Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Threat hunters continually look for efficient ways to identify command-and-control (C2) servers
When threat actors abuse github.com or githubusercontent.com, they host malware directly inside repositories or attach malicious files to comments on legitimate projects. Since github.com download links often redirect through raw.githubusercontent.com for direct file retrieval, malware can be fetched silently in the background without any visible user interaction.
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A named malware family observed being delivered via abused GitHub/GitLab links in phishing campaigns.
Named malware/tool family listed as detectable via favicon hash hunting of exposed infrastructure.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.