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Malware1 associated actor

Pallas

Tracked since Apr 16, 2026 · Updated 17 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationReconnaissance
Delivery
Watering hole
Platforms
Android

Pallas is a custom-developed Android remote access trojan used by the Lebanon-linked cyberespionage group Dark Caracal for surveillance and data theft. Publicly documented in 2018, it was among the malware families used in Dark Caracal campaigns targeting thousands of Lebanese citizens. The group has distributed Pallas through trojanized applications hosted on watering-hole websites.

Pallas collects and exfiltrates call logs and SMS messages, including newly received messages, and accesses device contact lists. Its surveillance capabilities include recording microphone audio and taking photographs with both front- and rear-facing cameras. It also enumerates installed applications and retrieves device metadata, including the device identifier, operating-system version, and number of cameras. Pallas uses deceptive phishing popups to harvest user credentials and exfiltrates collected data over HTTP. Operators can additionally instruct it to download and install applications and delete specified files from compromised devices.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal's malware toolkit includes Pallas a custom-developed toolkit for stealing data from Android devices

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Cerberus has been delivered to the device via websites that prompt the user to "[…] install Adobe Flash Player" and then downloads the malicious APK to the device. | Dark Caracal distributes Pallas via trojanized applications hosted on watering hole websites.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

“Their tactics include phishing, malicious websites, and trojanized mobile applications.”

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Fake device notifications A malicious application could send fake device notifications to the user. Clicking on the device notification could trigger the malicious application to display an input prompt.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

FinFisher captures and exfiltrates SMS messages. FrozenCell has read SMS messages for exfiltration. Pallas captures and exfiltrates all SMS messages... Rotexy can also send a list of all SMS messages on the device to the command and control server. RuMMS uploads incoming SMS messages to a remote command and control server. Stealth Mango uploads SMS messages. Windshift has included SMS message exfiltration...

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence2

BRATA has exfiltrated data to the C2 server using HTTP requests.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.