Malware

GolfSpy

GolfSpy is an Android surveillance malware family focused on collecting sensitive user and device data and transmitting it to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Its observed capabilities include theft of SMS messages, call logs, contact lists, local account information, browser bookmarks and history, photos, and files stored on device storage including SD cards. It can enumerate installed applications, inspect running processes, list media and other stored files, and copy arbitrary files from the device for exfiltration. GolfSpy has also been observed recording ambient audio and phone calls, capturing photos with the front-facing camera, and deleting arbitrary files on the device.

The malware uses Android broadcast receivers for event-triggered execution, including registering for the USER_PRESENT broadcast so that device-unlock activity can trigger covert photo capture. Exfiltration has been observed over HTTP POST, consistent with standard application-layer protocol abuse for command and control or data theft. GolfSpy is also capable of installing attacker-specified applications, indicating secondary payload delivery or expansion of device compromise.

GolfSpy has been associated with delivery through a hosted Android application package promoted on social media in activity involving Bouncing Golf. Its functionality and collection profile are consistent with mobile spyware used for persistent surveillance and post-compromise data harvesting on Android devices.

For your environment

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Discovery

2 techniques

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

BOULDSPY can access browser history and bookmarks, and can list all files and folders on the device. RatMilad has listed files and pictures on the device starting from /mnt/sdcard/.

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

BRATA has collected account information from compromised devices. Corona Updates can collect voice notes, device accounts, and gallery images. GolfSpy can collect local accounts on the device.

Collection

1 technique

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Anubis can exfiltrate files encrypted with the ransomware module from the device and can modify external storage. BusyGasper can collect images stored on the device and browser history. CHEMISTGAMES can collect files from the filesystem and account information from Google Chrome.

Command and Control

1 technique

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence2

BRATA has exfiltrated data to the C2 server using HTTP requests.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

27 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

27 SOURCESView more in app

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Capture Camera, Technique T1512 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Android malware capable of recording video.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Application Discovery, Technique T1418 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Mobile spyware used in cyberespionage that enumerates installed applications.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Data from Local System, Technique T1533 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Android spyware that steals accounts, pictures, browser data, SD card contents, and arbitrary files.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Standard Application Layer Protocol, Technique T1437 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Mobile spyware family that exfiltrates data using HTTP POST requests.

+23 more in the timeline

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The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

GolfSpy