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Malware2 associated actors

Sefirah

Tracked since May 9, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs1Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Silver Fox

Once the environment was prepped, a binary called “sefirah” dropped onto the machine. It’s written in Rust... The payload ran eight data collectors in parallel: Crypto wallets... Discord tokens... Developer credentials... Browser data... Screenshots... File search... Everything was bundled into a JSON package and sent to a command-and-control server

via thecybersecguruthecybersecguru.com
SwimSnake

Once the environment was prepped, a binary called “sefirah” dropped onto the machine. It’s written in Rust... The payload ran eight data collectors in parallel: Crypto wallets... Discord tokens... Developer credentials... Browser data... Screenshots... File search... Everything was bundled into a JSON package and sent to a command-and-control server

via thecybersecguruthecybersecguru.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

The repository had typosquatted OpenAI's legitimate Privacy Filter release, copied its model card nearly verbatim, and shipped a loader.py file that fetches and executes infostealer malware on Windows machines.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

A fake repository impersonating OpenAI’s Privacy Filter tool climbed to the top of Hugging Face’s trending list last week... Attackers cloned its documentation almost word-for-word, creating a mirror repository that looked credible enough to fool experienced developers at first glance.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

followed by the creation of a scheduled task dressed up as a Microsoft Edge update to lock in SYSTEM-level persistence.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The repository had typosquatted OpenAI's legitimate Privacy Filter release, copied its model card nearly verbatim, and shipped a loader.py file that fetches and executes infostealer malware on Windows machines.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The command, which is executed in an invisible window, downloads a batch file (start.bat) that performs privilege escalation, downloads the final payload (sefirah), adds it to Microsoft Defender's exclusions for it, and executes it.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The command, which is executed in an invisible window, downloads a batch file (start.bat) that performs privilege escalation, downloads the final payload (sefirah), adds it to Microsoft Defender's exclusions for it, and executes it.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Users who followed the repo’s setup instructions – cloning the project and running either start.bat on Windows or loader.py on Linux/macOS – kicked off a multi-stage infection chain.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

followed by the creation of a scheduled task dressed up as a Microsoft Edge update to lock in SYSTEM-level persistence.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

followed by the creation of a scheduled task dressed up as a Microsoft Edge update to lock in SYSTEM-level persistence.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

Next came a Windows UAC prompt to grab admin rights

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The ‘loader.py’ Python script included fake AI-related code to appear harmless, but in the background, it disabled SSL verification, decoded a base64 URL pointing to an external resource, and then fetched and executed a JSON payload containing a PowerShell command.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

HiddenLayer highlights the malware’s extensive anti-analysis features, which include checks for virtual machines, sandboxes, debuggers, and analysis tools, all with the purpose of evading analysis systems.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

To stay hidden, the malware added its own directories to Microsoft Defender’s exclusion list and disabled both AMSI and ETW

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

Browser data: Saved passwords, credit cards, cookies, and autofill data from Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave, and any other Chromium or Gecko-based browser on the machine.

T1552.004Private KeysEvidence1

Developer credentials: SSH keys, FTP credentials (with specific attention to FileZilla), and VPN configs.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Browser data: Saved passwords, credit cards, cookies, and autofill data from Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave...

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Discord tokens: Session tokens and local databases that can let attackers bypass MFA entirely.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

File search: A sweep for files containing words like “backup,” “seed,” “secret,” or “password.”

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

HiddenLayer highlights the malware’s extensive anti-analysis features, which include checks for virtual machines, sandboxes, debuggers, and analysis tools, all with the purpose of evading analysis systems.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

The payload ran eight data collectors in parallel... Crypto wallets... Developer credentials... Browser data... File search...

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

Screenshots: Multi-monitor captures to grab whatever was on screen at the time of infection.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Everything was bundled into a JSON package and sent to a command-and-control server

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

It then fetched an encoded payload from JSON Keeper, a public paste service used as a “dead drop”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

It then fetched an encoded payload from JSON Keeper, a public paste service used as a “dead drop”, a trick that let attackers swap out the malicious payload remotely without ever touching the Hugging Face repo again.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Everything was bundled into a JSON package and sent to a command-and-control server at recargapopular[.]com over encrypted channels.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching1Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.