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Mallory
Malware

CGrabber Stealer

Tracked since Apr 17, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs26Tracked
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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

If all of these checks pass, the loader decrypts the next-stage shellcode in memory and executes it... The loader uses the ChaCha20 algorithm with a hardcoded key and nonce for decryption.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The same three anti-analysis checks are performed for a third time, along with a check for whether the machine is running in a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) locale and a check for a mutex indicating the stealer is already running.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The shellcode decompresses and reflectively loads a portable executable (PE) into memory that serves as an additional loader with similar function to Direct-Sys.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Organizations can defend against this malware by monitoring for syscall stubs in memory, suspicious DLL sideloading activity, outbound POST requests to the attacker’s C2 endpoints and in-memory patching of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) APIs, another evasive measure leveraged in this campaign.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The same three anti-analysis checks are performed for a third time, along with a check for whether the machine is running in a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) locale and a check for a mutex indicating the stealer is already running.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The data is aggregated in a ZIP archive and sent via a POST request to the C2 endpoint /api/upload/complete or sent in 1MB chunks to the /api/upload/chunk endpoint if the archive size exceeds 1MB.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

If all checks pass, the stealer establishes a connection with a remote command-and-control (C2) server... The data is aggregated in a ZIP archive and sent via a POST request to the C2 endpoint /api/upload/complete or sent in 1MB chunks to the /api/upload/chunk endpoint.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The data is aggregated in a ZIP archive and sent via a POST request to the C2 endpoint /api/upload/complete or sent in 1MB chunks to the /api/upload/chunk endpoint if the archive size exceeds 1MB.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching26Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.