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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Zegost

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
Fake update
Platforms
Windows

Zegost is a Windows malware family most consistently described as an information stealer, although reporting also shows code and operational overlap with other Chinese-language malware clusters, including Purple Fox and FatalRAT-related tooling. It has been observed in both cybercriminal and espionage-associated activity. Zegost has appeared in staged infection chains using shortcut files and MSI-based loaders, and has also been distributed through trojanized software packages in campaigns targeting Chinese-speaking users.

Documented Zegost functionality includes host fingerprinting, keylogging, webcam-related reconnaissance through COM interfaces, and theft of victim information. Reporting on related samples indicates shellcode-based execution and encrypted payload staging. Multiple analyses also note strong code similarities between Zegost and later malware used in Purple Fox operations, suggesting either code reuse, shared developers, or common operators. In Purple Fox-linked activity, overlapping behaviors included victim profiling, anti-analysis-aware module loading, and integration with broader post-compromise tooling.

Zegost has primarily targeted Windows systems. Historical attribution in open reporting is mixed: it has been associated with Chinese cybercriminal activity and has also been observed in intrusion sets aligned with espionage objectives. Some public sources have conflated Zegost with Gh0st RAT, but available reporting does not support treating them as the same malware family with high confidence.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FinGhost

In September 2022, a few weeks before we first spotted DragonSpark indicators, a sample of Zegost malware – an info-stealer historically attributed to Chinese cybercriminals, but also observed as part of espionage campaigns – was reported communicating with 104.233.163[.]190.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique
T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The attackers behind Purple Fox opt for implementing a customized user-mode loader in order to minimize the amount of bookkeeping entries that their malicious code would register with the system’s internal data structures.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Both implement a similar keylogging functionality, as seen in Figure 42.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

They query the registry key “HKLM\\HARDWARE\\DESCRIPTION\\System\\CentralProcessor\\0\\\"~MHz\” to identify the resources of the infected machine.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Svchost.txt backdoor implements a process checker list for common AV and EDR products.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It sends all the fingerprinting logs collected from the victim’s system... They query the registry key “HKLM\\HARDWARE\\DESCRIPTION\\System\\CentralProcessor\\0\\\"~MHz\” to identify the resources of the infected machine.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Both implement a similar keylogging functionality, as seen in Figure 42.

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Both use a similar COM APIs sequence to find video capture devices installed on the victims’ machines, such as a webcams.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.