LegionLoader
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injectionCrypto theft
- Delivery
- ClickfixSpearphishingDrive byLure
- Platforms
- Windows
LegionLoader, also known as Satacom, CurlyGate, and RobotDropper, is a Windows malware loader and downloader written in C/C++ and first observed in 2019. It retrieves and executes additional malware, including information stealers such as Lumma Stealer, Rhadamanthys, StealC, and RisePro, and distributes malicious Chrome extensions. Its command-driven functionality supports PowerShell execution, native executables, DLLs, shellcode, and MSI packages, with execution occurring either from disk or through in-memory loading and process injection.
Distribution methods include fake software installers, drive-by-download campaigns, password-protected archives, and ClickFix pages impersonating CAPTCHA or verification screens. Targeted spear-phishing emails have also directed recipients to ClickFix lures. LegionLoader has been delivered through the ROMULUS distribution platform and as a payload of OnionDrop; these delivery relationships do not establish common ownership or operator attribution.
Infection chains use DLL side-loading through legitimate applications, layered encryption, dynamic API resolution, and process hollowing. Some delivery packages contain extensively padded executables intended to hinder scanning and analysis. Anti-analysis checks identify virtualized or atypical environments. LegionLoader registers compromised systems with command-and-control infrastructure, retrieves tasks, reports execution results, and uses RC4 encryption with Base64 encoding for command traffic. Observed versions support startup persistence, security-product discovery, and bypassing the Antimalware Scan Interface before executing PowerShell.
LegionLoader can collect Chrome encryption keys, browser profile information, and browsing history. Its malicious browser extensions provide additional capabilities, including modifying email content, monitoring browsing, capturing visible-tab screenshots, and facilitating cryptocurrency theft. Its use of CursedChrome turns compromised browsers into HTTP proxies, enabling attackers to access websites through victims' authenticated sessions.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Related Romulus activity has also been observed delivering LegionLoader and abusing legitimate signed applications from other vendors for DLL side-loading.
Techniques & procedures
51 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
ErrTraffic begins after someone reaches a compromised WordPress website. The injected JavaScript does not contain the final destination in clear text.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Initial access The malware is delivered by “drive by download” technique.
The threat actor sent emails disguised as instructions for issuing accounts for internal business systems and lured users into clicking a malicious URL.
Execution
8 techniques
Execution
PowerShell downloads and executes initial staging script
The command used for extraction is as follows: "C:\Users\???\AppData\Roaming\Viqwo Stars Ci\Rotq App\UnRar.exe" x -p3809610121t -o+ ...
ErrTraffic begins after someone reaches a compromised WordPress website. The injected JavaScript does not contain the final destination in clear text.
Once ntdll.dll is unhooked, LegionLoader invokes decrypted direct syscalls without alerting the EDR.
The sample requires user interaction to execute, triggered by the execution of the setup.msi file.
When a user clicks on the malicious URL in the email, they are redirected multiple times and ultimately connected to a malicious page disguised as a Cloudflare CAPTCHA screen.
The archive contains several legitimate DLLs and a malicious Setup.exe file that the user needs to execute manually to initiate the infection chain.
Threat actors abused ChatGPT’s Custom GPTs to present links to pages serving ClickFix lures.
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
The main purpose of the malware that is dropped by the Satacom downloader is to steal BTC from the victim’s account by performing web injections into targeted cryptocurrency websites. The malware attempts to do this by installing an extension for Chromium-based web browsers.
Persistence setup: Registering 'Run' and 'RunOnce'.
Finally, the PS script recursively searches for any link (.LNK) file in the above locations and modifies the “Target” parameter for all existing browser shortcuts with the flag “–load-extension=[pathOfExtension]” so that the shortcut will load the browser with the malicious extension installed.
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The backdoor can execute native PE files using process injection and execute shellcode through Explorer.exe process injection.
T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection — Reflective loading of decrypted infostealer into host memory
Native PE execution includes 'RuntimeBroker.exe' process hollowing.
Persistence setup: Registering 'Run' and 'RunOnce'.
Finally, the PS script recursively searches for any link (.LNK) file in the above locations and modifies the “Target” parameter for all existing browser shortcuts with the flag “–load-extension=[pathOfExtension]” so that the shortcut will load the browser with the malicious extension installed.
Stealth
14 techniques
Stealth
LegionLoader sequentially decrypts encrypted shellcode and PE files it contains, then executes the final backdoor malware.
