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Threat actorLinked to in-the-wild CVEs

DarkLunnen

Updated today
Trending this week#61of 10,539 threat actors
Mention activity · 30 days7 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
CVEs1Associated
Malware14Families
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs45Tracked
Origin
🇷🇺 Russia
Motivation
—
Targets
UAPLRODECHUSTRAZDZIEKRCZ
Capabilities
Initial accessCredential theftSession hijackingPersistenceReconnaissanceScanningBrute forcePost exploitationLateral movementExfiltrationDefense evasion
Also known asDarkLunnen

DarkLunnen is a threat actor associated with offensive cyber operations documented from at least April 2025 through July 2026, primarily against European organizations. Its targets include Ukrainian defense, aviation, drone-technology, and aerial-reconnaissance organizations, as well as exposed enterprise infrastructure across multiple countries. The actor's nationality, organizational identity, state affiliation, and motivation have not been established. Russian-language operational artifacts do not establish a Russian origin. DarkLunnen uses publicly available exploits and offensive-security tools for internet-facing reconnaissance, initial access, credential collection, and post-exploitation activity. It modified a watchTowr proof of concept for FortiOS authentication bypass CVE-2024-55591 to support batch scanning, per-target logging, and creation of a privileged administrator account. A stolen Romanian firewall configuration contained the corresponding account and yielded ten cleartext VPN passwords. Subsequent activity included VPN connection attempts and internal scanning. The actor also conducted extensive VNC brute forcing, including against endpoints with industrial-control-associated desktop names, and scanned Ukrainian address ranges for Hikvision CVE-2017-7921. Other operations included attempted source-code collection from Ukrainian organizations, Roundcube CVE-2025-49113 exploitation attempts, Exchange-targeted webshell and tunneling activity, credential-based Windows operations, and access to cloud backup snapshots using AWS credentials. Its toolset includes Sliver, Neo-reGeorg, reGeorg, suo5, Evil-WinRM, NetExec, dploot, DonPAPI, and restic. Operational records include NTLM-hash-based authentication, DPAPI cookie extraction, and remote execution attempts against a German organization. An exposed operational server discovered in July 2026 revealed stolen configurations, target lists, tools, and command histories. Only part of the directory was recovered. Successful source-code theft, industrial-process manipulation, camera compromise, and compromise of every scanned target have not been established.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Military
  • Capital Goods
  • Education & Research
  • Government & Administration
  • Health Care Equipment & Services
  • Transportation

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • Ukraine
  • Poland
  • Romania
  • Azerbaijan
  • Czechia
  • Germany
  • Algeria
  • Türkiye
  • Canada
  • Switzerland
  • Spain
  • France
  • United Kingdom
  • Ireland
  • South Korea
  • Mexico

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Russia
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

25 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

12 of 15 tactics47 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0043Reconnaissance1 technique
T1595Active Scanning
T1595.001Scanning IP Blocks
T1595.002Vulnerability Scanning
TA0042Resource Development2 techniques
T1583Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.003Virtual Private Server
T1588Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002Tool
T1588.005Exploits
T1588.007Artificial Intelligence
TA0001Initial Access3 techniques
T1078Valid Accounts
T1078.004Cloud Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0002Execution2 techniques
T1047Windows Management Instrumentation
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.008Network Device CLI
TA0003Persistence4 techniques
T1078Valid Accounts
T1078.004Cloud Accounts
T1133External Remote Services
T1136Create Account
T1136.001Local Account
T1505Server Software Component
T1505.003Web Shell
TA0004Privilege Escalation1 technique
T1078Valid Accounts
T1078.004Cloud Accounts
TA0005Stealth1 technique
T1078Valid Accounts
T1078.004Cloud Accounts
TA0006Credential Access5 techniques
T1003OS Credential Dumping
T1003.002Security Account Manager
T1003.004LSA Secrets
T1110Brute Force
T1110.001Password Guessing
T1552Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001Credentials In Files
T1555Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
TA0008Lateral Movement2 techniques
T1021Remote Services
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.006Windows Remote Management
T1550Use Alternate Authentication Material
T1550.002Pass the Hash
TA0009Collection1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
TA0011Command and Control1 technique
T1572Protocol Tunneling
TA0010Exfiltration1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service
Vulnerabilities

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has associated with this actor across public reporting. 1 of them is exploited in the wild (not necessarily by this actor).

CVE-2024-555912 evidence · Nov 14, 2026Exploited in the wildSuper-admin authentication bypass in FortiOS and FortiProxyDarkLunnen used a modified proof-of-concept exploit developed by watchTowr for FortiGate CVE-2024-55591, designed to create a backdoor super-admin account named “service”.View vulnerability →
Indicators of compromise

Observables

45 indicators attributed to this actor. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does DarkLunnen target?
DarkLunnen targets Military, Capital Goods, Education & Research, Government & Administration, Health Care Equipment & Services, and Transportation in Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Azerbaijan, Czechia, Germany, Algeria, Türkiye, and 8 more.
What malware does DarkLunnen use?
DarkLunnen is associated with donpapi, dploot, Evil-WinRM, git-dumper, gost, and 9 more.
Where is DarkLunnen from?
Mallory's sources associate DarkLunnen with Russia.
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
ctoatncsc substackNews · Nov 14, 2026CTO at NCSC Summary: week ending November 15thAn alleged Russian operator conducted vulnerability scanning, credential theft, and attempted intrusions across European and neighboring countries. Evidence includes FortiGate exploitation, apparent targeting of Ukrainian defense and aviation organizations, VNC brute forcing, and camera scanning. Identifying vulnerable devices does not establish their compromise; several apparent operations and unrecovered artifacts remain unverified.Read more ↗gurucul threat researchNews · Nov 13, 2026Inside The Server: 14 Months of Offensive Cyber Operations Targeting Europe | Community Portal | GuruculConducted more than 14 months of offensive operations against European organizations, including Ukrainian defense and aviation targets. Activities included attempted exploitation of FortiGate firewalls, VNC brute-force attacks, targeting vulnerable Hikvision cameras, and attempts to access Exchange servers. The operator also obtained stolen VPN credentials from a Romanian organization's firewall configuration. Potential compromises were identified, but not all attacks were confirmed successful. The report lists campaign-associated CVEs without detailing their individual use or exploitation outcomes.Read more ↗risky biz rssNews · Nov 13, 2026Chinese APT uses SS7, Diameter attacks to spy on targetsNewly identified APT targeting organizations in Ukraine, Poland, and unspecified additional European countries. Evidence of its targeting was recovered from an open directory; no specific malware, intrusion techniques, or sponsor is identified.Read more ↗group ibNews · Nov 11, 2026Inside The Server: 14 Months of Offensive Cyber Operations Targeting Europe | Group-IB BlogAn unattributed activity cluster conducting network-appliance exploitation, credential theft, remote-access attacks, internal reconnaissance, and attempted source-code collection, with particular attention to European organizations and Ukrainian defense and aviation. Recovered evidence includes a stolen Romanian FortiGate configuration, extracted VPN passwords, VNC authentication results, Exchange tunneling-webshell deployment commands, and Sliver C2 deployment. Source-code theft, camera compromise, industrial-process manipulation, and the outcomes of several other operations remain unconfirmed. Only 35 of 457 exposed files were recovered. Russian-language artifacts indicate a working language, not an established nationality or state sponsor.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping25MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware14Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEs1CVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Observables45Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.