MalwareUsed by 1 actor

pgmon

For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

TeamPCP

Concurrently, a worm variant designated CanisterWorm was observed using the ICP canister C2 infrastructure to propagate across Kubernetes environments, masquerading as systemd services and the PostgreSQL utility pgmon, and executing recursive file deletion in affected clusters.

via cloud security alliancelabs.cloudsecurityalliance.org

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

It checks for the existence of specific files and directories associated with a persistent backdoor, including configuration paths under $HOME/.config/sysmon/ and files in /tmp/. It also verifies if a user service named sysmon.service is active using systemctl.

Persistence

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

may install a persistent systemd backdoor that polls for further payloads.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

may install a persistent systemd backdoor that polls for further payloads.

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Beyond stealing credentials and achieving persistence, the threat actors also masqueraded their activity as legitimate services like systemd and disguised the threat as a PostgreSQL utility called pgmon.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

theravenfile blogNews

Apr 2, 2026

Inside TeamPCP’s Shell Arsenal - THE RAVEN FILE

A persistent Python backdoor that disguises itself as a PostgreSQL monitoring service to evade detection on Linux systems.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

pgmon

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

TeamPCP

via cloud security alliancelabs.cloudsecurityalliance.org

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

Persistence

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

may install a persistent systemd backdoor that polls for further payloads.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

may install a persistent systemd backdoor that polls for further payloads.

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

theravenfile blogNews

Apr 2, 2026

Inside TeamPCP’s Shell Arsenal - THE RAVEN FILE

A persistent Python backdoor that disguises itself as a PostgreSQL monitoring service to evade detection on Linux systems.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.