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Malware1 associated actor

LegionLoader

Tracked since Apr 11, 2026 · Updated 9 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days7 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK51Techniques
IOCs271Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injectionCrypto theft
Delivery
ClickfixSpearphishingDrive byLure
Platforms
Windows

LegionLoader, also known as Satacom, CurlyGate, and RobotDropper, is a Windows malware loader and downloader written in C/C++ and first observed in 2019. It retrieves and executes additional malware, including information stealers such as Lumma Stealer, Rhadamanthys, StealC, and RisePro, and distributes malicious Chrome extensions. Its command-driven functionality supports PowerShell execution, native executables, DLLs, shellcode, and MSI packages, with execution occurring either from disk or through in-memory loading and process injection.

Distribution methods include fake software installers, drive-by-download campaigns, password-protected archives, and ClickFix pages impersonating CAPTCHA or verification screens. Targeted spear-phishing emails have also directed recipients to ClickFix lures. LegionLoader has been delivered through the ROMULUS distribution platform and as a payload of OnionDrop; these delivery relationships do not establish common ownership or operator attribution.

Infection chains use DLL side-loading through legitimate applications, layered encryption, dynamic API resolution, and process hollowing. Some delivery packages contain extensively padded executables intended to hinder scanning and analysis. Anti-analysis checks identify virtualized or atypical environments. LegionLoader registers compromised systems with command-and-control infrastructure, retrieves tasks, reports execution results, and uses RC4 encryption with Base64 encoding for command traffic. Observed versions support startup persistence, security-product discovery, and bypassing the Antimalware Scan Interface before executing PowerShell.

LegionLoader can collect Chrome encryption keys, browser profile information, and browsing history. Its malicious browser extensions provide additional capabilities, including modifying email content, monitoring browsing, capturing visible-tab screenshots, and facilitating cryptocurrency theft. Its use of CursedChrome turns compromised browsers into HTTP proxies, enabling attackers to access websites through victims' authenticated sessions.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Romulus

Related Romulus activity has also been observed delivering LegionLoader and abusing legitimate signed applications from other vendors for DLL side-loading.

via socprime blogsocprime.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

51 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.006Web ServicesEvidence1

ErrTraffic begins after someone reaches a compromised WordPress website. The injected JavaScript does not contain the final destination in clear text.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Initial access The malware is delivered by “drive by download” technique.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The threat actor sent emails disguised as instructions for issuing accounts for internal business systems and lured users into clicking a malicious URL.

Execution

8 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

PowerShell downloads and executes initial staging script

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The command used for extraction is as follows: "C:\Users\???\AppData\Roaming\Viqwo Stars Ci\Rotq App\UnRar.exe" x -p3809610121t -o+ ...

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

ErrTraffic begins after someone reaches a compromised WordPress website. The injected JavaScript does not contain the final destination in clear text.

T1106Native APIEvidence2

Once ntdll.dll is unhooked, LegionLoader invokes decrypted direct syscalls without alerting the EDR.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

The sample requires user interaction to execute, triggered by the execution of the setup.msi file.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence2

When a user clicks on the malicious URL in the email, they are redirected multiple times and ultimately connected to a malicious page disguised as a Cloudflare CAPTCHA screen.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The archive contains several legitimate DLLs and a malicious Setup.exe file that the user needs to execute manually to initiate the infection chain.

T1204.004Malicious Copy and PasteEvidence2

Threat actors abused ChatGPT’s Custom GPTs to present links to pages serving ClickFix lures.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence1

The main purpose of the malware that is dropped by the Satacom downloader is to steal BTC from the victim’s account by performing web injections into targeted cryptocurrency websites. The malware attempts to do this by installing an extension for Chromium-based web browsers.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence setup: Registering 'Run' and 'RunOnce'.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Finally, the PS script recursively searches for any link (.LNK) file in the above locations and modifies the “Target” parameter for all existing browser shortcuts with the flag “–load-extension=[pathOfExtension]” so that the shortcut will load the browser with the malicious extension installed.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The backdoor can execute native PE files using process injection and execute shellcode through Explorer.exe process injection.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection — Reflective loading of decrypted infostealer into host memory

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

Native PE execution includes 'RuntimeBroker.exe' process hollowing.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence setup: Registering 'Run' and 'RunOnce'.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

Finally, the PS script recursively searches for any link (.LNK) file in the above locations and modifies the “Target” parameter for all existing browser shortcuts with the flag “–load-extension=[pathOfExtension]” so that the shortcut will load the browser with the malicious extension installed.

Stealth

14 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

LegionLoader sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files it contains, then executes the final backdoor malware.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence3

By appending massive sequences of non-functional null bytes (0x00) to the trailing overlay ... droppers are expanded from a baseline of 1.2 megabytes to over 800 megabytes on disk.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Stack-string construction, dynamic API resolution via LdrGetProcedureAddress, API hammering, and display device enumeration defeat both static and dynamic analysis at every stage.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File Passworded archives, AES stages, RC4/Base64 C2

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The malicious page is disguised as a Cloudflare CAPTCHA, while malicious URLs are presented as an official website or legitimate internal business system.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

ROMULUS campaigns bundle LegionLoader inside trojanized installers for legitimate commercial software, specifically targeting utilities developed by Stardock (such as Start11 and Fences).

