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Malware3 associated actors3 associated CVEs

FIRESTARTER

Tracked since Apr 23, 2026 · Updated 4 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns3Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs25Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
Exploit kit
Platforms
LinuxNetwork device

FIRESTARTER is a Linux ELF backdoor targeting Cisco Firepower and Secure Firewall appliances running Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) or Firepower Threat Defense (FTD) software. Associated with the espionage-focused threat actor UAT-4356, previously linked to the ArcaneDoor campaign, it provides persistent remote access and enables execution of attacker-supplied shellcode. It has been confirmed on a Cisco Firepower appliance at a U.S. Federal Civilian Executive Branch agency. Deployment follows compromise of exposed Cisco devices through exploitation of CVE-2025-20333 and CVE-2025-20362.

FIRESTARTER injects shellcode into LINA, Cisco’s core network-processing and security engine, and replaces a legitimate WebVPN XML request handler with a malicious hook. Specially crafted requests containing installation-specific markers and a victim-specific identifier trigger execution of additional payloads in memory. Requests that do not match the trigger are passed to the legitimate handler, preserving normal operation. In observed intrusions, FIRESTARTER maintained access alongside LINE VIPER and supported subsequent payload deployment.

The backdoor survives firmware updates and normal reboots through termination-signal handling and manipulation of Cisco Service Platform startup configuration. During graceful shutdown or reboot, it saves a copy of itself and arranges execution after restart. It subsequently restores configuration, removes temporary artifacts, and alters timestamps to reduce forensic visibility. Consequently, patching the vulnerabilities used for initial access does not necessarily evict an existing infection. Its persistence depends on graceful restart behavior and can be interrupted by physically disconnecting all power. Detection relies heavily on memory analysis because the implant leaves limited useful logging evidence.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-20333via bsi product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthenticated Root Code Execution in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerDie Verwundbarkeiten erhielten die Kennungen CVE-2025-20333 (CVSS: 9.9), CVE-2025-20362 (CVSS: 6.5) und CVE-2025-20363 (CVSS: 9.0). Mit den Advisories gab Cisco auch bekannt, dass die ersten beiden Schwachstellen bereits ausgenutzt werden ... Cisco Talos zeigt ... dass der Akteur UAT-4356 ... die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt [hat], um unauthorisierten Zugriff ... zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren. | Cisco Talos zeigt in diesem Zusammenhang auf, dass der Akteur UAT-4356 die Angriffe auf Cisco Firepower-Instanzen nach der Veröffentlichung des Patches im September fortgeführt hat. Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-20362via bsi product advisoriesExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Cisco ASA and FTD VPN Web ServerDie Verwundbarkeiten erhielten die Kennungen CVE-2025-20333 (CVSS: 9.9), CVE-2025-20362 (CVSS: 6.5) und CVE-2025-20363 (CVSS: 9.0). Mit den Advisories gab Cisco auch bekannt, dass die ersten beiden Schwachstellen bereits ausgenutzt werden ... Cisco Talos zeigt ... dass der Akteur UAT-4356 ... die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt [hat], um unauthorisierten Zugriff ... zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren. | Cisco Talos zeigt in diesem Zusammenhang auf, dass der Akteur UAT-4356 die Angriffe auf Cisco Firepower-Instanzen nach der Veröffentlichung des Patches im September fortgeführt hat. Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-30333via the record mediaRCE in Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) with VPN credentialsCISA said the unnamed department was infected with malware called “FIRESTARTER” that allowed the hackers to return to the Cisco device in March without re-exploiting the original vulnerabilities.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
DoNot

This actor, DoNot, recently started using a new malware loader we're calling "Firestarter."

