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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Linux-based botnet first reported in 2020. In this content it is referenced because a 2025 OrBit campaign used a dropper architecture identical to one linked to RHOMBUS and shared C2-related infrastructure.
Linux botnet malware and installer/dropper used for persistence, second-stage payload delivery, and DDoS activity. The article notes architectural overlap between a 2025 OrBit infector/dropper chain and a historical RHOMBUS dropper.
Ransomware family linked through static analysis artifacts found in the Hadooken binary, but not deployed in the observed intrusion.
A previously observed Gafgyt-related malware/variant with a dropper and crontab persistence that the author assesses as a likely evolutionary predecessor to vbot1.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.