Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

RedXOR

Tracked since Mar 26, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Platforms
Linux

RedXOR is a Linux backdoor assessed to be linked to Chinese state-sponsored activity, based on victimology, operational tradecraft, and code similarities with malware associated with the Winnti ecosystem. It masquerades as a legitimate policy-management daemon and uses the Adore-ng Linux kernel-module rootkit to conceal its process. RedXOR establishes persistence through system initialization service entries and runs detached in the background. Its configuration, including command-and-control settings, is stored encrypted in the binary. The backdoor communicates over TCP using XOR-based data encoding and traffic formatted to resemble HTTP. It provides system reconnaissance, file-management, pseudo-terminal shell access, self-update and uninstall functions, rootkit installation, and network port-mapping functionality implemented using a modified Rinetd component. RedXOR targets Linux endpoints and servers.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
APT41

We named it RedXOR for its network data encoding scheme based on XOR. Based on victimology, as well as similar components and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), we believe RedXOR was developed by high profile Chinese threat actors.

via intezer blogintezer.com
Axiom

The group uses a variety of TTPs including but not limited to LoTL tactics, phishing, ransomware, cryptocurrency mining, supply chain attacks, China Chopper, Gh0st RaT, PlugX, HighNoon, Derusbi, BioPass RAT, RedXOR, and ShadowPad.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

If a shell is requested via the command code 3000, the malware creates a new thread executing “/bin/sh”.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

In the new spawned shell, the malware executes python -c "import pty;pty.spawn('/bin/sh')” to get a pseudo-terminal (pty) interface.

Persistence

1 technique
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

After installing the binary to the hidden folder, the malware sets up persistence via “init” scripts. The following files are created after executing the malware on boot: /usr/syno/etc/rc.d/S99po1kitd-update.sh /etc/init.d/po1kitd-update /etc/rc2.d/S99po1kitd-update

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence1

After installing the binary to the hidden folder, the malware sets up persistence via “init” scripts. The following files are created after executing the malware on boot: /usr/syno/etc/rc.d/S99po1kitd-update.sh /etc/init.d/po1kitd-update /etc/rc2.d/S99po1kitd-update

Stealth

5 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence2

“LKM rootkits leverage different kernel features to hook kernel functions” and are used “to hide malicious activity by hooking execution flow.”

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

A 2.7 MB ELF binary with near-maximum entropy (7.997 bits per byte across ~832 KB of code). The obfuscation isn't packing -- it's a custom code virtualizer or instruction-level transformation that renders static analysis effectively impossible without dedicated devirtualization tooling.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The backdoor masquerades itself as polkit daemon.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

If this fails, it executes an “mv” shell command via the “system” function

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

It does this to create a hidden folder, called “.po1kitd.thumb”, inside the user’s home folder which is used to store files related to the malware.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata APIEvidence1

The most operationally significant capability is the backdoor's access to cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254 . This is the link-local address that every major cloud provider uses to serve instance credentials, API tokens, and configuration data to running workloads.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The C2 server responds with the command code 0 to collect system information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

2049 List folder

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The backdoor encodes its network data with a scheme based on XOR.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware communicates with the C2 server over a TCP socket. The traffic is made to look like HTTP traffic.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

Network tunneling is enabled by sending the command code 4001 to the malware.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Both have file uploading and downloading functionalities together with a running shell.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

the new controller is its continued use of the legacy RC4-MD5 encryption routine... a lightweight encryption layer applied to the interactive command-and-control channel after the backdoor is activated.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+1 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.