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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Overview Mofu Loader ... 1st Stage (shellcode loader) ... 2nd Stage (in-memory PE loader) ... Investigation of Mofu Loader on VT confirms that an account (d03b8b03) has uploaded multiple Mofu Loaders from CN and HK
Overview Mofu Loader ... 2nd Stage (in-memory PE loader) ... RatelSで使用されたローダと類似のローダを発見
The second wave, on the other hand, took place nearly a month after the initial intrusion, with the adversary attempting to unsuccessfully employ DLL side-loading to drop TernDoor by means of Mofu Loader, a shellcode loader previously attributed to GroundPeony.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Slides on '2nd Stage PE Loader (Mofu Loader)' state 'API Hashingのアルゴリズム(ror 12)と利用するAPIが同じ' and compare GroundPeony and RatelS loaders.
The payload comparison slide states 'カスタムXOR + LZNT1で展開される2ndペイロード' for GroundPeony and RatelS.
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A shellcode loader used in an attempted DLL side-loading chain to deploy TernDoor; the article notes it was previously attributed to GroundPeony.
An in-memory PE loader used as a second-stage component across multiple intrusion sets. It decrypts embedded payloads such as micDown, RatelS, and SlyMongo, using techniques including RC4 or a custom XOR plus LZNT1 decompression. The presentation highlights shared API hashing and decryption logic across campaigns.
A multi-stage loader framework consisting of a shellcode loader and an in-memory PE loader. It is used to decrypt and launch payloads including RatelS and SlyMongo, and is described as shared across multiple incidents and actors.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.