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Malware3 associated actors

BurnsRAT

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 13 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs64Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloading
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

BurnsRAT is a Windows remote access trojan developed by Mr.Burns that incorporates maliciously modified versions of legitimate remote-administration software, principally Remote Utilities/RMS and TeamViewer. It provides covert remote access, arbitrary shell-command execution, command-output retrieval, file downloading and execution, screenshots, and system-information collection. Its command interface also supports restarting or stopping the remote-administration component, shutting down or rebooting the host, and self-removal.

Analyzed RMS-based variants package legitimate applications with a malicious DLL in self-extracting archives or NSIS installers. They abuse a Microsoft Silverlight utility and DLL search-order hijacking to execute malicious code, hook Windows APIs to conceal remote-administration activity, and establish persistence through a Windows service and a per-user RunOnce entry. BurnsRAT gathers operating-system and architecture details, administrative status, user and domain information, active-window information, and RMS connection identifiers and passwords. Host information is transmitted to attacker-controlled infrastructure using RC4-encrypted messages.

The financially motivated, Russian-speaking actor VasyGrek, also known as Fluffy Wolf, used BurnsRAT from early 2019 and stopped using it after July 2024. Its campaigns targeted Russian organizations, particularly finance and accounting personnel, through business-themed phishing emails, malicious spreadsheet macros, archive attachments, and download links. BurnsRAT frequently appeared as a final-stage payload in multistage chains involving PureCrypter. Operators also used compromised systems to open fraudulent business-banking authentication pages in victims’ browsers. An RMS-based BurnsRAT variant appeared in the Horns&Hooves email campaign, which primarily targeted Russian users and small-to-medium businesses and was linked to TA569.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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vasygrek

The report analyzes BurnsRAT, developed by Mr.Burns and used by VasyGrek since 2019. Its variants incorporate malicious modifications of Remote Utilities or TeamViewer.

via f6f6.ru
Mr.Burns

The report analyzes BurnsRAT, developed by Mr.Burns and used by VasyGrek since 2019. Its variants incorporate malicious modifications of Remote Utilities or TeamViewer.

via f6f6.ru
Fluffy Wolf

BurnsRAT is listed among the malware tools used by VasyGrek.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"mailings with lookalike email attachments in the form of a ZIP archive containing JScript scripts... disguised as requests and bids"

Execution

6 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

cmdr — Выполняет команду cmd с отправкой результата на сервер.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

"ZIP archive containing JScript scripts... versions of the script mimicking legitimate JS files... added malicious code to the middle of the file"

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"When run, the script downloads a decoy document... which it then shows to the user."

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

Данный сервис будет выполнять команду, которая имеет следующий шаблон: %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\svchost.exe

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Вместо системной утилиты будет запущена программа Remote Utilities.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Переименованный rutserv.exe пытается запустить системную библиотеку msimg32.dll, однако вместо нее ... будет запущена содержащаяся в директории модифицированная версия данной библиотеки.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Для достижения закрепления в системе BurnsRAT создает сервис с названием USBSafeManager и отображаемым именем USB Safe Manager.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

BurnsRAT создает ключ реестра в ветке HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce с именем Silverlight.Configuration.exe.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Для достижения закрепления в системе BurnsRAT создает сервис с названием USBSafeManager и отображаемым именем USB Safe Manager.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

BurnsRAT создает ключ реестра в ветке HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce с именем Silverlight.Configuration.exe.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"Fully obfuscated version of the malicious script... link... is invisible to the naked eye"

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Инструменты разработчика PureCoder, а также ВПО MetaStealer, которые распространяются в запакованом виде.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

Сервис с названием USBSafeManager и отображаемым именем USB Safe Manager.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

В основном располагается в директориях легитимных инструментов, используемых при запуске и работе BurnsRAT (Silverlight и Remote Utilities).

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

kill — Самоудаление. Удаляет директорию, ключи реестра и сервис.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

BurnsRAT ... скрывает выполнение инструмента RMS, в том числе окна инструмента.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Вместо системной утилиты будет запущена программа Remote Utilities.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Переименованный rutserv.exe пытается запустить системную библиотеку msimg32.dll, однако вместо нее ... будет запущена содержащаяся в директории модифицированная версия данной библиотеки.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

BurnsRAT ... выполняет сбор имени пользователя и компьютера зараженной системы.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Версия системы (major, minor, build number). Имя пользователя. Имя компьютера. Имя домена. Язык системы.

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

BurnsRAT ... собирает информацию о языке зараженной системы.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

"RMS has support for connecting to a remote computer via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)... archives... created using RDP Wrapper"

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Перед началом взаимодействия с командным сервером будут собраны следующие данные: ... Скриншот экрана.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

BurnsRAT общается с командным сервером, используя стандартный HTTPS-протокол.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

dwl — Выполняет загрузку файла на зараженную систему. ... dwlr ... помимо загрузки, выполняет запуск загруженного файла.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Финальной, обнаруженной нами стадией цепочки заражения является инфицированная модификация ПО удаленного управления системой Remote Utilities (aka RMS).

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Трафик зашифрован алгоритмом RC4, где ключом является доменное имя, через которое выполняется коммуникация с сервером.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

MetaStealer и PureLogs Stealer ... взаимодействует с командным сервером и выполняет эксфильтрацию данных.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

64 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
the hacker newsNews · Nov 4, 2026Russian Police Arrest 3 Suspected VasyGrek Hackers, Dismantle Criminal InfrastructureA remote access trojan in VasyGrek's arsenal; individual capabilities and delivery details are not supplied.Read more ↗f6News · Nov 3, 2026VasyGrek и Mr.Burns: крепкие связи в сфере финансов - F6Provides concealed remote access through modified legitimate remote-management software. The analyzed Remote Utilities variant uses execution-flow and DLL search-order hijacking, hides its operation through API hooks, and persists through a service and a RunOnce registry entry. It collects system information, remote-access credentials and screenshots; supports command execution, file downloading and execution, system shutdown and self-removal; and encrypts C2 messages with RC4. VasyGrek also uses it to open fraudulent business-banking login pages on victims' computers.Read more ↗f6News · Nov 3, 2026Неугомонный VasyGrek: F6 изучила атаки злоумышленника в августе-ноябре 2025 годаMalware family encompassing weaponized versions of legitimate remote-administration software. VasyGrek stopped using it after F6 published research on his cooperation with Mr.Burns in July 2024.Read more ↗securelistNews · Dec 2, 2024NetSupport RAT and RMS in malicious emails | SecurelistRMS-based remote access payload delivered via an NSIS installer and executed via DLL side-loading (malicious msimg32.dll loaded by Silverlight.Configuration.exe). Used to start RMS as a service and exfiltrate host info / session ID to attacker infrastructure (e.g., 193.42.32[.]138/api/) with RC4-encrypted communications.Read more ↗
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IOC matching64Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.