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Mallory
Malware

PEAKLIGHT

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

ClickFix has also been adopted by threat actors behind the ClearFake campaign, which is known to infect sites with fake web browser update decoys on compromised WordPress to distribute malware.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Application Initial Access Spearphishing Link T1566.002 KMS piracy lure via freefugga.com

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

If executed, the LNK file used PowerShell to download and run an executable file... If the user copied and pasted the PowerShell script as instructed, it executed a second PowerShell script ultimately leading to DanaBot.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

If executed, the LNK file used PowerShell to download and run an executable file that used Peaklight (aka Emmenthal Loader) to display a decoy PDF and download and run an executable file that installed DanaBot.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

checks for the presence of hard-coded filenames and downloads files from a remote CDN if the files are not present

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

the LNK file used PowerShell to download and run an executable file that used Peaklight (aka Emmenthal Loader) to display a decoy PDF and download and run an executable file that installed DanaBot.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.