Hidden Bee is a Windows cryptocurrency-mining malware family associated with the Underminer exploit kit and active since at least 2018. It is also referred to as Hidden Mellifera. The malware is notable for distributing its components in proprietary executable formats derived from but substantially stripped down from the Portable Executable format, including formats referred to as NE and NS. These custom formats support manual in-memory loading, relocations, hashed import resolution, and custom exception-handling logic, reflecting an emphasis on modularity and analysis resistance.
Hidden Bee was primarily delivered through drive-by exploitation via the Underminer exploit kit, which used browser and Adobe Flash vulnerabilities to compromise victims. Campaign reporting linked activity heavily to parts of Asia, particularly Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Underminer infections were described as deploying a bootkit for persistence before delivering the Hidden Bee coin-mining payload.
The family’s final payload was a coin miner implemented with Lua-based components, indicating a modular architecture in which scripting played a central role. Hidden Bee has also been identified as an important predecessor in the development lineage of Rhadamanthys, with strong architectural overlap in custom executable formats, virtual filesystem concepts, steganographic payload delivery, Lua usage, shared-memory mechanisms, and 32-bit to 64-bit loading techniques. Last observed samples referenced in the available reporting date to 2021.
4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Security researchers have discovered a new exploit kit, currently active mainly in Asian countries, which, they say, has been busy spreading bootkits and cryptocurrency-mining (coinminer) malware.
I thought Drive-by Download attack was dead four years ago... However, even if in 2021, it will not disappear... Drive-by Download attacks are still being observed.
PurpleFox Exploit Kit has started exploiting CVE-2021-26411 RIG Exploit Kit has started exploiting CVE-2021-26411 Bottle Exploit Kit is back, and has started exploiting CVE-2020-1380 and CVE-2021-26411
Just like Hidden Bee, Rhadamanthys can run LUA scripts.
For this purpose, the author decided to use a shared memory area that is accessed by different processes via named mapping.
They are: CVE-2015-5119 —a use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player patched in July 2015; CVE-2016-0189 —a memory corruption vulnerability in Internet Explorer (IE) patched in May 2016; CVE-2018-4878 —a use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player patched in February 2018
In this case, the author goes another approach by hooking the exception dispatcher (KiUserExceptionDispatcher) within the NTDLL.
the EK has been seen using encrypted TCP tunnels to deploy a bootkit first —for OS persistence— and then a coinminer
most of the core modules are delivered in the form of custom executable formats
The function denoted as parse_response is responsible for decoding the next stage that was downloaded from the C2 and hidden in a media file (JPG).
Writing a Loader Module for Hidden Bee After reading the aforementioned write-up, I figured that the only difficulties in loading Hidden Bee images in IDA would be A) that the Hidden Bee customized header specifies API imports via hash rather than by name... Imports For dealing with the imports by hash...
the EK has been seen using encrypted TCP tunnels to deploy a bootkit first —for OS persistence— and then a coinminer
In this case, the author goes another approach by hooking the exception dispatcher (KiUserExceptionDispatcher) within the NTDLL.
all functional operations are executed in memory, no disk packing operations, with the Loader that can execute loading in memory, it can perfectly realize memory loading operations
before the vital part is unpacked, the main executable examines its environment by enumerating running processes and comparing them against the list of known analysis tools
the EK has been seen using encrypted TCP tunnels to deploy a bootkit first —for OS persistence— and then a coinminer
This new exploit kit (EK) has been named Underminer... has been busy spreading bootkits and cryptocurrency-mining (coinminer) malware.
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.