Malware

XLoader for Android

XLoader for Android is Android malware that has been observed masquerading as a security application to deceive users and reduce suspicion during installation. It is associated with mobile surveillance and data-harvesting behavior, particularly the collection of SMS messages and device-identifying information. Reported host profiling includes theft of subscriber and device identifiers such as IMSI, ICCID, Android ID, and serial number. These capabilities support victim fingerprinting, monitoring, and potential follow-on abuse of SMS-based authentication or communications. The available evidence supports Android targeting and information-stealing behavior, but does not establish additional capabilities beyond SMS and device identifier collection at high confidence.

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

Domains used inside SMS messages are either registered with Godaddy or use dynamic dns services such as duckdns.org. The intrusion set uses more than hundreds subdomains.

T1583.004ServerEvidence1

At the time of writing, we were able to identify 9 servers hosted on EHOSTIDC and VELIANET Autonomous Systems.

T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

The malware then retrieves its C2 server by requesting one of the social network profiles stored in the payload. In the analysed sample, the profiles are: shaoye77, shaoye88 and shaoye99 on Imgur service.

Initial Access

1 technique

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The initial attack vector is a text message distributed by SMS and containing a malicious URL... The URL either deploys the MoqHao Android malware, or redirects to an Apple login details credential harvesting page.

Execution

1 technique

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

If the target clicks on the link, an HTTP request is sent to the server.

Stealth

1 technique

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Agent Smith can impersonate any popular application on an infected device, and the core malware disguises itself as a legitimate Google application.

Discovery

1 technique

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

AbstractEmu can collect device IP address and SIM information; Android/SpyAgent has collected device network information, such as the IMEI and the phone number; ANDROIDOS_ANSERVER.A gathers the device IMEI and IMSI; many listed mobile malware families collect IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, MEID, serial number, phone number, MAC address, IP address, carrier, MCC/MNC, and related device/network identifiers.

Command and Control

2 techniques

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

If the target clicks on the link, an HTTP request is sent to the server... The malware then retrieves its C2 server by requesting one of the social network profiles stored in the payload.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

In the above Triage analysis, the malware requests the profile shaoye99 on the legitimate image hosting service Imgur... the 'about' section contains the string ... which embeds the DES-encrypted C2 server.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

This activity leveraging MoqHao or Apple IDs' credential harvesting pages notably provides Roaming Mantis access to data from the local system, SD card, applications, messages or contact list... as well as allowing remote interaction with a victims' device.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

21 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other

5 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago

ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

7 SOURCESView more in app

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Masquerade as Legitimate Application, Technique T1444 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Android loader that disguises itself as a security application.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Capture SMS Messages, Technique T1412 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Android malware that collects SMS messages from infected devices.

mitre attack websiteNews

Jan 18, 2018

System Information Discovery, Technique T1426 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Android variant of XLoader that collects Android ID and serial number.

mitre attack websiteNews

Jan 18, 2018

System Information Discovery, Technique T1426 - Mobile | MITRE ATT&CK®

Android malware that collects Android ID and serial number from infected devices.

+3 more in the timeline

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching26

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping10

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

XLoader for Android