Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

FakeSpy

Tracked since Apr 16, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceSpoofing
Delivery
SmishingLanding pageLure
Platforms
Android

FakeSpy is an Android information-stealing malware family used in long-running mobile fraud campaigns, particularly against users in Japan and South Korea. It commonly masquerades as trusted local postal, logistics, courier, e-commerce, telecommunications, financial, or other consumer-facing applications and is frequently delivered through SMS phishing campaigns that direct victims to malicious download pages hosting trojanized Android apps. FakeSpy has also been associated with broader mobile cybercrime activity linked to infrastructure overlap with XLoader and possible ties to operators connected to the Yanbian Gang, although shared-service use remains an alternative explanation.

On infected devices, FakeSpy collects a broad set of victim data, including SMS messages, contact lists, call records, installed application lists, device identifiers, subscriber information, phone numbers, operating system version, and device model information. It exfiltrates stolen data over HTTP and can monitor incoming SMS messages in near real time. The malware can send SMS messages from compromised devices and has been described as capable of supporting further fraud operations by interacting with messaging functionality.

FakeSpy also implements persistence on Android by registering for boot-related broadcast intents so that it can restart after device reboot. Variants have used encrypted configuration data and concealed command-and-control addressing through external online profiles and similar indirection mechanisms to complicate blocking and analysis. Some samples abuse Android JavaScriptInterface functionality to download and execute remote JavaScript that invokes internal app functions.

Beyond straightforward information theft, FakeSpy has been observed checking infected devices for banking-related applications and replacing targeted legitimate apps with counterfeit or repackaged versions that imitate the originals in order to phish credentials. It has also checked for digital currency trading and e-commerce applications, indicating victim profiling for financially motivated follow-on activity. In this role, FakeSpy can function as a delivery vector for banking-trojan-style fraud in addition to its core infostealer behavior.

The malware has been repeatedly used in campaigns themed around delivery and postal notifications, making smishing a defining distribution mechanism. It is widely tracked as a prominent Android mobile threat focused on credential and data theft, financial fraud enablement, and persistent access to victim messaging and device data.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Yanbian Gang

Meanwhile, we released our findings on FakeSpy in June after it infected Android users via SMS phishing or SMiShing to launch info-stealing attacks.

via trend micro blog historicblog.trendmicro.com
Roaming Mantis

It is known to infect victims with the following range of malware families for the Android OS: FakeCop, FakeSpy, MoqHao and FunkyBot.

via medium csis techblogmedium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Last year, FortiGuard Labs identified a malware campaign targeting Japanese users. The campaign impersonated a logistics company and deployed an Android malware called FakeSpy.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Would-be victims will first receive a mobile text message masquerading as a legitimate message from a Japanese logistics and transportation company urging recipients to click the link in the SMS.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

To send commands via JavaScript, FakeSpy also abuses JavaScript bridge (JavaScriptInterface) to invoke the app’s internal functions by downloading then running JavaScript from a remote website.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

Agent Smith can impersonate any popular application on an infected device, and the core malware disguises itself as a legitimate Google application.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information; Android/SpyAgent has collected device network information, such as the IMEI and the phone number; ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device IMEI and IMSI; many listed mobile malware families collect IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, MEID, serial number, phone number, MAC address, IP address, carrier, MCC/MNC, and related device/network identifiers.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

FakeSpy is capable of stealing text messages, as well as account information, contacts, and call records stored in the infected device.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

These SMS messages are stolen and uploaded to the C&C server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

AbstractEmu can use HTTP to communicate with the C2 server; AhRat can communicate with the C2 using HTTPS requests; BRATA can use both HTTP and WebSockets to communicate with the C2 server; LightSpy has used both HTTPS and Websockets to communicate with the C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

We used VirusTotal to search for an XLoader sample... and learned that the sample was downloaded from a malicious domain... When we analyzed a FakeSpy sample... we discovered that it was downloaded from the same malicious domain.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

FakeSpy’s author also abuses forums and open-source dynamic domain tools in a similar manner. To further evade detection, the C&C server address configured into the apps are updated at least once per day.

T1665Hide InfrastructureEvidence1

It abuses social media by writing the IP address on a Twitter profile whose handles are regularly modified. The IP address starts with ^^ and ends with $$. When FakeSpy launches, it will access the Twitter page and parse its contents to retrieve the C&C IP address.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

These SMS messages are stolen and uploaded to the C&C server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.