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Malware1 associated actor

Brushaloader

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs93Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA544

BrushaLoader is one of a growing group of downloaders frequently employed by threat actors to profile infected PCs and then load more robust payloads on devices of interest.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Most of the malware distribution activity that we observe associated with Brushaloader leverages malicious email campaigns targeting specific geographic regions to distribute various malware payloads, primarily Danabot.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

The malicious emails contain RAR archives. The RAR archives typically contain a VBScript (VBS) that is responsible for making an HTTP request to an attacker-controlled distribution server to download a malicious PE32 executable.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This code is responsible for establishing a remote, interactive session with the infected system that is then used to execute commands on the infected system retrieve the command output.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

One of the most significant changes in this campaign was the move toward PowerShell and away from wscript that was previously used to execute commands, gather system information, and provide additional payloads.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

Brushaloader also leverages a combination of VBScript and PowerShell to create a Remote Access Trojan (RAT) that allows persistent command execution on infected systems.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

We derived the name for this VisualBasic/JavaScript/PowerShell loader...

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The downloader functionality present within the VBS file does not activate until the OK button is selected.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The LNK shortcut contains Powershell, which is responsible for querying the contents of a registry key for additional commands to execute each time the system is rebooted.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The Powershell process running on the infected system also achieves persistence by creating a Windows shortcut (LNK) which is added to the Startup directory on the system.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The Powershell process running on the infected system also achieves persistence by creating a Windows shortcut (LNK) which is added to the Startup directory on the system.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The downloader scripts leveraged in various Brushaloader campaigns have also made use of invalid domains as a way to determine whether or not the downloader is executed in an analysis environment where network simulation is occurring.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

A majority of the checking and evasion techniques were removed, except some extended sleep commands to timeout some sandbox technologies.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The LNK shortcut contains Powershell, which is responsible for querying the contents of a registry key for additional commands to execute each time the system is rebooted.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

As can be seen in the screenshot above, the loader attempts to enumerate the following information about systems being infected: ProcessorId Windows operating system version Currently logged in Username Installed Antivirus Products System Make/Manufacturer Powershell version IP address information Available memory Current Working Directory System Installation Date/Time Display Adapter Information

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The downloader scripts leveraged in various Brushaloader campaigns have also made use of invalid domains as a way to determine whether or not the downloader is executed in an analysis environment where network simulation is occurring.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

A majority of the checking and evasion techniques were removed, except some extended sleep commands to timeout some sandbox technologies.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Figure 2: HTTP portion of BrushaLoader delivery and post-infection activity...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

First is the adversaries have moved to HTTPS traffic and are utilizing a domain instead of a hard-coded IP. Additionally, the type of request has changed from a GET to a POST.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

This communication occurs over a raw TCP "parallel" channel to BrushaLoader.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The VBS file is responsible for making an HTTP request to an attacker-controlled distribution server to download a malicious PE32 executable.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

93 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching93Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.