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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The Golang malware m6699.exe uses the Yaegi framework to interpret at runtime encoded Golang source code stored within the compiled binary, executing the code as if compiled.
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The Golang malware m6699.exe uses the Yaegi framework to interpret at runtime encoded Golang source code stored within the compiled binary, executing the code as if compiled. This is a technique for hindering static analysis and evading detection by static analysis mechanisms.
“allocat[es] executable… heap memory… places the first-stage shellcode… and executes it.” / “ctypes… load the shellcode in memory and start a new thread”
The first-stage shellcode implements a shellcode loader. The shellcode connects to a C2 server using the Windows Sockets 2 library and receives a 4-byte big value... The first-stage shellcode then receives from the C2 server the second-stage shellcode and executes it.
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.