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Mallory
Malware

Pure Crypter

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs41Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

On February 6th, 2023, a spear-phishing email impersonating a Bandai Namco game company was used to target a voice actor YouTuber in Korea, and Lumma Stealer malware was distributed through the email.

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

"...setting up persistence via... scheduled task..."

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

"The next optional method supports running arbitrary PowerShell command supplied by the threat actor"

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Bumblebee’s injection module ( dij command for DLL Injection) dynamically resolves NtQueueApcThread at runtime and uses it to inject a payload DLL... While the static import of NtQueueApcThread is flagged by multiple scanners, a runtime GetProcAddress lookup on ntdll.dll is invisible to import-table analysis.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

"...setting up persistence via... scheduled task..."

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"...or VBScript (.vbs) in the user’s startup folder." | "...setting up persistence via Run key..."

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

"...setting up persistence via... scheduled task..."

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Process injection sits at the top of the MITRE ATT&CK heap for the second year running. Picus Labs’ Red Report 2025 found T1055 in roughly 31% of the million-plus malware samples they examined.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Attackers spawn a process suspended, queue an APC into its main thread before the AV/EDR’s user-mode hooks have loaded, then resume. The payload runs before the security product begins.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

"RunPE , also known as Process Hollowing... creating a process in a suspended state... unmapping... overwriting... resuming..."

T1134.004Parent PID SpoofingEvidence1

"Parent process spoofing... OpenProcess... InitializeProcThreadAttributeList... UpdateProcThreadAttribute..."

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

"...or VBScript (.vbs) in the user’s startup folder." | "...setting up persistence via Run key..."

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

"Junk data around 260 – 300 MB... cause issues with AV/EDR as they have file size limitations on uploads..."

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

Process injection sits at the top of the MITRE ATT&CK heap for the second year running. Picus Labs’ Red Report 2025 found T1055 in roughly 31% of the million-plus malware samples they examined.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Attackers spawn a process suspended, queue an APC into its main thread before the AV/EDR’s user-mode hooks have loaded, then resume. The payload runs before the security product begins.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

"RunPE , also known as Process Hollowing... creating a process in a suspended state... unmapping... overwriting... resuming..."

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

"...opening a file handle with FILE_SHARE_READ permissions only and having explorer.exe receive the handle via... DuplicateHandle()."

T1134.004Parent PID SpoofingEvidence1

"Parent process spoofing... OpenProcess... InitializeProcThreadAttributeList... UpdateProcThreadAttribute..."

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The Pure Crypter reads the separate data included within and then decrypts it to obtain configuration values for performing malicious actions set as desired. After extracting the configuration values, an additional malware payload is read from the resource and decrypted.

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

"...preventing multiple instances... via mutex."

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

"...executes several checks against virtual machines... WMI queries... searching for strings... 'VMware|VIRTUAL|...|Xen'... checks against loaded modules... 'SbieDll.dll'... 'cuckoomon.dll'..."

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

"The optional Execution Delay feature makes use of the Windows API SleepEx..."

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

"'Reflection' - ... .NET PE files, which are loaded and invoked..."

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

"...uses CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() API to determine if the process is being debugged"

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"There are two options in Pure Crypter to disable AMSI... patching the AmsiScanBuffer API in memory..." | "...disables the internet via the LOLBin ipconfig.exe... prevent AV/EDR from communicating with their backend..." | "...use of PowerShell to add an exclusion to Windows Defender..." | "...found an elementary bypass by simply patching the NtManageHotPatch API in memory..." | "...load 'clean' copies of kernel32.dll... and ntdll.dll, effectively bypassing any hooks already put in place by AV/EDR."

Discovery

3 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

"...executes several checks against virtual machines... WMI queries... searching for strings... 'VMware|VIRTUAL|...|Xen'... checks against loaded modules... 'SbieDll.dll'... 'cuckoomon.dll'..."

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

"The optional Execution Delay feature makes use of the Windows API SleepEx..."

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

"...uses CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent() API to determine if the process is being debugged"

Indicators of compromise

Observables

41 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching41Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.