FIRESTARTER
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injection
- Delivery
- Exploit kit
- Platforms
- LinuxNetwork device
FIRESTARTER is a Linux ELF backdoor targeting Cisco Firepower and Secure Firewall appliances running Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) or Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) software. Associated with the espionage-focused threat actor UAT-4356, previously linked to the ArcaneDoor campaign, it provides persistent remote access and enables execution of attacker-supplied shellcode. It has been confirmed on a Cisco Firepower appliance at a U.S. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agency. Deployment follows compromise of exposed Cisco devices through exploitation of CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362.
FIRESTARTER injects shellcode into LINA, Cisco’s core network-processing and security engine, and replaces a legitimate WebVPN XML request handler with a malicious hook. Specially crafted requests containing installation-specific markers and a victim-specific identifier trigger execution of additional payloads in memory. Requests that do not match the trigger are passed to the legitimate handler, preserving normal operation. In observed intrusions, FIRESTARTER maintained access alongside LINE VIPER and supported subsequent payload deployment.
The backdoor survives firmware updates and normal reboots through termination-signal handling and manipulation of Cisco Service Platform startup configuration. During graceful shutdown or reboot, it saves a copy of itself and arranges execution after restart. It subsequently restores configuration, removes temporary artifacts, and alters timestamps to reduce forensic visibility. Consequently, patching the vulnerabilities used for initial access does not necessarily evict an existing infection. Its persistence depends on graceful restart behavior and can be interrupted by physically disconnecting all power. Detection relies heavily on memory analysis because the implant leaves limited useful logging evidence.
Associated vulnerabilities
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
This actor, DoNot, recently started using a new malware loader we're calling "Firestarter."
Cisco Talos zeigt in diesem Zusammenhang auf, dass der Akteur UAT-4356 die Angriffe auf Cisco Firepower-Instanzen nach der Veröffentlichung des Patches im September fortgeführt hat. Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.
In April 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released a joint advisory on a newly identified backdoor named “FIRESTARTER,” deployed by the state-linked APT group UAT-4356 targeting Cisco Firepower devices.
Techniques & procedures
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Trusselaktører har i følge CISA og NCSC-UK sannsynligvis kompromittert enheter gjennom utnyttelse av sårbarhetene CVE-2025-20333 og CVE-2025-20362 før sikkerhetsoppdatering
We believe the propagation is most likely done via direct messages luring the victims to install the malware.
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
Once the file arrives, the malware will import the classes from the payload, and being now able to start the malicious service... Once the payload is on the victim device, the loader will load the classes and start the malicious service.
Key Characteristics Written to operate inside the LINA process, a core Cisco firewall component Executes attacker-supplied shellcode directly in memory
Breaches of the VPN web server software, including flaws that allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a compromised device...
FIRESTARTER is a Linux ELF binary that inserts hooks into the LINA (Linux-based Integrated Network Architecture) process... The hook replaces a legitimate WebVPN XML handler function with the address of a malicious Stage 2 shellcode.
Persistence
9 techniques
Persistence
To establish a foothold, UAT-4356 manipulates the device’s boot sequence by altering the Cisco Service Platform mount list.
CISA said Firestarter was especially sophisticated in that it maintained persistent access to compromised networking devices even after they were updated, allowing attackers to re-enter victims' networks without needing to exploit any new vulnerabilities.
When an attacker sends a specially crafted WebVPN authentication request containing a specific “magic packet” pattern, arbitrary shellcode is executed within the LINA process.
Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.
A Linux ELF binary, FIRESTARTER can set up persistence on the device, and survive firmware updates and device reboots unless a hard power cycle occurs ... it also shares some level of overlap with a previously documented bootkit referred to as RayInitiator.
Upon successful verification of identification, the next stage of the malware is loaded by copying it into LINA’s memory and invoking mprotect to enable execution of the newly injected code [T1543].
It then registers a callback function that triggers when the program receives any of the following termination-related signals [T1546.004].
If the device is rebooted, the loader will automatically check for the presence of the payload on the device, and load it if present.
This shellcode is triggered by a specially crafted WebVPN request, which, after validating a hardcoded identifier, loads and executes attacker-supplied payloads directly in memory.
Privilege Escalation
7 techniques
Privilege Escalation
To establish a foothold, UAT-4356 manipulates the device’s boot sequence by altering the Cisco Service Platform mount list.
The malware injects a block of shellcode 0x200 bytes before the end of the library’s text segment, installing the detour for the XML element handler [T1055].
Cisco Talos zeigt in diesem Zusammenhang auf, dass der Akteur UAT-4356 die Angriffe auf Cisco Firepower-Instanzen nach der Veröffentlichung des Patches im September fortgeführt hat. Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.
