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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Magic Cat

Tracked since Mar 18, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationDefense evasionSpoofing
Delivery
SmishingLanding pageLure
Platforms
Windows

Magic Cat is a phishing kit used in the Darcula phishing-as-a-service ecosystem to enable large-scale smishing campaigns and real-time theft of personal and payment-card data. It has been used to impersonate trusted organizations, including postal, government, toll-road, and delivery brands, and is designed to lower the technical barrier for criminal operators by providing a turnkey phishing platform with brand templates, operator tooling, and licensing controls.

The platform targets victims primarily through mobile-focused phishing flows delivered by text-based messaging, including SMS, iMessage, and RCS. Lures commonly claim that a package or delivery is on hold and direct victims to mobile phishing pages that request address details, payment-card information, and in some cases additional verification data such as PIN codes. Magic Cat includes anti-analysis and access-filtering logic intended to restrict phishing pages to mobile devices on cellular networks, hindering casual inspection from desktop environments.

Magic Cat supports real-time interaction between the victim-facing page and backend operators. Victim-entered data is streamed live to an operator dashboard, allowing scammers to monitor submissions as they occur and prompt victims for additional information when needed. The platform also supports SMS gateway integration and broad template-based impersonation across many brands and countries, making it suitable for international fraud operations at scale.

The backend has been observed to include commercial-style activation and license-management functionality. Individual deployments can generate and manage license keys, enforce expiration dates, annotate licenses, and limit the number of phishing templates available to a customer. This indicates that Magic Cat functions not merely as a single phishing kit but as a managed scamware product distributed to other criminals.

Magic Cat has been associated with the Darcula operation, which has been linked to extensive global smishing activity and large-scale theft of payment-card data. Reporting has attributed a substantial share of phishing text-message activity during peak periods to Darcula and tied the ecosystem to Telegram-based criminal communities supporting infrastructure, operations, and monetization. Researchers also identified logic suggesting a possible hidden authorization bypass or developer backdoor in the backend, though the exact intent of that functionality is not definitively established.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Darcula

In the Telegram group we also found a pinned message with installation instructions for the phishing software itself. We used a spare laptop, followed the instructions and minutes later, we had installed a copy of the same phishing software that had been used against us: Magic Cat.

via mnemonic blogmnemonic.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Such messages have one thing in common: they impersonate a brand that we trust to create a credible context for soliciting some kind of personal information, thus tricking us into willfully giving away our information.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The group leveraged their Magic Cat software to allow scammers with limited technical skill to impersonate trusted organizations like the USPS, IRS, and E-ZPass.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

This additional encryption acts as an obfuscation layer to hide the inner workings of the phishing protocol.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The sender claims to be the Norwegian Postal Service, informing us that a delivery is on hold until ‘missing’ address details are provided.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The first features were implemented in an effort to ensure the links could only be visited by mobile devices on cellular networks. Such features are often used so security solutions that do not meet these criteria would not be able to inspect the link for malicious content.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The first features were implemented in an effort to ensure the links could only be visited by mobile devices on cellular networks. Such features are often used so security solutions that do not meet these criteria would not be able to inspect the link for malicious content.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Everything they typed in, character by character, we could see on our screen.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.