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The backdoor can execute native PE files using process injection and execute shellcode through Explorer.exe process injection.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection — Reflective loading of decrypted infostealer into host memory

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

Native PE execution includes 'RuntimeBroker.exe' process hollowing.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The shellcode repeats the AES-256-CBC and byte-reversal sequence.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

The backdoor executes MSI files using ShellExecute and msiexec.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

Since the malware later attempts to execute the payload using rundll32, it is highly likely that the final payload is a DLL...

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Within the MSI, two anti-sandbox mechanisms have been identified. The first anti-sandbox measure presents a button with the label “Please verify that you are not a robot.”. In one of the samples, it was observed that a virtual environment is detected through a feature of Advanced Installer.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

If the host contains fewer than 4 CPU cores or less than 8 GB of physical RAM, the binary enters an infinite sleep loop to thwart sandbox execution.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

Restoring original syscall bytes to unhook EDR sensors

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1111Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionEvidence1

For example, it has the ability to retrieve the victims’ addresses, obtain account information, bypass 2FA, and much more.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

For example, it can extract information through the browser, such as the system information, cookies, browser history, screenshots of opened tabs, and even receive commands from the C2 server.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

Appendix II – MITRE ATT&CK Mapping This table contains all the TTPs identified during analysis of the activity described in this report.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

Chrome Local State key handling is used to retrieve keys and collect sensitive information stored on the Chrome browser of victims.

Discovery

8 techniques
T1016.001Internet Connection DiscoveryEvidence1

An HTTP GET request is sent to ipinfo[.]io/what-is-my-ip to compare the system's ASN type value with the 'hosting' string.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

T1082 System Information Discovery — Querying system uptime and hardware profile

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

For example, it has the ability to retrieve the victims’ addresses, obtain account information, bypass 2FA, and much more.

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Chrome information collection includes collecting browser history.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Within the MSI, two anti-sandbox mechanisms have been identified. The first anti-sandbox measure presents a button with the label “Please verify that you are not a robot.”. In one of the samples, it was observed that a virtual environment is detected through a feature of Advanced Installer.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

If the host contains fewer than 4 CPU cores or less than 8 GB of physical RAM, the binary enters an infinite sleep loop to thwart sandbox execution.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

After that, the script searches for the possible locations of shortcuts for each of the targeted browsers in such places as Desktop, Quick Launch and Start Menu.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Appendix II – MITRE ATT&CK Mapping This table contains all the TTPs identified during analysis of the activity described in this report.

Collection

4 techniques
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

JavaScripts: requesting commands from the C2 (left pane) and taking screenshots (right pane)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

The malicious extension has various JS scripts to perform browser manipulations while the user is browsing the targeted websites, including enumeration and manipulation with cryptocurrency websites.

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

The extension performs various actions on the account in order to remotely control it using the web inject scripts, and eventually the extension tries to withdraw the BTC currency to the threat actors’ wallet.

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

This archive contains 2 files: A 7zip password protected archive, the sole purpose of this protection is to bypass malware analysis; and a picture file reminding the password of the next archive to the victim.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The final backdoor registers infected-host information with C2 and receives commands through nfront.php, while nback.php reports command-execution results.

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

To do so, it performs a DNS request to don-dns[.]com through Google DNS (8.8.8.8, another decrypted string) and it queries for the TXT record.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Researchers also found a malicious MSI with a Node.js backdoor that used Tor for command-and-control traffic

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer MSI, 7z, 7zr.exe, and payload downloads

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

The reason for using the last cryptocurrency transaction of a specific wallet to retrieve the C2 address is that the server address can be changed by the threat actors at any time.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Coverage ... Command and Control ◦ T1573 Encrypted Channel

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

C2 communication using RC4 and Base64.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

For example, it can extract information through the browser, such as the system information, cookies, browser history, screenshots of opened tabs, and even receive commands from the C2 server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

271 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Oct 21, 2026Decades-Old ARPANET Utilities in Modern Malware | ShellcodeLoader described as abusing finger.exe to retrieve intermediate shellcode stagers that inject into legitimate Windows processes, including svchost.exe and explorer.exe.Read more ↗sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Oct 20, 2026LegionLoader Deep Dive: Dissecting 800MB Artific | ShellcodeWindows malware loader described as padding executables with over 800 MB of null bytes to exceed security inspection limits while retaining a small mapped memory footprint. Following socially engineered execution, it checks hardware resources and cursor movement, resolves APIs through ROR13 hashing, and restores clean ntdll.dll code to remove user-mode hooks. It decrypts secondary payloads in memory and reflectively loads or injects malware including Lumma Stealer, Vidar, and DarkGate into child processes.Read more ↗sh3llc0d3 blogNews · Oct 20, 2026ROMULUS ClickFix Crime Platform: Weaponizing 800 | ShellcodeThe principal malware described in the ROMULUS delivery chain. The content reports that LegionLoader is distributed through ClickFix social engineering and trojanized software installers, with executables padded beyond 800 MB to evade file-size-limited inspection. It also describes dynamic API resolution, NTDLL unhooking, and in-memory decryption and injection of subsequent payloads, including Lumma Stealer, Vidar, and DarkGate.Read more ↗socprime blogNews · Oct 20, 2026CVE-2026-110936: Siemens Software Center Zero-DayA malware loader mentioned as a payload delivered in related Romulus activity. The content does not establish that LegionLoader was delivered through the Siemens vulnerability.Read more ↗
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IOC matching271Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping51Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.