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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Its name is YDArk and it is an open-source tool available even on GitHub. YDArk is a powerful kernel manipulation tool that appeared in the Chinese underground communities back in 2020.
Its name is YDArk and it is an open-source tool available even on GitHub. YDArk is a powerful kernel manipulation tool that appeared in the Chinese underground communities back in 2020.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
“Some drivers we have observed being leveraged by the Agenda ransomware is YDark, a publicly available tool designed for kernel manipulation.”
Its name is YDArk and it is an open-source tool available even on GitHub. YDArk is a powerful kernel manipulation tool that appeared in the Chinese underground communities back in 2020.
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
YDArk can hide processes the rootkit way: at the kernel level. It manipulates the EPROCESS kernel object of the target process by changing its PID to 0 and redirecting forward and backward ActiveProcessLinks to the self’s EPROCESS address.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A utility deployed during the intrusion to help evade defenses, including through kernel-level process termination techniques.
Publicly available kernel-manipulation tool leveraged in Agenda infection chains as part of vulnerable-driver-based defense evasion.
Open-source kernel-level process-hiding tool that manipulates EPROCESS structures to hide processes by changing the PID and relinking ActiveProcessLinks. The article says Makop used it and notes prior use in campaigns installing LockBit ransomware.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.