CISA said Firestarter was especially sophisticated in that it maintained persistent access to compromised networking devices even after they were updated, allowing attackers to re-enter victims' networks without needing to exploit any new vulnerabilities.
Upon successful verification of identification, the next stage of the malware is loaded by copying it into LINA’s memory and invoking mprotect to enable execution of the newly injected code [T1543].
It then registers a callback function that triggers when the program receives any of the following termination-related signals [T1546.004].
If the device is rebooted, the loader will automatically check for the presence of the payload on the device, and load it if present.
Stealth
12 techniques
Stealth
TA0005 – Defense Evasion: Operating as fileless malware, restoring modified configurations after execution, and blending malicious activity into legitimate firewall and VPN request handling.
The first execution of the loader provides a lure to make the victim believe that there was no malicious install. Once the message of uninstallation is shown, the icon is removed from the user interface... If the user checks the permissions, it can see that they exist but with the name "System Service," which is made to deceive the user into thinking that it's seeing system related permissions and not the application permissions.
Upon execution, FIRESTARTER accesses its own binary located at /usr/bin/lina_cs on the device [T1036.005] and copies its contents into memory.
The malware injects a block of shellcode 0x200 bytes before the end of the library’s text segment, installing the detour for the XML element handler [T1055].
After the reboot, it restores the original mount list and removes related files from disk to erase traces.
These commands delete the modified CSP_MOUNT_LIST file [T1070.004] restoring the original CSP_MOUNT_LIST.
Execute permissions are granted to any user, the owner and timestamp are set to match the original [T1070.006], and the temporary file is then deleted.
When an attacker sends a specially crafted WebVPN authentication request containing a specific “magic packet” pattern, arbitrary shellcode is executed within the LINA process.
A Linux ELF binary, FIRESTARTER can set up persistence on the device, and survive firmware updates and device reboots unless a hard power cycle occurs ... it also shares some level of overlap with a previously documented bootkit referred to as RayInitiator.
Once the message of uninstallation is shown, the icon is removed from the user interface. The only way to detect the application is by checking the application list.
FIRESTARTER is a Linux ELF binary that inserts hooks into the LINA (Linux-based Integrated Network Architecture) process... The hook replaces a legitimate WebVPN XML handler function with the address of a malicious Stage 2 shellcode.
This is done through a mechanism in which Firestarter hooks into LINA by modifying an XML handler and injecting shellcode into memory, creating a controlled execution path.
Defense Impairment
3 techniques
Defense Impairment
If absent, it creates the directory with full read/write/execute permissions [T1222].
This shellcode is triggered by a specially crafted WebVPN request, which, after validating a hardcoded identifier, loads and executes attacker-supplied payloads directly in memory.
og har unngått sikkerhetsoppdateringer ... og har omgått påfølgende sikkerhetsoppdateringer fra Cisco på disse sårbarhetene
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
This shellcode is triggered by a specially crafted WebVPN request, which, after validating a hardcoded identifier, loads and executes attacker-supplied payloads directly in memory.
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
The process enumerates LINA’s virtual memory map to locate the private read-write (rw-p) segment associated with lina [T1057].
It will send information regarding the victim's identity and geolocation, both crucial for the next steps the operators will perform. After getting the Google FMC token (Step 1) the operators have everything they need to send the Google FMC message containing the URL for the malware to download the payload. They also have the geographic location, IP address, IMEI and email address from the victims, allowing them to decide which victims should receive the payload.
It will send information regarding the victim's identity and geolocation, both crucial for the next steps the operators will perform.
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
DoNot is now leveraging Google Firebase Cloud Messaging (Google FCM) as a mandatory communication channel with the malware. This communication channel is encrypted and mixed among other communications performed by Android Operating System with the Google infrastructure...
FIRESTARTER then actively intercepts incoming WebVPN requests. If an incoming request matches a specific custom prefix, the malware immediately executes the attached shellcode. If the data lacks the required prefix, FIRESTARTER quietly forwards the request to the original handler to evade suspicion.
When the malware receives a message from Google FMC, it checks if it contains a key called "link." If that exists, it will check if it starts with "https," if everything checks out, it will use the link to download the payload from a hosting server. Once the file arrives, the malware will import the classes from the payload...
When an attacker sends a specially crafted WebVPN authentication request containing a specific “magic packet” pattern, arbitrary shellcode is executed within the LINA process.
skadevaren er en persistent bakdør som ved vellykket kompromittering tillater vedvarende fjerntilgang til systemet
The newly discovered Firestarter malware uses Google Firebase Cloud Messaging to notify its authors of the final payload location. Even if the command and control (C2) is taken down, the DoNot team can still redirect the malware to another C2 using Google infrastructure.
Observables
25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
32 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.