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
UAT-4356

Cisco Talos zeigt in diesem Zusammenhang auf, dass der Akteur UAT-4356 die Angriffe auf Cisco Firepower-Instanzen nach der Veröffentlichung des Patches im September fortgeführt hat. Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.

via bsi product advisoriesbsi.bund.de
ArcaneDoor

In April 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) released a joint advisory on a newly identified backdoor named “FIRESTARTER,” deployed by the state-linked APT group UAT-4356 targeting Cisco Firepower devices.

via osint team blogosintteam.blog
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence17

Trusselaktører har i følge CISA og NCSC-UK sannsynligvis kompromittert enheter gjennom utnyttelse av sårbarhetene CVE-2025-20333 og CVE-2025-20362 før sikkerhetsoppdatering

T1566PhishingEvidence1

We believe the propagation is most likely done via direct messages luring the victims to install the malware.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence13

Once the file arrives, the malware will import the classes from the payload, and being now able to start the malicious service... Once the payload is on the victim device, the loader will load the classes and start the malicious service.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

Key Characteristics Written to operate inside the LINA process, a core Cisco firewall component Executes attacker-supplied shellcode directly in memory

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Breaches of the VPN web server software, including flaws that allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on a compromised device...

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence8

FIRESTARTER is a Linux ELF binary that inserts hooks into the LINA (Linux-based Integrated Network Architecture) process... The hook replaces a legitimate WebVPN XML handler function with the address of a malicious Stage 2 shellcode.

Persistence

9 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence5

To establish a foothold, UAT-4356 manipulates the device’s boot sequence by altering the Cisco Service Platform mount list.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

CISA said Firestarter was especially sophisticated in that it maintained persistent access to compromised networking devices even after they were updated, allowing attackers to re-enter victims' networks without needing to exploit any new vulnerabilities.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

When an attacker sends a specially crafted WebVPN authentication request containing a specific “magic packet” pattern, arbitrary shellcode is executed within the LINA process.

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence2

Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

A Linux ELF binary, FIRESTARTER can set up persistence on the device, and survive firmware updates and device reboots unless a hard power cycle occurs ... it also shares some level of overlap with a previously documented bootkit referred to as RayInitiator.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

Upon successful verification of identification, the next stage of the malware is loaded by copying it into LINA’s memory and invoking mprotect to enable execution of the newly injected code [T1543].

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence2

It then registers a callback function that triggers when the program receives any of the following termination-related signals [T1546.004].

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence9

If the device is rebooted, the loader will automatically check for the presence of the payload on the device, and load it if present.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

This shellcode is triggered by a specially crafted WebVPN request, which, after validating a hardcoded identifier, loads and executes attacker-supplied payloads directly in memory.

Privilege Escalation

7 techniques
T1037Boot or Logon Initialization ScriptsEvidence5

To establish a foothold, UAT-4356 manipulates the device’s boot sequence by altering the Cisco Service Platform mount list.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence7

The malware injects a block of shellcode 0x200 bytes before the end of the library’s text segment, installing the detour for the XML element handler [T1055].

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence5

Cisco Talos zeigt in diesem Zusammenhang auf, dass der Akteur UAT-4356 die Angriffe auf Cisco Firepower-Instanzen nach der Veröffentlichung des Patches im September fortgeführt hat. Dabei wurden die bereits bekannten Sicherheitslücken CVE-2025-20333 und CVE-2025-20362 genutzt, um unauthorisierten Zugriff auf den Geräten zu erlangen und die Backdoor FIRESTARTER zu installieren.

T1098Account ManipulationEvidence1

CISA said Firestarter was especially sophisticated in that it maintained persistent access to compromised networking devices even after they were updated, allowing attackers to re-enter victims' networks without needing to exploit any new vulnerabilities.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

Upon successful verification of identification, the next stage of the malware is loaded by copying it into LINA’s memory and invoking mprotect to enable execution of the newly injected code [T1543].

T1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationEvidence2

It then registers a callback function that triggers when the program receives any of the following termination-related signals [T1546.004].

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence9

If the device is rebooted, the loader will automatically check for the presence of the payload on the device, and load it if present.

