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Malware2 associated actors

DEV#POPPER RAT

Tracked since Apr 5, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Contagious Interview

Updated DEV#POPPER RAT versions inserted code into VS Code, Cursor, and Discord to execute whenever those applications started.

via cryptika blogcryptika.com
PolinRider

The decrypted payloads then deploy remote access malware, including DEV#POPPER RAT and OmniStealer, to exfiltrate data from the compromised systems.

via cysecurity newscysecurity.news
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Contagious Interview ... approaches prospective targets and tricks them into executing malicious code from a fake repository as part of an assessment. Some of these efforts have used weaponized Node.js projects hosted on GitHub.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Contagious Interview ... tricks them into executing malicious code from a fake repository as part of an assessment.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence5

PolinRider is a DPRK-linked supply-chain campaign... takes over legitimate GitHub accounts and quietly injects an obfuscated JavaScript loader into repositories the maintainer already owns.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence3

SlippyNunchucks cible des individus sinophones au Sri Lanka via le détournement des mises à jour de QuickFox pour déployer le toolset DarkVigil (aka FDMTP) ; DeceptiveDevelopment remonte la chaîne d’approvisionnement logicielle : vol de credentials Git/SSH, injection de code malveillant dans des dépôts publics/privés

Execution

8 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

It can also quietly launch a second hidden process in the background using child_process.spawn() with the windowsHide flag set to true, keeping everything out of sight on Windows systems.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

T1059.004 — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell (Execution)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence4

Les deux versions malveillantes contiennent un implant JavaScript injecté au moment du bundling ... qui s’exécute au chargement du module (import-time)

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The malware sits quietly inside what looks like a standard Tailwind CSS configuration file... Once that obfuscated code runs, it quietly transforms into a full JavaScript malware loader operating inside Node.js.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

The tasks.json catches developers using VS Code (triggering on folder open), while the injected JavaScript executes for anyone who builds or runs the project regardless of their IDE.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Contagious Interview ... tricks them into executing malicious code from a fake repository as part of an assessment.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK # T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File

T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order HijackingEvidence1

For persistence, it injects versioned code (markers: C250617A through C250620A) into developer applications (e.g., Antigravity, VS Code, Cursor, Discord, GitHub Desktop) and creates a hidden .node_modules folder for Node.js module search order hijacking.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

For persistence, it injects versioned code (markers: C250617A through C250620A) into developer applications (e.g., Antigravity, VS Code, Cursor, Discord, GitHub Desktop)

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Persistance dans VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity (@vscode/deviceid), Discord Desktop, GitHub Desktop, npm CLI global

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Persistance dans VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity (@vscode/deviceid), Discord Desktop, GitHub Desktop, npm CLI global

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The appended JavaScript is obfuscated and reconstructs its real behavior at runtime... A large whitespace gap hides the malicious payload after the legitimate Tailwind configuration, making it easy to miss in code review.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

L’implant utilise un mécanisme de résolution de payload via des transactions blockchain publiques (Tron, Aptos, BNB Smart Chain) pour récupérer du code chiffré, le déchiffrer par XOR, et l’évaluer dynamiquement.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The malware sits quietly inside what looks like a standard Tailwind CSS configuration file... Once that obfuscated code runs, it quietly transforms into a full JavaScript malware loader operating inside Node.js.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The loader uses hardcoded XOR keys to decrypt the material it retrieves and then runs the result directly inside Node.js using eval().

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The RAT specifically detects and avoids CI/CD environments (e.g., GitLab CI, BuildBot) and cloud sandboxes, executing only on real developer workstations.

T1574.008Path Interception by Search Order HijackingEvidence1

For persistence, it injects versioned code (markers: C250617A through C250620A) into developer applications (e.g., Antigravity, VS Code, Cursor, Discord, GitHub Desktop) and creates a hidden .node_modules folder for Node.js module search order hijacking.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The RAT specifically detects and avoids CI/CD environments (e.g., GitLab CI, BuildBot) and cloud sandboxes, executing only on real developer workstations.

Collection

1 technique
T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

Collecte : informations système, liste de processus Windows, IP publique via ip-api.com, données clipboard

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

InvisibleFerret implant (also reported as DEV#POPPER RAT and OmniStealer) for credential theft, browser-data theft, wallet exfiltration, and socket.io-based C2.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Loader de 5 849 octets configurant le endpoint Socket.IO (166.88.134.62:443) ... Requête vers 23.27.13.43/$/boot avec header Sec-V: A9-0135-3

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK # T1102.001 — Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence7

Peut provisionner Python et télécharger un infostealer Python ... Deuxième résolution blockchain pour récupérer le RAT final

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

T1041 — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel (Exfiltration)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.