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Malware1 associated actor

SNOWGLAZE

Tracked since Apr 23, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs6Tracked

SNOWGLAZE is a Python-based tunneling utility used as part of the SNOW malware ecosystem associated with the UNC6692 threat cluster. It is designed to provide covert external communications and network pivoting after initial compromise, typically alongside the SNOWBELT browser-extension backdoor and the SNOWBASIN Python backdoor.

SNOWGLAZE runs on both Windows and Linux and establishes an authenticated, persistent WebSocket tunnel between a compromised host or internal network segment and attacker-controlled command-and-control infrastructure. It supports SOCKS-style proxying of TCP traffic, allowing operators to route interactive sessions and other network communications through the victim environment while masking command-and-control activity as ordinary encrypted web traffic. Reported implementations wrap tunneled data in JSON and Base64-encoded structures for transport over WebSockets.

In observed intrusions, SNOWGLAZE was not typically the initial payload. It was delivered after social-engineering-based access, including Microsoft Teams helpdesk impersonation and email-bombing lures that led victims to execute staged AutoHotkey components and install SNOWBELT. Once deployed, SNOWGLAZE enabled deeper access into victim networks by carrying operator traffic used for reconnaissance and lateral movement. It was used to support remote administration activity, including tunneling sessions used for PsExec and RDP access into additional internal systems.

SNOWGLAZE is part of a modular intrusion set focused on stealth, persistence, and post-compromise expansion in enterprise environments. Its role is primarily communications concealment and internal pivoting rather than direct credential theft or destructive action. The broader campaigns in which it has been observed targeted enterprise users, including senior personnel, and were oriented toward credential harvesting, internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, and theft of sensitive organizational data.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC6692

Tool SNOWGLAZE Python based tunneling utility supporting SOCKS5 traffic to conceal command and control communications

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.006Web ServicesEvidence1

its systematic abuse of legitimate cloud services for every stage of the attack payload delivery, credential exfiltration, C2 infrastructure, and data staging, all of which relied on trusted platforms like AWS S3 and Heroku.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The hacker sends a link to a fake “Mailbox Repair” utility or asks the victim to open remote access tools like Quick Assist. Either way, they install the SNOW malware suite.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Once it's clicked, it leads to the download of an AutoHotkey script from a threat actor-controlled AWS S3 bucket.

T1566PhishingEvidence5

Step 2 — The helper arrives on Teams Right away, an external Microsoft Teams account named “IT Helpdesk” messages the victim. The hacker offers to fix the email issue immediately.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The fake helpdesk worker prompts the user to click a link that supposedly installs a local patch that prevents email spamming. This directs victims to a landing page masquerading as a 'Mailbox Repair Utility'...

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Step 2 — The helper arrives on Teams Right away, an external Microsoft Teams account named “IT Helpdesk” messages the victim. The hacker offers to fix the email issue immediately.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence4

Clicking it downloads a renamed AutoHotkey binary along with a script... Once the AutoHotkey script runs... It includes... a Python based tunneling tool.

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

...a ZIP archive containing a portable Python executable and required libraries. SnowGlaze is a Python-based tunneler... Finally, SnowBasin is a Python bindshell...

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

...to trick victims into installing a fake fix for email issues. The attack delivered AutoHotKey-based loaders...

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Once it's clicked, it leads to the download of an AutoHotkey script from a threat actor-controlled AWS S3 bucket.

Persistence

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The hacker sends a link to a fake “Mailbox Repair” utility or asks the victim to open remote access tools like Quick Assist. Either way, they install the SNOW malware suite.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Attacker commands (such as whoami or net user) are sent through the SnowGlaze tunnel...

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

...allowing deeper network access and reconnaissance.

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence1

Following internal port scanning, the threat actor established a Sysinternals PsExec session to the victims system via the SNOWGLAZE tunnel, and executed commands to enumerate local administrator accounts.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Using PsExec sessions routed through the SNOWGLAZE tunnel... initiated an RDP session to a backup server.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence2

initiate an RDP session via the SNOWGLAZE tunnel from the victim system to a backup server.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence3

Use a Python script to scan the local network for ports 135, 445, and 3389 for lateral movement, establish a PsExec session to the victim's system via the SNOWGLAZE tunneling utility

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

It also disguises malicious traffic by wrapping data in JSON objects and Base64 encoding it for transfer via WebSockets, which makes it look like legitimate, standard encrypted web traffic.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

SNOWGLAZE is a Python tunneler that creates a persistent encrypted channel back to attacker infrastructure.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

It creates an authenticated WebSocket tunnel between the victim's internal network and the attacker's command-and-control (C2) infrastructure, such as a Heroku subdomain.

T1090ProxyEvidence3

SnowGlaze is a Python-based tunneler... It creates an authenticated WebSocket tunnel between the victim's internal network and the attacker's command-and-control (C2) infrastructure...

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence2

SNOWGLAZE is a Python-based tunneler to create a secure, authenticated WebSocket tunnel between the victim's internal network and the attacker's command-and-control (C2) server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Once installed, the extension can download additional components, including malware tools dubbed SnowGlaze and SnowBasin, along with AutoHotkey scripts and a portable Python environment used to run further malicious code.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence2

a Python based tunneling utility supports SOCKS5 style traffic to route commands through the compromised host, blending in with normal web activity.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching6Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.