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Malware3 associated actors

Evil-WinRM

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DarkLunnen

Post-exploitation: evil-winrm, dploot, donpapi, nxc –sam/–lsa on US target.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
TheGentlemen

“The upload routine matches the PowerShell artifacts of winrm-fs, the library that evil-winrm uses, which makes evil-winrm the most likely tool-transfer framework.”

via ransom isac blogransom-isac.org
Toy Ghouls

Attackers deliver the backdoors and their configuration files to compromised systems over WinRM using open-source tools including Evil-WinRM.

via securelist rusecurelist.ru
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence6

`evil-winrm -i 192.168.13.110 -u Administrator@thm-ad.local -H 2dfe...` and `xfreerdp ... /u:Administrator /pth:2dfe...`

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Detects ... WinRM-related parent process ... spawns schtasks.exe with command-line arguments indicating remote scheduled task creation. This is a common persistence pattern...

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The workflow uses PowerShell to download, load, and execute AMSI-bypass, Mimikatz, PowerUp, and NTDS/SAM-dumping scripts, including commands piped into Invoke-Expression.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Detects ... WinRM-related parent process ... spawns schtasks.exe with command-line arguments indicating remote scheduled task creation. This is a common persistence pattern...

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence6

`evil-winrm -i 192.168.13.110 -u Administrator@thm-ad.local -H 2dfe...` and `xfreerdp ... /u:Administrator /pth:2dfe...`

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Detects ... WinRM-related parent process ... spawns schtasks.exe with command-line arguments indicating remote scheduled task creation. This is a common persistence pattern...

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence6

`evil-winrm -i 192.168.13.110 -u Administrator@thm-ad.local -H 2dfe...` and `xfreerdp ... /u:Administrator /pth:2dfe...`

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence6

`evil-winrm -i 192.168.13.110 -u Administrator@thm-ad.local -H 2dfe...` and `xfreerdp ... /u:Administrator /pth:2dfe...`

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"We need to patch AMSI using our script" and "From now on, Defender doesn’t have access to your PowerShell sessions." The article also directs users to bypass the PowerShell execution policy with "powershell -ep bypass."

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

The operator extracted base64-encoded SAM, SYSTEM, and SECURITY registry hives from a Windows host for offline cracking. The dataset also contains a valid Active Directory database (ntds.dit).

T1003.003NTDSEvidence3

Evil-WinRM history logs reveal attempts to copy the AD database from a tunneled domain controller, aiming for full domain compromise.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence5

If you find any valid credentials via SMB, LFI, or OSINT, immediately attempt to login using evil-winrm to get a stable, interactive shell.

T1021.006Windows Remote ManagementEvidence25

Post-exploitation: evil-winrm, dploot, donpapi, nxc –sam/–lsa on US target.

T1550.002Pass the HashEvidence8

The walkthrough uses `-H` with Evil-WinRM and `/pth` with FreeRDP to authenticate as Administrator using an NTLM hash, and explicitly describes enabling RDP "via PTH."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The harvester and the implant installer were uploaded over WinRM into the Domain Admin profile on the domain controller.

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.