Loading malware…
TOFUPIPE is a TCP-based passive listener payload associated with the Iranian state-sponsored threat actor UNC1860, which Mandiant assesses is likely affiliated with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). It is loaded and executed by the OATBOAT backdoor, including in samples masquerading as CyveraConsole.exe. Reporting describes TOFUPIPE alongside TOFULOAD as a passive implant used in stealthy intrusions against high-priority Middle Eastern networks, especially government and telecommunications organizations, with broader targeting also noted across media, academia, and critical infrastructure. UNC1860 is reported to use these passive listeners for high-value targets after initial access is established, often following deployment chains involving web shells and other backdoors. The actor’s tradecraft emphasizes stealth: TOFUPIPE is described as not initiating outbound traffic, instead operating as a passive listener, which helps evade traditional network monitoring and reduces reliance on conventional C2 infrastructure. Related reporting states UNC1860 leverages undocumented Windows HTTP.sys capabilities and reverse-engineered undocumented calls to establish listeners with lower detectability by common security tools. Mentioned indicators include OATBOAT samples containing encrypted TOFUPIPE shellcode, including a sample masquerading as CyveraConsole.exe.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
e1ad173e49eee1194f2a55afa681cef7c3b8f6c26572f474dec7a42e9f0cdc9d_CyveraConsole.exe_OATBOAT that contains encrypted TOFUPIPE shellcode
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A TCP-based passive listener payload loaded by Oatboat to accept inbound commands rather than beaconing outbound.
An implant/shellcode payload referenced as being embedded in OATBOAT samples in encrypted form.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.