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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

Mofu Loader

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For your environment

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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Ratel Master

Overview Mofu Loader ... 2nd Stage (in-memory PE loader) ... RatelSで使用されたローダと類似のローダを発見

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
GroundPeony

Overview Mofu Loader ... 2nd Stage (in-memory PE loader) ... RatelSで使用されたローダと類似のローダを発見

via jsac jpcertjsac.jpcert.or.jp
Salt Typhoon

The second wave, on the other hand, took place nearly a month after the initial intrusion, with the adversary attempting to unsuccessfully employ DLL side-loading to drop TernDoor by means of Mofu Loader, a shellcode loader previously attributed to GroundPeony.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The 'Mofu Loader in VT' slide shows the SlyMongo chain with 'Inject explore.exe'.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Slides on '2nd Stage PE Loader (Mofu Loader)' state 'API Hashingのアルゴリズム(ror 12)と利用するAPIが同じ' and compare GroundPeony and RatelS loaders.

T1027.015CompressionEvidence1

The payload comparison slide states 'カスタムXOR + LZNT1で展開される2ndペイロード' for GroundPeony and RatelS.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The 'Mofu Loader in VT' slide shows the SlyMongo chain with 'Inject explore.exe'.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping... T1140 Deobfuscate / Decode Files or Information RC4, AES-CBC, LZNT1, and Deflate decryption/decompression of Deed RAT components and plugins.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The presentation labels Mofu Loader and Dracu Loader as '2nd Stage (in-memory PE loader)' and 'simple in-memory PE Loader', noting that shellcode decrypts and executes embedded PE payloads directly in memory.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Slides describe 'カスタムXORのアルゴリズムが同じ ○ sub + xor + add' and 'Custom xor + LZNT1' used to unpack second-stage payloads, with PE magic values removed.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.