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Mallory
Malware

SHELLTER

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasionPost exploitation
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

SHELLTER is a dual-use commercial Windows AV/EDR-evasion framework developed for authorized red-team operations. Illicitly acquired Shellter Elite v11.0 instances were used in financially motivated campaigns from April 2025 to package and load payloads including LUMMA, RHADAMANTHYS, and ARECHCLIENT2/SECTOP RAT. Observed campaigns used phishing lures directed at content creators and links promoted through gaming-related YouTube content. SHELLTER-protected binaries embed self-modifying polymorphic shellcode in legitimate programs and encrypt compressed payloads with AES-128-CBC. The framework incorporates extensive defense-evasion functionality, including runtime API resolution, fresh ntdll mapping and indirect syscalls to bypass user-mode hooks, call-stack concealment, memory-permission changes, debugger and hypervisor checks, AMSI bypass methods, decoy-module unlinking from process loader structures, and vectored-exception-handler-based API proxying. Embedded license and self-disarm metadata in malicious samples indicated that multiple campaigns may have used a single illicit Shellter Elite license.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

Evidence suggests malicious campaigns used Shellter Elite version 11.0. A May 16 post advertised 'Shellter Elite v11.0 up for sale on a popular forum.'

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

RHADAMANTHYS infections begin with YouTube videos targeting game hacking and gaming mods, with video comments linking to malicious files hosted on MediaFire. | Campaigns targeting content creators used sponsorship-opportunity lures impersonating Udemy, Skillshare, Pinnacle Studio, and Duolingo; emails included download links to .rar archives containing promotional material and a SHELLTER-protected executable.

T1659Content InjectionEvidence1

Low detection is attributed in part to 'backdooring code into legitimate applications.'

Execution

2 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence2

SHELLTER bypasses user-mode hooks by using trampoline-based indirect syscalls... A ret instruction then pops this address into the RIP register, diverting execution to the syscall instruction stealthily.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

A sample deploys a simple C++ loader client abusing BITS (Background Intelligent Transfer Service) for C2.

Persistence

1 technique
T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

A sample deploys a simple C++ loader client abusing BITS (Background Intelligent Transfer Service) for C2.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Memory scan evasion techniques include decoding and re-encoding instructions at runtime, removal of execute permissions on inactive memory pages, reducing footprint... and using Windows internals structures, such as the PEB, as temporary data holding spots.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

SHELLTER-protected samples commonly employ self-modifying shellcode with polymorphic obfuscation... legitimate instructions and polymorphic code helps these files evade static detection and signatures.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Observed samples employ time-based seeding to obfuscate API addresses... uses a seeded-ROR13 hashing algorithm on API names to resolve the function addresses at runtime.

T1027.014Polymorphic CodeEvidence1

По данным исследования Elastic Security Labs, даже коммерческий фреймворк SHELLTER использует полиморфную обфускацию (Polymorphic Code, T1027.014, Defense Evasion) для изменения байтовой последовательности при каждой генерации.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

A sample deploys a simple C++ loader client abusing BITS (Background Intelligent Transfer Service) for C2.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

A similar capability is observed in our malicious samples after a call to ZwQuerySystemInformationEx using CPUID and _bittest instructions. This functionality returns various CPU information along with the Hyper-Threading Technology (HTT) flag.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

SHELLTER employs user-mode and kernel-mode debugging detection using Process Heap flags and checking the KdDebuggerEnabled flag via the _KUSER_SHARED_DATA structure.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

Low detection of SHELLTER-protected ARECHCLIENT2 is attributed to custom-built static-analysis evasions and 'the application of code-signing certificates.'

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

To bypass API hooking techniques from AV/EDR vendors, SHELLTER maps a fresh copy of ntdll.dll... There are two methods of AMSI bypassing... in-memory patching of AMSI functions... [or] overwrite[s] the Scan function pointer with the address of the ret gadget.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

A similar capability is observed in our malicious samples after a call to ZwQuerySystemInformationEx using CPUID and _bittest instructions. This functionality returns various CPU information along with the Hyper-Threading Technology (HTT) flag.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

SHELLTER employs user-mode and kernel-mode debugging detection using Process Heap flags and checking the KdDebuggerEnabled flag via the _KUSER_SHARED_DATA structure.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The report identifies a C++ loader client abusing BITS for C2 and lists LUMMA, ARECHCLIENT2, and RHADAMANTHYS command-and-control infrastructure.

T1659Content InjectionEvidence1

Low detection is attributed in part to 'backdooring code into legitimate applications.'

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.