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Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

CRAT

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK41Techniques
IOCs141Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

CRAT is a modular Windows remote access trojan first observed in 2020 and used in targeted intrusions against South Korean users and organizations. It has been associated in multiple investigations with Lazarus-linked or broader North Korea-aligned tradecraft, and later reporting connected historical CRAT activity with the Larva-26005 cluster and overlap with Xctdoor and Hansom ransomware operations.

CRAT functions as a standalone RAT and also supports downloading and activating additional plugins from command-and-control infrastructure. Documented capabilities include system reconnaissance, collection of host and security-product information, file and directory enumeration, file read/write and movement operations, command execution, reverse shell access, and data exfiltration. Observed plugin functionality includes screen capture, clipboard monitoring, keylogging, and deployment of the Hansom ransomware component. In some cases, CRAT operators also used credential-stealing tooling to extract browser-stored credentials.

The malware uses multiple defense-evasion and anti-analysis measures, including string obfuscation, dynamic API resolution, runtime code patching, anti-debugging checks, and anti-infection logic based on host artifacts and analysis-tool blocklists. It commonly injects or reflectively loads itself into legitimate Windows processes and can activate DLL plugins through native Windows utilities or in-memory loading. Persistence has been established through scheduled tasks, services, shortcut files, and autorun mechanisms, often via dedicated EXE or DLL loaders that ultimately load the CRAT payload.

Observed delivery has included spear-phishing with malicious Hangul Word Processor documents exploiting CVE-2017-8291, as well as trojanized software distributed through South Korean community sites. Lures have included Korean-language themes such as public-health and business-related subjects. Reporting on later activity indicates operational continuity between CRAT-era campaigns and subsequent Xctdoor intrusions, including shared obfuscation patterns, similar installation conventions, and overlap with Hansom ransomware deployment. CRAT is therefore best understood as a modular RAT platform used in targeted espionage and financially motivated operations against Korean-speaking victims.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-8291via talosintelligence otherExploited in the wildGhostscript .rsdparams Type Confusion and SAFER BypassCisco Talos has observed a new version of a remote access trojan (RAT) family known as CRAT. Apart from the prebuilt RAT capabilities, the malware can download and deploy additional malicious plugins on the infected endpoint.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

Cisco Talos has observed a new version of a remote access trojan (RAT) family known as CRAT. Apart from the prebuilt RAT capabilities, the malware can download and deploy additional malicious plugins on the infected endpoint.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Larva-26005

"Analysis of the Connection Between Xctdoor and Past CRAT Attack Cases (Larva-26005)" published by Ahnlab. #CVE20178291, #Phishing, #LNK, #Xctdoor, #CRAT, #Larva26005, #Hansom

via lazarusholic blueskybsky.app
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

41 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

"Analysis of the Connection Between Xctdoor and Past CRAT Attack Cases (Larva-26005)" published by Ahnlab. #CVE20178291, #Phishing, #LNK, #Xctdoor, #CRAT, #Larva26005, #Hansom

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

The first version of CRAT has been known to be distributed via malicious HWPs. The HWPs masquerade as a COVID-19 themed document pertaining to an infectious disease management support group from South Korea.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Establish persistence for itself using a scheduled task on the infected endpoint. Usually scheduled to run once every few minutes.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

Execute commands with two variations of the functionality: Simply execute the command on the endpoint. Execute a command and send output of command to C2.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Shellcode executing PowerShell to download and activate CRATv1 via regsvr32.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Enumerate drives using the 'dir' command: cmd /c "dir <drive_name> /s >> %temp%\<custom_prefix>error.log"

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

This variant will create a VBS file to run rar.exe to extract CRAT components.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The HWPs consisted of an exploit for CVE-2017-8291 used to activate malicious shellcode.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

"Analysis of the Connection Between Xctdoor and Past CRAT Attack Cases (Larva-26005)" published by Ahnlab. #CVE20178291, #Phishing, #LNK, #Xctdoor, #CRAT, #Larva26005, #Hansom

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence1

It attempts to connect to a named pipe named “\\.\Pipe\ChromeUpdatePipe” and, if successful, transmits the payload; the co-installed injector module can read from that named pipe and inject the received payload into a legitimate process.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Establish persistence for itself using a scheduled task on the infected endpoint. Usually scheduled to run once every few minutes.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Create and run a malicious service on the endpoint to run itself.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The loader may also obtain persistence using a registry RUN key.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

