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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
С ноября 2025 года для доставки ABCDoor злоумышленники стали использовать JavaScript-загрузчик... run_direct.ps1 проверял наличие NodeJS... затем он запускал файл run.deobfuscated.obf.js.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Legitimate signed JavaScript runtime weaponized as a trusted proxy execution and malware-launching mechanism. Attackers execute malicious JavaScript through node.exe, establish Run-key persistence, and evade security controls that trust the signed developer tool.
JavaScript-based loader chain relying on Node.js to download, unpack, and launch the ABCDoor appclient package. Used as a delivery mechanism for ABCDoor from late 2025.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.