Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
ClearFake fetches and executes base64 encoded and gzip compressed code... The initial smart contract delivers an obfuscated JavaScript payload... Both SharkStealer and ArechClient2 use AES decryption with a hardcoded key... LoaderOnNet... uses ChaCha20Poly1305 encryption for both data exchange with the C2 server and the data pulled from the smart contract.
ArechClient2 has been using the Binance Smart Chain (BSC) to fetch C2 servers (a technique known as EtherHiding) since at least June 2025... In the past, a single API endpoint hxxps[:]//bsc-dataseed1[.]binance[.]org was used for this, but in this new sample we see requests to 10 different API (sub)domains.
Threat actors store data (for example C2 configuration) or code on a public blockchain... they can access it through a legitimate API endpoint... SharkStealer and ArechClient2... pull their C2 configuration from a smart contract... ZigCryptoStealer... uses smart contracts to receive their C2 configuration.
22 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Mentioned only as a comparison for similar blockchain-based command infrastructure techniques.
Mentioned only for broader context as another stealer using blockchain-backed C2 techniques.
An infostealer that uses the BNB Smart Chain Testnet for command-and-control or delivery in order to evade reputation monitoring on the main network.
A stealer that uses EtherHiding to retrieve C2 configuration from a smart contract on BNB Smart Chain, using AES decryption with a hardcoded key.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.