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Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

Akdoor

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK13Techniques
IOCs84Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Delivery
Watering hole
Platforms
Windows

Akdoor is a Windows backdoor associated with the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group and described as a variant of NukeSped, also known as Manuscrypt. AhnLab uses Akdoor detection names for malicious components observed in targeted intrusions against South Korean organizations.

Akdoor-detected activity includes maliciously modified legitimate DLL libraries that retain substantial benign code while adding, replacing, or altering exported functions. Analyzed variants use execution arguments, NTFS alternate data streams, or companion data files to decrypt and execute malicious PE payloads in memory. Some operate as Windows services and establish command-and-control communications. This modular design separates executable components from configuration and encrypted payload data. Alternate data streams, in-memory execution, and VMProtect packing conceal malicious functionality and hinder analysis. The initial intrusion vector for these modified-library attacks was not established.

Akdoor detections also occurred in Lazarus's Operation Dream Magic campaign, which exploited vulnerable DreamSecurity MagicLine software through compromised South Korean media websites. The campaign used watering-hole delivery and IP-based filtering to select victims, affecting IT companies, defense firms, media organizations, public institutions, and a digital finance company. AkdoorTea is a separately named backdoor that shares commonalities with Akdoor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Kimsuky

AhnLab’s anti-malware software, V3, is currently detecting and blocking the files using the following aliases. – VBS file: Dropper/VBS.Akdoor

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
Lazarus

vuproc.sys ... Trojan/Win.Akdoor

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

악성 Export 함수 호출 시 ‘-s’ 로 시작하는 유효 인자가 전달되어야 동작한다.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Upon running the script file with the VBS extension... Ultimately, when the user runs the VBS, a malicious activity commences in parallel with the execution of the PDF file.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

매직라인 취약점을 악용한 워터링 홀은 ... 언론사 기사 클릭할 때 악성코드에 감염되는 조건은 IP 필터링과 매직라인 취약점이 존재해야 합니다.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Ultimately, when the user runs the VBS, a malicious activity commences in parallel with the execution of the PDF file.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

정상 라이브러리(DLL) 파일의 Export 정보를 변조(추가, 교체, 변경)한 악성 파일 ... 정상 라이브러리 파일에 Export 함수를 새로 추가하거나 함수 형식을 교체, 또는 기존 함수의 코드를 변경하는 방식으로 악성 파일을 제작하였다.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

만약 파일명이 동일했다면 공격자가 라이브러리 파일을 교체하는 DLL 하이재킹(Hijacking) 방식으로 악성코드를 실행했을 가능성이 있다.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

ServiceMain 함수이기 때문에 윈도우 서비스로 동작한다.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

ServiceMain 함수이기 때문에 윈도우 서비스로 동작한다.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

또한 기존 VC++ 파일을 Vmprotect로 패킹하여 전체 코드 패턴을 바꿨기 때문에 코드 변경 여부와 기능 파악을 어렵게 하였다.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

zone과 data 스트림은 각각 암호화된 데이터와 암호를 풀기위한 키 데이터이다.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The attacker also added ‘.pdf’ in front of the extension to trick users... resulting in the users mistaking the file for a PDF file even though it is a VBS file.

T1564.004NTFS File AttributesEvidence1

실행 과정에서 ADS (Alternate Data Streams) 데이터를 읽는다. ADS를 이용해 실행에 필요한 악성 데이터를 사용자 눈에 보이지 않게 숨겼다.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

정상 라이브러리(DLL) 파일의 Export 정보를 변조(추가, 교체, 변경)한 악성 파일 ... 정상 라이브러리 파일에 Export 함수를 새로 추가하거나 함수 형식을 교체, 또는 기존 함수의 코드를 변경하는 방식으로 악성 파일을 제작하였다.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

만약 파일명이 동일했다면 공격자가 라이브러리 파일을 교체하는 DLL 하이재킹(Hijacking) 방식으로 악성코드를 실행했을 가능성이 있다.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

인자를 이용하여 내부 연산을 하고 이후 메모리에서 악성 PE를 실행한다.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

C2 통신 119.205.211.85:443 ... hxxps://hiwoosung.com/ ... hxxps://www.hds-secu.com/

Indicators of compromise

Observables

84 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching84Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping13Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.