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Mallory
Malware

Venus

Tracked since Mar 27, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationLateral movementReconnaissanceBrute forceExtortion
Platforms
Windows

Venus is a Windows ransomware family used in intrusions that have been linked to operators also deploying Crysis. Observed attacks commonly begin with compromise of externally exposed Remote Desktop Protocol services through brute-force or dictionary attacks against weak credentials. After gaining access, operators use the foothold for credential theft, internal reconnaissance, and lateral movement, including deployment of tools such as Mimikatz and NirSoft utilities to identify additional reachable systems and harvest account data before encryption.

On execution, Venus encrypts victim files and appends a dedicated extension to affected data. It drops an HTML ransom note, alters the desktop to present extortion instructions, and is associated with claims that data was stolen in addition to file encryption. Prior to encryption, it terminates a range of business, office, mail, and database-related processes to maximize file access. It also excludes selected system and application paths and avoids encrypting certain self-referential note-related names.

Venus includes recovery-inhibition behavior typical of modern ransomware. It deletes volume shadow copies and modifies recovery-related settings through native administrative utilities to hinder restoration. In reported incidents, Venus was sometimes deployed after an attempted Crysis encryption failed, indicating it can serve as an alternate locker within the same intrusion workflow. The family has also been referenced as an influence on later ransomware development, including cryptographic design elements borrowed by GenieLocker. Victimology in documented cases reflects opportunistic enterprise targeting via exposed remote administration services rather than a narrowly defined sector focus.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Threat actors can use the obtained account credentials to log in to the system through RDP, allowing them to gain control over the system in question and perform a variety of malicious actions.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

It was found that most servers that were abused as malware command-and-control sites were infiltrated through SQL injection vulnerabilities or file upload vulnerabilities.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Threat actors can use the obtained account credentials to log in to the system through RDP, allowing them to gain control over the system in question and perform a variety of malicious actions.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

Web shells are inserted to secure redundant access to web servers that are being abused as C&Cs.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Threat actors can use the obtained account credentials to log in to the system through RDP, allowing them to gain control over the system in question and perform a variety of malicious actions.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Threat actors can use the obtained account credentials to log in to the system through RDP, allowing them to gain control over the system in question and perform a variety of malicious actions.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The command used by Venus to delete volume shadow copies are as follows. > cmd.exe /C wbadmin delete catalog -quiet && vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet && bcdedit.exe /set {current} nx AlwaysOff && wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Systems found during this scanning process are subject to brute force or dictionary attacks. If a user has inappropriate account credentials, then threat actors can easily take those very credentials.

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Venus first terminates various programs such as Office, email clients, and databases to encrypt more files.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Using the collected account information, lateral movement can occur to other systems within the network. In an actual attack case involving Crysis, the threat actor used RDP for lateral movement into other systems within the network. | Crysis and Venus are both major ransomware types known to target externally exposed remote desktop services. Actual logs from the AhnLab Smart Defense (ASD) infrastructure also show attacks being launched through RDP.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

The threat actor ultimately executed Crysis to encrypt the system, and after recognizing failure after a few hours, retried the attack using Venus.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

Venus first terminates various programs such as Office, email clients, and databases to encrypt more files.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

The command used by Venus to delete volume shadow copies are as follows. > cmd.exe /C wbadmin delete catalog -quiet && vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet && bcdedit.exe /set {current} nx AlwaysOff && wmic SHADOWCOPY DELETE

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.