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Malware2 associated actors

CageyChameleon

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs157Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CryptoCore

What appears to be the main backdoor of the group is also a VBS file (tracked by Proofpoint Emerging Threats as CageyChameleon)... In the cases observed by us... the compromised host performs a one-time communication with the C2 to download a VBS payload identified as VBS/CageyChameleon by Proofpoint’s Emerging Threats service.

via clearsky blogclearskysec.com
APT38

“The CageyChameleon (aka CabbageRAT) family has expanded its functionality but still operates as a victim-profiling framework, exfiltrating running processes and host information while setting up the potential to launch subsequent tooling loaded from the command-and-control server.”

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The attackers make first contact through LinkedIn and Telegram, sometimes using previously compromised accounts to appear more legitimate. They then share scheduling links via Calendly to set up meetings on fake platforms that closely copy the look and feel of Zoom, Google Meet, and Microsoft Teams.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

On Windows machines, the ClickFix prompt instructs victims to press Win + X followed by “A” to open a terminal with administrator privileges, then paste and run a set of commands. These commands pull down two separate PowerShell scripts from attacker-controlled servers.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

On Linux systems, victims are instructed to press Ctrl + Alt + T... and then they are prompted to paste and execute the following commands which include fetching and running an ELF downloader.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

one distinct characteristic of the group is a relatively heavy use of VBS files both as downloaders and as backdoors.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

When the victim tries to enable their audio or video, a ClickFix-style prompt appears on the screen, instructing them to copy and run a piece of code. This is the moment the malware enters the system.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

“TA444 had… an LNK-oriented delivery chain… The lure LNKs used to initiate execution are still often titled Password.txt.lnk.”

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

A notable change in this version is the introduction of a .lnk shortcut file placed in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring the malware runs every time the user logs in.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

A notable change in this version is the introduction of a .lnk shortcut file placed in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring the malware runs every time the user logs in.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The group pretends to be venture capital firms looking for investment partnerships, building trust with targets over time before delivering malicious payloads through counterfeit video conferencing platforms.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The downloader determines a suitable working directory via the getTmpDir function by retrieving the $TMPDIR environment variable, falling back to /tmp/, and appending a randomly generated string to construct a unique file path.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

20 → Download, Base64-decode, and XOR-decrypt a secondary VBS payload, which is then executed in memory... In-Memory Executes VBScript payloads directly in memory.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The first script downloads a VBScript file, writes it to the temporary directory, and executes it twice using wscript.exe, while also adding the C:\Users directory to Windows Defender’s exclusion list and restarting the WinDefend service to suppress any alerts.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The VBS collects... Network adapter information

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

That VBS collects the following information: Username

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

also lists the processes running on target computer, looking for specific strings: "hudongf" or "qhsafe"

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

That VBS collects the following information: Username, Host name, OS version, install date and run time, Time zone, CPU name

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The VBScript payload is an updated variant of Cabbage RAT that begins by collecting system details including the current username, hostname, operating system version, and installed browser extensions.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

20 → Download, Base64-decode, and XOR-decrypt a secondary VBS payload, which is then executed in memory.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Another characteristic of the group is communicating with the C2 server through the 8080 port with the target's unique identifier appended usually to an “id” parameter

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

These files are used to connect to the command and control (C2) server and download next-stage files.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Once access is granted, the script processes the media streams and transmits them in real time using WebRTC-based streaming... via a WebSocket signaling channel.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

157 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching157Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.