Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Vultur

Tracked since Apr 11, 2026 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs114Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
SmishingVishingLureFake update
Platforms
Android

Vultur is an Android banking trojan identified in 2021 that combines screen recording, accessibility-based keylogging, and remote device control to steal credentials and personally identifiable information and facilitate on-device financial fraud. It targets banking and cryptocurrency applications, with campaigns affecting users in Australia, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and the United States. Its keylogging targets also include messaging and social media applications.

Vultur monitors foreground applications and selectively captures screen content and accessibility events. It uses VNC-based functionality, including AlphaVNC and ngrok in earlier variants, to provide remote access to infected devices. Expanded accessibility logging captures interface text and user input when Android's FLAG_SECURE protections prevent screen capture. Fraudulent actions can be orchestrated through backend-driven sequences of commands. Later variants support remote clicks, swipes and scrolling; file upload, download, deletion and installation; application blocking; custom notifications; and disabling Android Keyguard to weaken lock-screen protections.

Distribution is closely associated with the Brunhilda dropper framework and its operators, known as the Brunhilda Project crew. Campaigns have used functional-looking authenticator and file-recovery applications on Google Play that prompt victims to install malicious updates. Other campaigns combine fraudulent transaction-warning SMS messages with telephone calls that persuade victims to install a trojanized security application. Brunhilda is a separate delivery component, not an alias for Vultur.

Updated Vultur infection chains use multiple APK and DEX stages, native-code payload decryption, and impersonation of legitimate security and accessibility software to hinder detection and analysis. Vultur receives commands through Firebase Cloud Messaging and uses AES-encrypted, Base64-encoded command-and-control traffic over HTTPS.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Brunhilda Project

First discovered by ThreatFabric in July 2021, Vultur is an Android banking trojan which specializes in stealing PII from infected devices using its screen-streaming capabilities.

via threatfabric blogthreatfabric.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

With Vultur fraud can happen on the infected device of the victim. These attacks are scalable and automated ... circumventing detection based on phishing MO’s that require fraud to be performed from a new device

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

In order to deceive unsuspecting individuals into installing malware, the threat actors employ a hybrid attack using two SMS messages and a phone call. First, the victim receives an SMS message that instructs them to call a number if they did not authorise a transaction involving a large amount of money... A second SMS is sent during the phone call, where the victim is instructed into installing a trojanised version of the McAfee Security app from a link.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

These attacks are scalable and automated since the actions to perform fraud can be scripted on the malware backend and sent in the form of sequenced commands.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

Brunhilda and Vultur have started using native code for decryption of payloads, likely in order to make the samples harder to reverse engineer.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Sideloading bypasses the official app stores’ rigorous vetting processes... [It leaves] devices exposed to malware and unauthorized code.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

the dropper prompts the victim with a screen asking to download an update for the current application. If the user accepts the displayed request, the dropper proceeds to install Vultur.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Apps downloaded outside official stores are particularly risky, exposing users and organizations to Trojans and data leaks.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence3

public static void keylog ( AccessibilityEvent event ) { String data ; if ( ! keyLoggerManager . KeyloggerActive ) { return ; }

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Disable Keyguard in order to bypass lock screen security measures... 77b58a53 (NEW) Ensures that the device stays on by acquiring a wake lock, disables keyguard, sleeps for 0,1 second, and then swipes up to unlock the device without requiring a PIN.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence3

public static void keylog ( AccessibilityEvent event ) { String data ; if ( ! keyLoggerManager . KeyloggerActive ) { return ; }

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The latest version of Brunhilda also implemented a new layer of obfuscation, which encrypts strings by using AES with a varying key

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

in these new version, the installation logic is not contained in the main DEX file, but in a additional dex file which is loaded dynamically.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Appendix Brunhilda Dropper App name Package name SHA-256 Protection Guard ... Vultur App name Package name SHA-256 Protection Guard ... Authenticator 2FA ...

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

Vultur has also started masquerading more of its malicious activity by encrypting its C2 communication, using multiple encrypted payloads that are decrypted on the fly... The decryption algorithm is implemented in native code.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Disable Keyguard in order to bypass lock screen security measures... 77b58a53 (NEW) Ensures that the device stays on by acquiring a wake lock, disables keyguard, sleeps for 0,1 second, and then swipes up to unlock the device without requiring a PIN.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Vultur features two separate target lists: one for screen-streaming targets and one for keylogging targets.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

Disable Keyguard in order to bypass lock screen security measures... 77b58a53 (NEW) Ensures that the device stays on by acquiring a wake lock, disables keyguard, sleeps for 0,1 second, and then swipes up to unlock the device without requiring a PIN.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.005VNCEvidence2

It is also able to create a remote session on the device using VNC technology to perform actions on the victim’s device

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence3

Vultur features two separate target lists: one for screen-streaming targets and one for keylogging targets.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

Vultur is an Android banking trojan which specializes in stealing PII from infected devices using its screen-streaming capabilities.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

the dropper initially sends a registration message to its C2 server. As a response, the server sends back an appToken, which is then used in the following requests to identify the device.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Otherwise, it will receive a configuration data with the URL containing the payload.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

nstart_vnc() libavnc.so public static void startVnc ( FileDescriptor fileDescriptor , VncSessionConfig config ... C2Commands . log ( "VNC: START VNC SERVICE" )

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Threat Actors are known for monitoring public reports and adjusting infrastructure that believe may be compromised... the developers behind the Vultur banking trojan appear to have updated the naming scheme of their domain infrastructure in response to a public threat intelligence report.

T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

Below we can see that several of the domains have historically resolved to the same IP address of 82.221.136[.]47... there are malicious domains routing through it.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence2

Threat Actors are known for monitoring public reports and adjusting infrastructure that believe may be compromised... the developers behind the Vultur banking trojan appear to have updated the naming scheme of their domain infrastructure in response to a public threat intelligence report.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

114 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+13 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching114Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.