여기까지의 과정이 끝나면 지속성 유지를 위해 시작 프로그램 경로에 바로가기를 생성하고 실행하는 데 XcLoader를 RegSvr32를 통해 실행시키는 명령이다.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Establish persistence for itself using a scheduled task on the infected endpoint. Usually scheduled to run once every few minutes.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Depending on the MS Windows OS version, it will inject and reflectively-load itself into the right process.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Create and run a malicious service on the endpoint to run itself.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The loader may also obtain persistence using a registry RUN key.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

여기까지의 과정이 끝나면 지속성 유지를 위해 시작 프로그램 경로에 바로가기를 생성하고 실행하는 데 XcLoader를 RegSvr32를 통해 실행시키는 명령이다.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The RAT consists of multiple obfuscation techniques to hide strings, API names, command and control (C2) URLs and instrumental functions, along with static detection evasion.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Runtime Code Patching: The malware consists of a select few instrumental subroutines that are decoded, executed and then patched/encoded again (during runtime).

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

API Resolution: All APIs used are resolved dynamically. The process of selecting the API to call is also a cumbersome algorithm... involving index tables, switch cases and API name deobfuscation.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The attackers have also used file names and export API names in the CRAT DLLs to masquerade the RAT as a benign application's library.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

Depending on the MS Windows OS version, it will inject and reflectively-load itself into the right process.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

This command also deletes the target file once it has been added to the archive.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

The implant will also timestomp the tmp file to either a hardcoded value or copy the filetimes from a system file such as %windir%\system32\user32.dll.

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence3

For DLL plugins: Activate using regsvr32.exe

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

For DLL plugins: Activate using rundll32.exe

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The implant performs checks to verify its execution on an allowed endpoint. The implant uses a variety of criteria to identify a blocklisted system by utilizing: Process name blocklists Network adapter name blocklists MAC Address blocklists Analysis tool names blocklists

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Depending on the MS Windows OS version, it will inject and reflectively-load itself into the right process.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The implant also checks for indicators that the process is being debugged (including CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent). If the infected endpoint fails any of the anti-infection checks, the implant quits execution.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

The keylogger plugin monitors the state of all the alphanumeric keys pressed.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

STEAL BROWSER PASSWORDS: CHROMEPASS Execute chromepass.exe with the /stext switch to obtain the usernames and passwords stored in Google Chrome.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Execute chromepass.exe with the /stext switch to obtain the usernames and passwords stored in Google Chrome.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

TCP/IP enabled MAC Addresses using WMI query: wmic PATH Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration WHERE IPEnabled=TRUE GET MACAddress.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Flag if the current user has administrative privileges

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Collects the following system information: Installed AntiVirus software names Installed FirewallProduct names Domain Names... Path to the system folder Flag if the current user has administrative privileges

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3

Collects size information about all files and folders on the infected endpoint... Enumerate drives using the 'dir' command | CRAT has the capability to read the contents of the file specified by the C2 and exfiltrate these to the C2.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The implant performs checks to verify its execution on an allowed endpoint. The implant uses a variety of criteria to identify a blocklisted system by utilizing: Process name blocklists Network adapter name blocklists MAC Address blocklists Analysis tool names blocklists

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The implant also checks for indicators that the process is being debugged (including CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent). If the infected endpoint fails any of the anti-infection checks, the implant quits execution.

Collection

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

The keylogger plugin monitors the state of all the alphanumeric keys pressed.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

The screen capture plugin will capture the current foreground window (every second or so) and save the screenshot to a .tmp file in a hardcoded directory.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence3

This plugin will read the clipboard data and write the contents of the clipboard to a log file.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

The log file is then rolled up into a '.rar' archive using a pre-existing installation of a RAR archiver program... The RAR archive is then read to memory and exfiltrated to the C2

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Both versions of CRAT use HTTP to communicate with the C2 servers.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Downloads and installs a malicious plugin from the C2.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

Generate a random four-byte value (DWORD). XOR the data to be exfiltrated with the DWORD. Base64-encode... Exfiltrate the encoded data as URL encoded form data.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

REVERSE SHELL Open up a reverse command shell for arbitrary command execution using Windows pipes.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

When transmitting data, it is segmented... and sent to the C2 server... 3 Transmission of shell command results... 17 Transmit keylog data... 18 Send data whenever the clipboard content changes... 24 Submitting Screenshots

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

Cisco Talos의 보고서에 따르면 Hansom 랜섬웨어를 설치해 감염 시스템을 암호화하였는데 국내 ASD 로그에서도 동일한 유형의 공격 사례가 확인되었다.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

141 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching141Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping41Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.