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Malware

Trik

Tracked since Apr 3, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs52Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
Initial accessPersistenceScanningBrute forceLateral movementDefense evasion
Delivery
MalspamUSB
Platforms
Windows

Phorpiex, also known as Trik, is a long-running Windows botnet and malware distribution platform derived from SDBot. Active for roughly a decade, it has been used by multiple threat actors to propagate itself and to deliver additional malware families, including ransomware, credential-stealing malware, spam bot payloads, and cryptocurrency miners. It is distinct from TrickBot despite the similar name.

Historically, Phorpiex spread through removable USB media, Windows Live Messenger, and Skype messaging. Later activity shows continued propagation through removable media and large-scale spam operations. The botnet has also been observed distributing ransomware families such as Nemty and serving as an access and delivery layer for other malware including GandCrab, Pushdo, and Pony.

Phorpiex uses IRC-based command and control and receives encrypted payload delivery instructions from its operators. Campaigns commonly involve downloading and executing additional malware or using infected hosts to distribute payloads via spam. Operators have demonstrated the ability to recover from sinkholing and to rotate or reuse infrastructure across campaigns. Some variants include anti-analysis logic, including checks for debugging and analysis environments, while other observed versions removed much of that functionality.

A notable later capability involved SMB-based worming to support ransomware deployment. In that mode, the malware scanned random public IP space for systems exposing SMB services, attempted authentication using hardcoded administrator usernames and weak or default passwords, copied itself to successfully accessed hosts, and launched remotely through the Windows Service Control Manager. In observed Nemty-related operations, this logic was used to determine whether a host had already been infected by Phorpiex and, if not, to download and execute the ransomware while continuing propagation.

Phorpiex has primarily targeted Windows systems and has functioned both as a self-propagating botnet and as a malware delivery service. Its long operational lifespan, spam capability, removable-media propagation, and support for secondary payload deployment have made it a durable criminal distribution platform.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence4

USB / rem drive spreader... create shortcut with the name of the drive and drive icon when open the shortcut it will open the hidden folder with all files and the bot

T1566PhishingEvidence3

The Phorpiex team operates by infecting Windows computers and using these systems as spam bots to send out massive spam campaigns. These spam campaigns keep the spam botnet alive, by infecting new PCs with Phorpiex, but they also send out custom spam campaigns on behalf of other cybercrime groups.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

The criminals behind the botnet use the infected computers to send email spam and have been observed pushing out a wide range of malware families, with Nemty being the latest to join the list.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

if logged in, it downloads your file with powershell and bitsadmin

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

if logged in, it downloads your file with powershell and bitsadmin

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

bot automatically download, decrypt and execute them

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

It then uses the Windows Service Control Manager to start the SMB component’s process on the remote machine.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

First, the SMB component creates the following registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List\"[PATH OF THE ORIGINAL FILE]" = "[PATH OF THE ORIGINAL FILE]:*:Enabled: Windows NetBIOS Driver"

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

if logged in, it downloads your file with powershell and bitsadmin

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Tries to copy to %systemdrive% and create regkey @ HKLM, if this fails it moves to %userprofile% and create regkey @ HKCU

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

create shortcut with the name of the drive and drive icon when open the shortcut it will open the hidden folder with all files and the bot

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

PE Infector... infect them with ddownload and exec shellcode Infection works with 32 and 64 bit files

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Tries to copy to %systemdrive% and create regkey @ HKLM, if this fails it moves to %userprofile% and create regkey @ HKCU

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

create shortcut with the name of the drive and drive icon when open the shortcut it will open the hidden folder with all files and the bot

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

It also uses API Hashing to conceal the Windows functions it calls at runtime, and builds suspicious strings in memory byte by byte to bypass static security scanners.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

This version of Trik uses a .NET loader that has the main bot split into several encrypted pieces saved in the resources of the .NET loader.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

To avoid detection, the malware silently adds itself to the Windows Firewall’s list of allowed programs under the name “Microsoft Corporation,” making it appear as a trusted system component.

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

PE Infector... infect them with ddownload and exec shellcode Infection works with 32 and 64 bit files

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

if logged in, it downloads your file with powershell and bitsadmin

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

operators have backtracked in sophistication by removing the anti-VM code from most of the samples we detected. However, they retained some of these features in other samples, including a version that uses a .NET loader and performs very basic anti-analysis.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Version v2.5 of Trik performs the following: Snapshot current running process, query a hardcoded list of common analysis tools... Query a list of hardcoded users... Determine if it is being debugged with IsDebuggerPresent.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Determine if it is being debugged with IsDebuggerPresent.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

First, the SMB component creates the following registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List\"[PATH OF THE ORIGINAL FILE]" = "[PATH OF THE ORIGINAL FILE]:*:Enabled: Windows NetBIOS Driver"

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

To avoid detection, the malware silently adds itself to the Windows Firewall’s list of allowed programs under the name “Microsoft Corporation,” making it appear as a trusted system component.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

The malware can infect public IP addresses with port 139 open that are using any of the common administrator usernames and passwords on its list.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

it will scans all drives including USB and remote drives for .exe files and infect them

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

operators have backtracked in sophistication by removing the anti-VM code from most of the samples we detected. However, they retained some of these features in other samples, including a version that uses a .NET loader and performs very basic anti-analysis.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Version v2.5 of Trik performs the following: Snapshot current running process, query a hardcoded list of common analysis tools... Query a list of hardcoded users... Determine if it is being debugged with IsDebuggerPresent.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Determine if it is being debugged with IsDebuggerPresent.

Lateral Movement

4 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

VNC Spreader and autoinfector... checks for port 5900, if port is open it start bruteforce and if logged in, it downloads your file with powershell and bitsadmin

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

To find targets, the SMB component generates random IP addresses then tries to connect to them on port 139... If access is granted, the malware uses the SMB protocol to copy itself to the remote machine.

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence4

USB / rem drive spreader... create shortcut with the name of the drive and drive icon when open the shortcut it will open the hidden folder with all files and the bot

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The malware also spreads to removable USB drives and shared network folders by dropping a hidden executable named DrvMgr.exe alongside a disguised shortcut file (.lnk) that launches Phorpiex on any machine where the infected drive is connected.

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

The malware alters crypto wallet addresses in a clipboard, and the money is transferred to the wallet that belongs to the malware operators.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

"The developer for the Phorpiex botnet is extremely lazy and careless," the malware analyst said, claiming that he could have also hijacked the botnet in the past due to its simplistic IRC-based command and control mechanism.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Trik nodes communicate with their C&C servers using the IRC protocol and campaign payloads are sent to the bot in an encrypted state using a custom implementation of RC4.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Trik uses a layer of SOCKS proxies to hide the real C&C servers.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

It combines traditional command-and-control (C2) servers with a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, meaning that even if one server is taken down, the botnet continues to operate because infected machines talk directly to each other.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

When we did spot IRC C&C servers online, we managed to capture a command for loading another malware to the infected machines... Tldr is a downloader that uses HTTP protocol for communication with C&C servers. Its main purpose is to load another malware on the infected machines.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence1

We also noticed that, shortly after a spam campaign, the C&Cs would close their C&C port until the following day at which point it would re-open, ready for a new campaign.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Credentials, wallets, and browser cookies exfiltrated from victims will be processed on whichever panel belongs to the customer who ran the worm — not only on the one panel we originally documented.

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

The April 20 report focused on one Needle panel — 178.16.54[.]109 — and documented it end-to-end from the Phorpiex/Trik delivery worm through the wallet-drainer capability set, the private Monero mining pool on :6060

Indicators of compromise

Observables

52 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching52Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping32Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.