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Mallory
Malware

Direct-Sys Loader

Tracked since Apr 17, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs34Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

MITRE Initial Access: T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File Execution

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Stage-3... sets up the required syscall stubs... specifically to perform APC-based process injection and inject next stage shellcode into the legitimate, Microsoft-signed Dllhost.exe.

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

MITRE Defense Evasion: T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence1

Stage-3... sets up the required syscall stubs... specifically to perform APC-based process injection and inject next stage shellcode into the legitimate, Microsoft-signed Dllhost.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

If all of these checks pass, the loader decrypts the next-stage shellcode in memory and executes it... The loader uses the ChaCha20 algorithm with a hardcoded key and nonce for decryption.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The loader queries display device information via EnumDisplayDevicesA... decrypts a hardcoded list of known hypervisor and analysis-environment display device strings... If any match is detected, the loader silently terminates execution.

T1497.002User Activity Based ChecksEvidence1

Before decrypting and executing the next in-memory shellcode, the Stage-1 loader performs three primary checks... Text File Check... Active Process Check... Display Device Check.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The PE is then loaded reflectively into memory, after which execution is redirected to its entry point.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Before decompressing the next-stage PE, the shellcode patches the in-memory implementations of AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiScanString, and EtwEventWrite at runtime to bypass user mode hooks.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

It then proceeds to enumerate all active processes on the system, collecting the Process ID, Session ID, Process Name, and corresponding command-line arguments.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The loader queries display device information via EnumDisplayDevicesA... decrypts a hardcoded list of known hypervisor and analysis-environment display device strings... If any match is detected, the loader silently terminates execution.

T1497.002User Activity Based ChecksEvidence1

Before decrypting and executing the next in-memory shellcode, the Stage-1 loader performs three primary checks... Text File Check... Active Process Check... Display Device Check.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching34Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.