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Mallory
Malware4 associated CVEs

Hidden Bee

Tracked since Apr 11, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Cryptominer
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
Exploit kitDrive by
Platforms
Windows

Hidden Bee is a Windows cryptocurrency-mining malware family associated with the Underminer exploit kit and active since at least 2018. It is also referred to as Hidden Mellifera. The malware is notable for distributing its components in proprietary executable formats derived from but substantially stripped down from the Portable Executable format, including formats referred to as NE and NS. These custom formats support manual in-memory loading, relocations, hashed import resolution, and custom exception-handling logic, reflecting an emphasis on modularity and analysis resistance.

Hidden Bee was primarily delivered through drive-by exploitation via the Underminer exploit kit, which used browser and Adobe Flash vulnerabilities to compromise victims. Campaign reporting linked activity heavily to parts of Asia, particularly Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Underminer infections were described as deploying a bootkit for persistence before delivering the Hidden Bee coin-mining payload.

The family’s final payload was a coin miner implemented with Lua-based components, indicating a modular architecture in which scripting played a central role. Hidden Bee has also been identified as an important predecessor in the development lineage of Rhadamanthys, with strong architectural overlap in custom executable formats, virtual filesystem concepts, steganographic payload delivery, Lua usage, shared-memory mechanisms, and 32-bit to 64-bit loading techniques. Last observed samples referenced in the available reporting date to 2021.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2018-4878via bleeping computerExploited in the wildUse-after-free remote code execution in Adobe Flash PlayerResearchers have spotted only three. They are: CVE-2018-4878 —a use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player patched in February 2018View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-0189via bleeping computerExploited in the wildMicrosoft Internet Explorer Scripting Engine Memory CorruptionResearchers have spotted only three. They are: CVE-2016-0189 —a memory corruption vulnerability in Internet Explorer (IE) patched in May 2016View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-5119via bleeping computerExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player AS3 ByteArray Use-After-FreeResearchers have spotted only three. They are: CVE-2015-5119 —a use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player patched in July 2015View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-15982via nao sec blogExploited in the wildAdobe Flash Player Use-After-Free Remote Code ExecutionThe features of the 6 types of Exploit Kits currently observed are as follows ... Spelevo No No CVE-2018-8174, CVE-2018-15982 ... Underminer Yes No CVE-2018-15982View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587Develop CapabilitiesEvidence1

Security researchers have discovered a new exploit kit, currently active mainly in Asian countries, which, they say, has been busy spreading bootkits and cryptocurrency-mining (coinminer) malware.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

I thought Drive-by Download attack was dead four years ago... However, even if in 2021, it will not disappear... Drive-by Download attacks are still being observed.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

PurpleFox Exploit Kit has started exploiting CVE-2021-26411 RIG Exploit Kit has started exploiting CVE-2021-26411 Bottle Exploit Kit is back, and has started exploiting CVE-2020-1380 and CVE-2021-26411

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Just like Hidden Bee, Rhadamanthys can run LUA scripts.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

For this purpose, the author decided to use a shared memory area that is accessed by different processes via named mapping.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

They are: CVE-2015-5119 —a use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player patched in July 2015; CVE-2016-0189 —a memory corruption vulnerability in Internet Explorer (IE) patched in May 2016; CVE-2018-4878 —a use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player patched in February 2018

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

In this case, the author goes another approach by hooking the exception dispatcher (KiUserExceptionDispatcher) within the NTDLL.

Persistence

1 technique
T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

the EK has been seen using encrypted TCP tunnels to deploy a bootkit first —for OS persistence— and then a coinminer

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

most of the core modules are delivered in the form of custom executable formats

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

The function denoted as parse_response is responsible for decoding the next stage that was downloaded from the C2 and hidden in a media file (JPG).

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Writing a Loader Module for Hidden Bee After reading the aforementioned write-up, I figured that the only difficulties in loading Hidden Bee images in IDA would be A) that the Hidden Bee customized header specifies API imports via hash rather than by name... Imports For dealing with the imports by hash...

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

the EK has been seen using encrypted TCP tunnels to deploy a bootkit first —for OS persistence— and then a coinminer

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

In this case, the author goes another approach by hooking the exception dispatcher (KiUserExceptionDispatcher) within the NTDLL.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

all functional operations are executed in memory, no disk packing operations, with the Loader that can execute loading in memory, it can perfectly realize memory loading operations

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

before the vital part is unpacked, the main executable examines its environment by enumerating running processes and comparing them against the list of known analysis tools

Command and Control

1 technique
T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

the EK has been seen using encrypted TCP tunnels to deploy a bootkit first —for OS persistence— and then a coinminer

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

This new exploit kit (EK) has been named Underminer... has been busy spreading bootkits and cryptocurrency-mining (coinminer) malware.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.