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Malware1 associated actor

Taurus Stealer

Tracked since Apr 11, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Predator the Thief

Adopted Taurus Stealer code introduced since mid 2020.

via media defconmedia.defcon.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The initial attack vector usually starts with a malspam campaign that distributes a malicious attachment, although it has also been seen being delivered by the Fallout Exploit Kit.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The initial attack vector usually starts with a malspam campaign that distributes a malicious attachment, although it has also been seen being delivered by the Fallout Exploit Kit.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

If persistence is set in the Loader configuration, it will also schedule a task in the infected machine to run the downloaded file every minute using: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /F /sc minute /mo 1

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

It will use CreateProcessA to execute cmd.exe with the following arguments: cmd.exe /c timeout /t 3 & del /f /q <malware_filepath>

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

If persistence is set in the Loader configuration, it will also schedule a task in the infected machine to run the downloaded file every minute using: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /F /sc minute /mo 1

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

If persistence is set in the Loader configuration, it will also schedule a task in the infected machine to run the downloaded file every minute using: C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /F /sc minute /mo 1

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The first layer of the Packer makes use of junk code and useless loops to avoid analysis and prevent detonation in automated analysis systems.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

The malware will resolve its API calls dynamically using hashes.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

After exfiltration, it uses DeleteUrlCacheEntry with the C2 as a parameter for the API call, which deletes the cache entry for a given URL.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The Shellcode is decrypted using a 32 byte key in blocks of 8 bytes.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After resolving these API calls, it enters in a function that will prevent the malware from detonating if it is being executed in an emulated environment.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Taurus Stealer tries to avoid infection in countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by checking the language identifier of the infected machine via GetUserDefaultLangID.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence2

RedLine stealer... Collecting credentials, cookies, credit cards from Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

We can summarize the files Taurus Stealer is interested in the following table: ... logins.json Chrome ... signons.sqlite Mozilla Firefox & Others ... Login Data Chrome / Chromium based

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Anyrun just have browser honeypot but steal also current credentials ... +---cookies ... +---forms ... \---users

Discovery

11 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1

One curious difference from earlier Taurus Stealer versions is that the Active Window from the infected machine is now also included in the information gathering process.

T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

This grabber is used in the Outlook Stealing functionality and uses advapi32.dll RegOpenKeyA, RegEnumKeyA, RegQueryValueExA and RegCloseKey API calls to access the and steal from Windows Registry.

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

An example of the response from the C2 could be ... #[156.146.57.112;US]#[] ... It gets information ... IP: ... Country:

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Current username: User ... Computername: USER-PC ... Domain: WORKGROUP ... Computer users: All Users, Default, Default User, Public, User

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It gets information and concatenates it sequentially in memory until we get the final result: ... OS: Windows 6.1 7601 x64 ... CPU name ... GPU name ... RAM ... Screen resolution ...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

This is one of the most used grabbing methods... and consists of traversing files (it ignores directories) by using kernel32.dll FindFirstFileA, FindNextFileA and FindClose API calls.

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Logical drives: C: D: Z:

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

Date: 15.4.2021 14:57

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

After resolving these API calls, it enters in a function that will prevent the malware from detonating if it is being executed in an emulated environment.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Taurus Stealer tries to avoid infection in countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by checking the language identifier of the infected machine via GetUserDefaultLangID.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

As part of the information gathering process, it will try to get a list of the installed software from the infected machine by looping in the registry from “HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall”

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

This is the software the analyzed sample is targeting. It has functionalities to steal from: Wallets ... Browsers ... Internet Explorer data ... Outlook ...

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

This pushes the data extracted with the sqlite3.dll to the corresponding file and compact it on a zip in memory.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Taurus Stealer uses wininet APIs InternetOpenA, InternetSetOptionA, InternetConnectA, HttpOpenRequestA, HttpSendRequestA, InternetReadFile and InternetCloseHandle for its networking functionalities.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

If the module is enabled, it will load an URL from the Loader configuration and execute URLOpenBlockingStream to download a file. This file will then be dumped in %TEMP% folder

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

It uses a classic BASE64 to encode the message (that has been previously encrypted with RC4) and then, after encoding, the RC4 symmetric key is appended to the beginning of the message.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

the agent sends the informations ... p1=90059c37-1320-41a4-b58d-816d-806e6f6e6976 ... p8=504B0304140000080800

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.