Direct-Sys Loader
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
MITRE Initial Access: T1204.002 – User Execution: Malicious File Execution
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.
Stage-3... sets up the required syscall stubs... specifically to perform APC-based process injection and inject next stage shellcode into the legitimate, Microsoft-signed Dllhost.exe.
Stealth
9 techniques
Stealth
MITRE Defense Evasion: T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information
However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.
Stage-3... sets up the required syscall stubs... specifically to perform APC-based process injection and inject next stage shellcode into the legitimate, Microsoft-signed Dllhost.exe.
If all of these checks pass, the loader decrypts the next-stage shellcode in memory and executes it... The loader uses the ChaCha20 algorithm with a hardcoded key and nonce for decryption.
Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.
The loader queries display device information via EnumDisplayDevicesA... decrypts a hardcoded list of known hypervisor and analysis-environment display device strings... If any match is detected, the loader silently terminates execution.
Before decrypting and executing the next in-memory shellcode, the Stage-1 loader performs three primary checks... Text File Check... Active Process Check... Display Device Check.
The PE is then loaded reflectively into memory, after which execution is redirected to its entry point.
The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Before decompressing the next-stage PE, the shellcode patches the in-memory implementations of AmsiScanBuffer, AmsiScanString, and EtwEventWrite at runtime to bypass user mode hooks.
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
It then proceeds to enumerate all active processes on the system, collecting the Process ID, Session ID, Process Name, and corresponding command-line arguments.
Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.
The loader queries display device information via EnumDisplayDevicesA... decrypts a hardcoded list of known hypervisor and analysis-environment display device strings... If any match is detected, the loader silently terminates execution.
Before decrypting and executing the next in-memory shellcode, the Stage-1 loader performs three primary checks... Text File Check... Active Process Check... Display Device Check.
The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.
Observables
34 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.