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

TA0005 – Defense Evasion: Operating as fileless malware, restoring modified configurations after execution, and blending malicious activity into legitimate firewall and VPN request handling.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The first execution of the loader provides a lure to make the victim believe that there was no malicious install. Once the message of uninstallation is shown, the icon is removed from the user interface... If the user checks the permissions, it can see that they exist but with the name "System Service," which is made to deceive the user into thinking that it's seeing system related permissions and not the application permissions.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence2

Upon execution, FIRESTARTER accesses its own binary located at /usr/bin/lina_cs on the device [T1036.005] and copies its contents into memory.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence7

The malware injects a block of shellcode 0x200 bytes before the end of the library’s text segment, installing the detour for the XML element handler [T1055].

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3

After the reboot, it restores the original mount list and removes related files from disk to erase traces.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

These commands delete the modified CSP_MOUNT_LIST file [T1070.004] restoring the original CSP_MOUNT_LIST.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence2

Execute permissions are granted to any user, the owner and timestamp are set to match the original [T1070.006], and the temporary file is then deleted.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

When an attacker sends a specially crafted WebVPN authentication request containing a specific “magic packet” pattern, arbitrary shellcode is executed within the LINA process.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence1

A Linux ELF binary, FIRESTARTER can set up persistence on the device, and survive firmware updates and device reboots unless a hard power cycle occurs ... it also shares some level of overlap with a previously documented bootkit referred to as RayInitiator.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence3

Once the message of uninstallation is shown, the icon is removed from the user interface. The only way to detect the application is by checking the application list.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence8

FIRESTARTER is a Linux ELF binary that inserts hooks into the LINA (Linux-based Integrated Network Architecture) process... The hook replaces a legitimate WebVPN XML handler function with the address of a malicious Stage 2 shellcode.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

This is done through a mechanism in which Firestarter hooks into LINA by modifying an XML handler and injecting shellcode into memory, creating a controlled execution path.

Defense Impairment

3 techniques
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence3

If absent, it creates the directory with full read/write/execute permissions [T1222].

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

This shellcode is triggered by a specially crafted WebVPN request, which, after validating a hardcoded identifier, loads and executes attacker-supplied payloads directly in memory.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

og har unngått sikkerhetsoppdateringer ... og har omgått påfølgende sikkerhetsoppdateringer fra Cisco på disse sårbarhetene

Credential Access

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

This shellcode is triggered by a specially crafted WebVPN request, which, after validating a hardcoded identifier, loads and executes attacker-supplied payloads directly in memory.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

The process enumerates LINA’s virtual memory map to locate the private read-write (rw-p) segment associated with lina [T1057].

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

It will send information regarding the victim's identity and geolocation, both crucial for the next steps the operators will perform. After getting the Google FMC token (Step 1) the operators have everything they need to send the Google FMC message containing the URL for the malware to download the payload. They also have the geographic location, IP address, IMEI and email address from the victims, allowing them to decide which victims should receive the payload.

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

It will send information regarding the victim's identity and geolocation, both crucial for the next steps the operators will perform.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

DoNot is now leveraging Google Firebase Cloud Messaging (Google FCM) as a mandatory communication channel with the malware. This communication channel is encrypted and mixed among other communications performed by Android Operating System with the Google infrastructure...

T1090ProxyEvidence1

FIRESTARTER then actively intercepts incoming WebVPN requests. If an incoming request matches a specific custom prefix, the malware immediately executes the attached shellcode. If the data lacks the required prefix, FIRESTARTER quietly forwards the request to the original handler to evade suspicion.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

When the malware receives a message from Google FMC, it checks if it contains a key called "link." If that exists, it will check if it starts with "https," if everything checks out, it will use the link to download the payload from a hosting server. Once the file arrives, the malware will import the classes from the payload...

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence3

When an attacker sends a specially crafted WebVPN authentication request containing a specific “magic packet” pattern, arbitrary shellcode is executed within the LINA process.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence7

skadevaren er en persistent bakdør som ved vellykket kompromittering tillater vedvarende fjerntilgang til systemet

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

The newly discovered Firestarter malware uses Google Firebase Cloud Messaging to notify its authors of the final payload location. Even if the command and control (C2) is taken down, the DoNot team can still redirect the malware to another C2 using Google infrastructure.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching25Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.