads... In the malicious emails, Kimsuky entices the target to open a link to download a password-protected document. Most recently, they made use of Microsoft OneDrive to host the malicious document for download.
Kimsuky engages in extensive email correspondence and uses spoofed URLs, websites imitating legitimate web platforms, and Office documents weaponized with the ReconShark malware.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
Similar to previous BabyShark variants, ReconShark relies on Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query process and battery information.
In addition to exfiltrating information, ReconShark deploys further payloads in a multi-stage manner that are implemented as scripts (VBS, HTA, and Windows Batch)...
ReconShark deploys further payloads in a multi-stage manner that are implemented as scripts (VBS, HTA, and Windows Batch)...
The lure documents Kimsuky distributes contain Microsoft Office macros that activate on document close. | ReconShark deploys further payloads in a multi-stage manner that are implemented as scripts (VBS, HTA, and Windows Batch)...
ReconShark edits Windows Shortcuts (LNK files) to the msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, whale.exe, and firefox.exe applications. When executed, these LNK files start the linked legitimate applications and execute malicious code at the same time.
Kimsuky also seizes any available opportunity to distribute password-protected weaponized Office documents that deploy the ReconShark reconnaissance malware.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
The malware runs the following commands to modify the windows registry... These keys set the VBAWarnings keys for Word and Excel to a value of “1”... turning off some macro protections in those versions.
ReconShark edits Windows Shortcuts (LNK files) to the msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, whale.exe, and firefox.exe applications.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
ReconShark edits Windows Shortcuts (LNK files) to the msedge.exe, chrome.exe, outlook.exe, whale.exe, and firefox.exe applications.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
Some ReconShark strings are encrypted using a relatively simple cipher to evade static detection mechanisms.
ReconShark replaces the default %AppData%\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm Office template, which opens whenever a user starts Microsoft Word, with a malicious Office template hosted at the C2 server.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The malware runs the following commands to modify the windows registry... These keys set the VBAWarnings keys for Word and Excel to a value of “1”... turning off some macro protections in those versions.
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
ReconShark functions as a reconnaissance tool... ReconShark checks for the presence of a broad set of processes associated with detection mechanisms, such as ntrtscan.exe, mbam.exe, NortonSecurity.exe, and avpui.exe.
ReconShark exfiltrates information relevant for conducting subsequent precision attacks, such as deployed detection mechanisms and hardware information.
ReconShark checks for the presence of a broad set of processes associated with detection mechanisms... Enumeration of deployed detection mechanisms.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
we continually observe brands being impersonated for illicit use, including credential phishing and malware delivery.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
ReconShark exfiltrates information relevant for conducting subsequent precision attacks... with the main distinction being the use of a different C2 server: staradvertiser[.]store.
Observables
29 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.