CGrabber Stealer
Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.
Stealth
6 techniques
Stealth
However, this loader uses a distinct asynchronous procedure call (APC) based process injection technique to inject additional shellcode into the legitimate Microsoft-signed executable Dllhost.exe.
If all of these checks pass, the loader decrypts the next-stage shellcode in memory and executes it... The loader uses the ChaCha20 algorithm with a hardcoded key and nonce for decryption.
Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.
The same three anti-analysis checks are performed for a third time, along with a check for whether the machine is running in a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) locale and a check for a mutex indicating the stealer is already running.
The shellcode decompresses and reflectively loads a portable executable (PE) into memory that serves as an additional loader with similar function to Direct-Sys.
The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Organizations can defend against this malware by monitoring for syscall stubs in memory, suspicious DLL sideloading activity, outbound POST requests to the attacker’s C2 endpoints and in-memory patching of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) APIs, another evasive measure leveraged in this campaign.
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
Direct-Sys Loader, which performs three separate anti-sandbox and anti-analysis checks before decrypting and executing the next-stage shellcode.
The same three anti-analysis checks are performed for a third time, along with a check for whether the machine is running in a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) locale and a check for a mutex indicating the stealer is already running.
The second check decrypts a list of 67 process names associated with binary analysis, sandboxes and debugging tools, compares this list to all active processes and terminates if it finds a match.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The data is aggregated in a ZIP archive and sent via a POST request to the C2 endpoint /api/upload/complete or sent in 1MB chunks to the /api/upload/chunk endpoint if the archive size exceeds 1MB.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
If all checks pass, the stealer establishes a connection with a remote command-and-control (C2) server... The data is aggregated in a ZIP archive and sent via a POST request to the C2 endpoint /api/upload/complete or sent in 1MB chunks to the /api/upload/chunk endpoint.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
The data is aggregated in a ZIP archive and sent via a POST request to the C2 endpoint /api/upload/complete or sent in 1MB chunks to the /api/upload/chunk endpoint if the archive size exceeds 1MB.
Observables
26 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.