By appending massive sequences of non-functional null bytes (0x00) to the trailing overlay ... droppers are expanded from a baseline of 1.2 megabytes to over 800 megabytes on disk.
Stack-string construction, dynamic API resolution via LdrGetProcedureAddress, API hammering, and display device enumeration defeat both static and dynamic analysis at every stage.
T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File Passworded archives, AES stages, RC4/Base64 C2
The malicious page is disguised as a Cloudflare CAPTCHA, while malicious URLs are presented as an official website or legitimate internal business system.
ROMULUS campaigns bundle LegionLoader inside trojanized installers for legitimate commercial software, specifically targeting utilities developed by Stardock (such as Start11 and Fences).
The backdoor can execute native PE files using process injection and execute shellcode through Explorer.exe process injection.
T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection — Reflective loading of decrypted infostealer into host memory
Native PE execution includes 'RuntimeBroker.exe' process hollowing.
The shellcode repeats the AES-256-CBC and byte-reversal sequence.
The backdoor executes MSI files using ShellExecute and msiexec.
Since the malware later attempts to execute the payload using rundll32, it is highly likely that the final payload is a DLL...
Within the MSI, two anti-sandbox mechanisms have been identified. The first anti-sandbox measure presents a button with the label “Please verify that you are not a robot.”. In one of the samples, it was observed that a virtual environment is detected through a feature of Advanced Installer.
If the host contains fewer than 4 CPU cores or less than 8 GB of physical RAM, the binary enters an infinite sleep loop to thwart sandbox execution.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Restoring original syscall bytes to unhook EDR sensors
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
For example, it has the ability to retrieve the victims’ addresses, obtain account information, bypass 2FA, and much more.
For example, it can extract information through the browser, such as the system information, cookies, browser history, screenshots of opened tabs, and even receive commands from the C2 server.
Appendix II – MITRE ATT&CK Mapping This table contains all the TTPs identified during analysis of the activity described in this report.
Chrome Local State key handling is used to retrieve keys and collect sensitive information stored on the Chrome browser of victims.
Discovery
8 techniques
Discovery
An HTTP GET request is sent to ipinfo[.]io/what-is-my-ip to compare the system's ASN type value with the 'hosting' string.
T1082 System Information Discovery — Querying system uptime and hardware profile
For example, it has the ability to retrieve the victims’ addresses, obtain account information, bypass 2FA, and much more.
Chrome information collection includes collecting browser history.
Within the MSI, two anti-sandbox mechanisms have been identified. The first anti-sandbox measure presents a button with the label “Please verify that you are not a robot.”. In one of the samples, it was observed that a virtual environment is detected through a feature of Advanced Installer.
If the host contains fewer than 4 CPU cores or less than 8 GB of physical RAM, the binary enters an infinite sleep loop to thwart sandbox execution.
After that, the script searches for the possible locations of shortcuts for each of the targeted browsers in such places as Desktop, Quick Launch and Start Menu.
Appendix II – MITRE ATT&CK Mapping This table contains all the TTPs identified during analysis of the activity described in this report.
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
JavaScripts: requesting commands from the C2 (left pane) and taking screenshots (right pane)
The malicious extension has various JS scripts to perform browser manipulations while the user is browsing the targeted websites, including enumeration and manipulation with cryptocurrency websites.
The extension performs various actions on the account in order to remotely control it using the web inject scripts, and eventually the extension tries to withdraw the BTC currency to the threat actors’ wallet.
This archive contains 2 files: A 7zip password protected archive, the sole purpose of this protection is to bypass malware analysis; and a picture file reminding the password of the next archive to the victim.
Command and Control
7 techniques
Command and Control
The final backdoor registers infected-host information with C2 and receives commands through nfront.php, while nback.php reports command-execution results.
To do so, it performs a DNS request to don-dns[.]com through Google DNS (8.8.8.8, another decrypted string) and it queries for the TXT record.
Researchers also found a malicious MSI with a Node.js backdoor that used Tor for command-and-control traffic
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer MSI, 7z, 7zr.exe, and payload downloads
The reason for using the last cryptocurrency transaction of a specific wallet to retrieve the C2 address is that the server address can be changed by the threat actors at any time.
MITRE ATT&CK Coverage ... Command and Control ◦ T1573 Encrypted Channel
C2 communication using RC4 and Base64.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
For example, it can extract information through the browser, such as the system information, cookies, browser history, screenshots of opened tabs, and even receive commands from the C2 server.
Observables
271 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.